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YOUTH SURVEY CONDUCTED BY ALEXANDRIA UNIVERSITY

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 5 Sep 80 p 15

[Article by Mahmud Murad: "A Field Survey, Embracing 10,000 Young People, Undertaken by Alexandria University Concerning 'Our Youth, Growth and Future'"]

[Text] The problem is that our young people are worried, do not realize how intelligent they are and are confused when it comes to choosing their future.

All of the opinions heard express the demand that our youth play a role which contributes toward solving problems and working toward development.

Of those young people surveyed, 43 percent prefer to work in the private sector and 23 percent prefer the government sector. The remainder are only concerned with income!

This study was prepared by Alexandria University and falls within the framework of a series of research studies conducted by it concerning the makeup of the Egyptian people. The subject of this study is "Egyptian youth in the framework of social and economic growth." The study has five principal parts: the academic introduction to the study of the circumstances which our young people live in, their problems and the philosophy of their orientation; the points of view of Egyptian young people, and the positions which they take with regard to issues concerning the development of our society; points of view with regard to religion among Egyptian young people; political participation among our youth; and how our young people relate to the informational media. This is then followed by the study's general results and recommendations. The university clearly made an effort to make a scientific and objective analysis, and to view our traditional problems in an untraditional manner. One of the most important parts of the study is that which deals with the results of the field survey which was conducted by the University of Alexandria. The survey embraced 10,000 young people from both sexes and from various groupings whose ages ranged from 18 to 30. The questions attempted to elicit from each young person his or her opinions, ideas and attitudes towards issues which concern society, development and other problems such as attitudes toward religion, relationship to parents and the degree of interest in participating in public life. The questions were vital, and the answers to all of the questions were genuine and sincere. They reveal the hidden resources of our Egyptian youth and affirm our young people's desire to be self-reliant, to acquire knowledge and to embark upon all the tasks which are faced by our society, assuming their role and responsibilities. The important thing is that this role be defined and that our young people be granted the opportunity to utilize their potential so that it is not wasted!

I

The future does not begin in a vacuum, but rather is born from the womb of the present. The present is not something which is uprooted, but rather is born from the past. Real, true human values are the result of the labor pains of all of mankind's historical experience, that is, the past, the present and the future.

A person must fully realize this so that he can start out on the path of pursuing a positive life. He must realize this so that he does not stumble into the labyrinths of a daze, commit deeds which are rash or stupid, destroy his own happiness and stiffle his dreams himself!

Human values, that is, the values of any human being, are the objective of every serious study. Young people, in particular, are the subject of worldwide concern because they represent a distinct social group in the fabric of society and are thus the object of concern, to an equal degree, in both the advanced and the developing countries. This is in spite of the difference in their methods of dealing with youth-related problems and the difference in variety of problems which are dictated by their variety of political, economic and social circumstances. This concern increased following the May 1968 revolution which broke out in Paris and which came out with the motto: "The bourgeois revolution is a legal revolution, and the proletariat revolution is an economic revolution. But our revolution is a cultural and psychological revolution." These words may be simple, but they profoundly express the needs of young people who constitute one of the main groups of society. This revolution extended to all countries, in spite of their various doctrines and regimes. The result has been that "the world of today" has been forced to confront--calling upon the resources of its experts--one of today's major tasks which is that of aiding our young people to discover their role in the world in which they live, and to carry out this role of theirs as ably and as effectively as possible. This has created the need for a theory which is appropriate for providing orientation for our youth in society, in conjunction with a scientific program requiring numerous studies which embrace all social realms and which take into consideration how our young people view the future and what their views and concepts are about what is going on in our society.

It should be pointed out that partial solutions which deal with problems of a given moment are of no use because they do not take into consideration the trend of comprehensive social change. Modern man has become conscious of the fact that he is an integral member of a complete social entity. International politics is doing its part toward consolidating the conviction held by individuals that their own personal fate is organically linked to that of the society in which they live and to the logic which dominates how this society develops and how it solves its problems! For example, ideology is one of the principal instruments which help man to be in conformity with his surrounding environment and which help him to grow within the framework of his society. Ideology acquires a decisive role in providing guidance for society's individuals and it is an expression of one of the motives which are behind the process of development. For this reason, the lack of ideological programs for the future is the basic reason for the existence of what is known as the pragmatic trend in politics, that is, the trend which is controlled by neither reason nor logic, but rather by fanaticism, private interests and exploitation! This, in general terms, is the attitude of modern man and of the youth of "the world today." The youth of Egypt is not isolated from this worldwide youth movement.

Therefore, it is necessary to continue to conduct people, in order to discover the problems of our young people, to know what their needs, points of view and abilities are and to know what it is that is preventing them from freeing themselves from problems such as:

A. Problems connected with fulfilling their basic needs such as food, housing, transportation and health services.

B. The gap between their school curricula and their daily life, and the lack of connection between their education and growth and development.

C. The feeling of our university youth that the universities are merely dispensing quantities of information out to them, are not carrying out their "third function," which is that of guiding and educating the students, and are content to give classes and conduct research.

D. There is a type of intellectual and ideological vacuum felt by our young people as a result of the fact that they do not have a clear position in society, are weak in their political allegiance, and are not participating in the struggle for social change in Egypt.

E. Our young people are worried and perplexed because they do not know their own true inclinations, do not know how intelligent they are and do not know how to choose a future for themselves!

F. They are preoccupied with the conflicts between inherited traditional concepts and the new concepts which are supported by the development of science.

Many factors control the path which is taken by our young people in Egypt. But if one wants to delve into the minds of our young people and come close to finding out what their essence is, then it is necessary to conduct a field study by means of which our young people, themselves, can give answers concerning what they want, what they are thinking about, how they see the status quo and what their dreams are.

II

The study which the University of Alexandria conducted embraced 10,000 young people from all of Egypt's provinces with the exception of the provinces of Cairo and Marsa Matruh. People from all groups were represented. Sixty-five percent of them were peasant farmers, 25 percent of them were students and 15 percent were workers, professional people, craftsmen, administrative employees and housewives. Both sexes were represented. In fact, 7,372 of them were male and 2,595 of them were female. Their ages ranged between 18 and 30. Following analysis of the results of the study, certain important facts became clear.

Viewpoints Concerning the Economy

The results of the study say that 3.96 percent of our young people are unable to define what the most important economic problems are in our society. This is considered to be a very small percentage, and expresses the depth and intensity of the economic problems which are afflicting our nation's various groups of people. The most prominent problem is that of "limited income" and how it affects the various facets of life. At the same time, there is the problem of "the rise in prices." Although all of the groups surveyed pointed out this problem, it was the peasants who felt hardest hit by it!

The study also revealed how our young people feel concerning employment opportunities. They were asked whether or not such opportunities were abundant, limited or non-existent. Opinions were equally divided concerning whether or not employment opportunities are limited, and only 17.31 percent answered that "there are no opportunities." The viewpoints varied according to where the young people were from. Whereas only 12.23 percent of the young people from Alexandria said that employment existed, the percentage of young people saying that employment opportunities existed was 30.95 percent in the case of Suez, 36.26 percent in al-Buhayrah, 40.41 percent in Qina, 42.24 percent in al-Minufiyah, 43.49 percent in Kafr al-Shaykh, 45.25 percent in al-Sharqiyah, 48.19 percent in Bani Suwayf and 56.95 percent in Sawhaj. Another question concerned whether or not it was still regarded as desirable to work in government service because of the steady income and prestige which it provides. The response was that 43.06 percent preferred the free professions and private enterprise, as opposed to 23.75 percent who preferred working for the government. And 13.12 percent said that they would take any job, as long as the job gave them a higher income!

In this case, what are young people doing in order to gain a higher income for themselves?

In response, 29.94 percent said "we are working in our spare time, in our field of specialization;" 16.86 percent said "we are participating in private enterprises;" 27.62 percent said "we are working during our spare time, and in another field of specialization when necessary;" 13.3 percent said "we are being trained in a trade or manual labor job;" and 12.64 percent said "we are going to go to another Arab country or to a foreign country!"

The desire to improve their income is a result of the fact that income is not keeping pace with the rise in prices. This is the very thing which makes our young people believe that the future which is before them will be clouded with economic problems. According to 49.92 percent of them, this will be because of low salaries; 37.83 percent of them say that this will be because of the rise in cost of living; and 32.08 percent say that this will be due to lack of employment opportunities.

Viewpoints Concerning Education

A. Does out educational system perform its function of educating generations of people to possess awareness? In answer to this question, 49.75 percent said "yes," and 31.54 percent said "no." The remaining answers were in between "yes" and "no." Our young people are expressing the viewpoint that our educational system does not create within them a feeling of responsibility toward themselves and toward society so that they will participate in the process of building society.

B. Does our educational system contribute toward the growth of political awareness on the part of our youth? Of those asked, 36.92 percent said that it does, whereas the majority said that it does not. This brings up an important issue. One of the most important causes of the intense problems which the application of socialism has had to face in Egypt is the fact that our people have a low level of political awareness. Stated more precisely, many of the functional obstacles which have limited the effectiveness of the application of socialism in Egypt are due to the fact that our prevailing cultural and intellectual climate was not prepared for the acceptance of this type of approach. In addition to this, there is a lack of existence of an educational policy which creates political awareness among our youth.

Viewpoints Concerning University Education and Our Youth's Cultural Level

The survey has revealed the fact that Egyptian families, both in the rural areas and in towns, insist on having their young people obtain either a university or some other form of higher education since this degree of education is linked to the social status of the graduating students. This response was given by 83.03 percent of those surveyed. The study also revealed that the greatest preference expressed in terms of type of education was that which prepared a person to become a doctor, an engineer, a scientist and in general to work in fields of technical specialization. The next highest fields, in terms of preference, were those of business and economics, and the fields least preferred were those of liberal arts, law and social studies. This, of course, is a result of the growing importance of the specializations which were first mentioned above, and this is due to the spread of industry and growth in size of our cities in addition to the fact that jobs in these professions involve higher income.

In this realm, the study also clearly indicated that 35.27 percent of our young people prefer white-collar jobs, whereas 29.14 percent of them prefer manual labor. And 34.36 percent of them said that they did not prefer one to the other. The significance of this is that although our young people do prefer white-collar work, nevertheless manual labor jobs are beginning to interest them. This is, of course, linked to the fact of changes in social and economic circumstances and the fact that many Egyptian laborers have gone abroad to work, such that pursuing manual labor has become economically more profitable.

Viewpoints Concerning the Problems of Illiteracy, Population Increase and Family Planning

A. The Problem of Illiteracy

It has turned out that 84.98 percent of our young people are aware of the extent of the seriousness of the illiteracy problem in Egypt, and 86.26 percent of them are demanding to assume a role in being responsible for, and participating in, eliminating this illiteracy. This indicates, on the one hand, how aware our young people are of this, and it also demonstrates that it is possible to utilize their efforts in solving this problem.

B. The Population Increase Problem

The study says: "In spite of the fact that we are aware of the importance and seriousness of the problem of population increase in Egypt, nevertheless we should revise our thinking concerning this population increase in light of the theoretical, scientific and analytical concepts which enable us to achieve a correct awareness of this issue. There exists a theory which inclines toward exaggerating the gravity of the increase in population and considering population growth to be the basic obstacle to Egypt's growth process. But whoever says this is really attempting to mislead our awareness concerning the population problem. The fact is that historical evidence does not bear this out. Consequently, this trend of thinking uses the issue of population growth as an easy excuse to separate questions of growth from questions of social, political and economic change. Thus the essence of the problem becomes a matter of how to transform this population increase into something which can be put to work for us. In other words, how can we utilize the increase in population, as human resources, to promote the development of our country?" What do our young people have to say about this problem? The survey shows that 83 percent of them say that it is a serious problem, and 9.26 percent of them do not consider that it is a problem at all!

As for what they consider to be solutions to the problem, their suggestions varied and included birth control (61.68 percent), opening up desert areas and building new cities (20.43 percent), raising the minimum age for marriage (13.46 percent), and making education available for more people (11.77 percent). Our young people also emphasize that they have a role to play in solving this problem by serving as an example to others (39.51 percent) or by taking upon themselves the responsibility of increasing the awareness of others concerning this problem (37.98 percent).

The study comments on these opinions, saying that our young people's perception of the nature of the problem, on the basis that it is linked to family planning, reveals their lack of understanding of the constructive relationship between population growth in Egypt and the nature of our society's economic and social structure as well as our country's foreign relations. It is a known fact that family planning alone cannot constitute an appropriate strategy for dealing with the problem of population growth. Family planning programs must be within the framework of a comprehensive plan for social, economic and political change which considers the increase in population as a human resource to be utilized and channeled for the sake of the country's growth. Apparently, our young people's lack of perception concerning this matter is basically due to the unorganized and misguided approach followed by the family planning institutions which have misrepresented the essence of the problem. And at the same time, they have not been successful!

Women's Rights and the Status of Women

Concerning this question, most young people held an opinion which was very significant. Of those surveyed, 46.43 percent said that they are against women working, in spite of all of the economic pressure for them to do so—pressue which is especially felt by young people who are trying to build their new life. And 36.15 percent said that they agreed that women should be educated up to the university level, whereas 29.98 percent agreed that they should have some degree of education! And 32.5 percent rejected education for women! These results tell us that our young people agree that women should be educated in order that they assume their educational and child-rearing roles within the family. They feel that this is more beneficial and effective for society and for the country's growth than if women worked, because if women worked this would bring on new burdens. This is consistent with the fact that our young people agree that women should be granted political rights and that it should be illegal to have more than one wife. But they think that a man's freedom to divorce his wife should not be restricted!

III

Religious faith is one of the most important factors which influence the life and actions of our young people as well as their view of all of the people and the world around them. It is the most important of the authentic Egyptian values which stem from a belief in the heavenly prophecies. It is the focus of concern of those who are engaged in guiding our youth and in setting up programs for orienting our young people. What then is the status of religion?

Praying Regularly

Of those surveyed, 63.65 percent said that they prayed regularly.

Going to Religious Services

A large percentage of young people, 60 percent, still do not regularly go to religious services. This indicates a lack of aware of the political, economic and social--in addition to spiritual--role which is undertaken by the mosque. It also indicates that our houses of worship are not able to attract young people by expanding their activities such as study groups, classes for intensifying religious awareness, clinics, etc.

Our Youth and Their Religious Upbringing

Do our young people adhere to the teachings of their religion, and how adequate and how profound is their religious upbringing?

Of those surveyed, 15.4 percent said that our young people do not at all adhere to their religious teachings. And 56.6 percent said that our young people adhere to these teachings to a certain degree. And 27.6 percent said that our young people do adhere to the teachings of their religion.

Also, 28.1 percent of those surveyed said that they seek guidance from men of religion when they are faced with difficult situations. And 32.2 percent of them said that they do not believe that there is any benefit in seeking advice from men of religion. Finally, 39.39 percent of them said that they do this from time to time, but that they do not do this as a regular part of their lives.

In addition, 66.6 percent said that they were in favor of applying Islamic religious law in all matters concerning our society, whereas 6.7 percent felt that Islamic religious law should be applied only in the realm of religious worship and religious obligations.

Furthermore, 66.4 percent were in favor of women being required to dress in a way which is in conformity with the teachings of religion, whereas 30.1 percent of our young people felt that these were personal matters which no one should interfere with.

IV

Human beings have a value. Their value is in the role which they play. The most important and critical role which a person plays is the one which he engages in concerning the political life of his society. In fact, there is no meaning to a person's existence if he does not participate in his society. Such participation does not necessarily have to be direct political activity. It could be indirect participation by means of knowing what is going on, discussing what is going on, defining his role in society and in his society's development, and carrying out his function as a useful and productive person.

Do our young people follow political issues?

Of those surveyed, 76.06 percent said they they do do this. In fact, some of them (37.73 percent) said that they always closely follow political issues, and others (39.33 percent) said that they do follow political issues, but not regularly. These results indicate the desire felt by our young people to be involved in the events which they see taking place around them and to try to learn the facts and

information which help them to increase their political awareness and perception. When responding to questions concerning their sources of knowledge of news and information, 56.26 percent of them said their source was the radio, 41.56 percent of them said that they got their information from the daily newspapers, 38.74 percent of them said that their source was television and 5.89 percent of them got their information from talking to other people.

V

This study contains a special section which deals with informational media because of the vital, immediate and direct role which they play in the lives of people and, especially, young people. Their principal means of information is the press because of the magic effect of the press's printed word as well as the prestige which the press enjoys since people respect this printed word. This importance of the press was confirmed when we found out that 61 percent of our young people regularly read newspapers. And of those covered by this survey who said that they do not read the newspapers, the reasons given were that their ability to read was poor (37 percent), or they were not in the habit of reading (23 percent), or that they did not have time to read (20 percent). Ten percent of them said that they had no desire to read, and 7 percent of them said that they were too poor to buy newspapers or books!

Radio and Television

The results of this study indicate that 56 percent of our young people listen to the radio on a regular basis, 36 percent listen to the radio sometimes, 4 percent listen to the radio only rarely and 3 percent never listen to it at all! Concerning the type of programs that they listen to, we found that the majority of them (46 percent) were basically interested in religious programs. The next most popular type of programs were entertainment programs (35 percent). Both political and musical programs were interesting to 25 percent of them. And finally, 23 percent of them said that they listen to programs of a social nature.

Only 33 percent of the young people said that they listen to "Idha'at al-Shabab" [the Youth Radio], and most of these turned out to be from the less civilized provinces.

As for television, 13 percent said that they do not watch television at all. Other percentages of those surveyed said that they watch television when they have the opportunity. And among those who said that they do not watch television, 69 percent said that the reason for this is that their families have not purchased television sets, but 16 percent of them said that they do not have time to watch television and 5 percent of them said that they do not enjoy the programs.

Our Young People Need an "Example"!

In the concluding part of its study, the University of Alexandria made a series of recommendations concerning various realms. Among these recommendations there were those that concerned how our young people view Egypt's development. The recommendations demanded that more effort be expended to deal with Egypt's economic problem by means of constantly working toward achieving a balance between personal incomes and the constant rise in prices. It was also recommended that government agencies strive to provide support for values which promote production, saving, investment, respect for manual labor and expanding both our technical education and vocational

training. It was also recommended that our youth welfare organizations concern themselves with how our young people should be profitably spending their spare time. Also, mention was made of the necessity to revise our programs concerning [political] awareness and family planning, as well as the need to work, on the basis of well thought-out planning, toward intensifying our young people's feeling of belonging to their families and to Egyptian society. It was also recommended that a study be made of the phenomenon of internal and external migration in an effort to have our society not lose the young people on whom it spends so much for training and education. It was also recommended that new cities be set up on the basis of exact and scientific planning so that they would become a source of attraction rather than a place of exile!

Concerning the subject of political participation on the part of our young people, the recommendations called for the necessity to revise our educational system so that it would increase the capabilities of young Egyptians to engage in political participation and enable them to acquire the necessary special skills for this. This would include, for example, learning how to vote when choosing a class leader from among their student colleagues, expanding their scope of representation in the councils of the Federation of Students and Parents, etc. And this system should be included starting with the stage of elementary education all the way up to that of university education.

In addition to this, social agencies could effectively participate in increasing political participation among our youth, especially since the results of our study have shown that participation in projects to improve the environment was the most popular form of political participation which they engaged in. And it is necessary to allow our young people to participate in nation-wide projects such as the anti-illiteracy campaign, student-aid programs or cleanliness campaigns. These projects are among the most important public service projects that there are.

The Egyptian informational media, including all of their active agencies and institutions, should be part of a comprehensive national plan which creates the general framework, basic principles and objectives connected with this process. Their task should be that of planning, orientation and follow-up, whereas the operations of implementation and programming should be left to the branch and specialized organizations.

No effort or money should be wasted on the propagation of an idea which might be fundamentally false and mislead the masses. And as much as possible, there should be no discussion of a privileged minority and a minority which monopolizes everything. What is needed is the creation of positive heroes. The hero could be either a real or an imaginary person who is glorified by stories and novels, who represents contemporary man, and who becomes a source of inspiration for our millions of young people because of the example which he sets. Such a hero could be a worker, peasant, soldier or he could be an average educated person who distinguishes himself through his striving toward greatness and through his noble moral characteristics.

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DEVELOPMENT OF NEW CITIES IN EGYPT

Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI in Arabic 22 Sep 80 pp 26-30

[Article: "Development of New Communities in Egypt. Opportunities for Investment and Joint Enterprises"]

[Text] Egypt's total population was estimated to be only 2.4 million at the beginning of the 19th century. That figure quadrupled twice during the 19th century and once more in the last 75 years. It is estimated by the Egyptian Central Organization for Statistics and Mobilization that Egypt's population will be 66 million people in the year 2000. If we take the various hypothesis into consideration, the projected population by the end of this century will range between 60 and 70 million people. The rapid increase of population in Egypt, as in any of the developing countries, will sharply affect the economic development. The situation in Egypt will be even more acute due to the relative stability of the agricultural land and the absence of a resource plan for quite some time. In addition, no studies have been made of the potentials of the provinces or the discovery of new resources to accommodate new people. This shortage of new areas has created a serious increase in the population density of the Nile valley and the Delta (the population density increased from 845 people per a square kilometer in 1960 to 1042 people per square kilometer in 1975). This situation has made Egypt one of the most densely populated countries of the world.

The population growth in the rural areas increased at a rate that the agricultural sector could not absorb creating an imbalance between the land and the people. This imbalance led to a great increase in the trend of migration to the cities. It also led to fragmentation of agricultural property which made the situation worse due to the direction of the population shift from rural areas to urban ones.

As a result, the population in the cities increased at a faster rate than that which could be tolerated in the overall increase in population. This percentage is about 44 percent at the present time. The annual rate of population growth in the cities has now reached more than 4 percent on the average.

This tendency toward the highest degree of urbanization which prevails throughout most of the developing countries is expected to increase at a faster rate in the future. In any case, if the issue is not reconsidered, it could lead to the over population of the cities and create serious bottlenecks in housing and other city facilities. This would be reflected in serious economic and social problems which are not acceptable. Therefore, the mission of the Ministry of Reconstruction as determined by the economic, social and financial policies will provide basic facilities for any urban habitation center to conform with the efforts exerted to create an economic base and national industrialization.

Cities System: Modern Trends

The old factors affecting the Egyptian system of the cities and guiding its new stages are characterized by primitiveness or a distorted distribution of population in the cities. Most of the population is concentrated in Cairo and Alexandria.

The population of these two cities has increased steadily in relation to the total population. The increase reached 59 percent in 1975 while it was only 53 percent in 1960. It is noted that this trend of concentrating the population in the city of Cairo takes place gradually at the expense of smaller cities which are located in the heart of the agricultural land and the delta. In the past this trend led to a major unacceptable economic, social and political imbalance in the existing system in the cities.

In any case, the geographical distribution of cities is not only limited to Egypt, and it is not abnormal in regard to the stage of economic and social development. In fact, these changes are common and accompany the first stages of development and the transformation from an agricultural economy to a diversified economic framework on the national level.

Toward a Comprehensive Development Policy in the City. Plans and Programs

The Egyptian government pays special attention to the above mentioned problems and conditions that face the process of economic development in the city and the province. At the present time the ministry of Reconstruction is coordinating with government and private organizations to work out long-, medium- and short-range policies for developing the city and the province. These plans and programs are aimed at:

A- Bridging the difference between the urban and rural areas in all fields in order to avoid the negative effects of internal migration.

B- Developing a system of small- and medium-size cities so that the geographical distribution of the population will lead to the creation of better opportunities more flexible and efficient systems for work movement and creation of new sources for the workforce.

C- Changing the planning in the city on both national and regional levels by affecting the population density trends of the migration from the rural areas. This is true for Egypt in particular because the present system of cities is not based upon sizes which foster conformity between population, jobs and the economy. Actually, this system is characterized by a primitive framework which is imbalanced and cannot be corrected if it is not planned properly.

D- A tie must exist between urbanization, industrialization and agricultural indistrialization if we wish to achieve the transformational framework mentioned above, especially when we keep in mind that urbanization is an effective tool for social change. However, we should realize that the strength of this tool is a functional reflection not only on the degree of urbanization (the rate of growth of the city in relation to the total population) but also on its framework (the accurate planning of cities, their sizes and their population distribution). It is the time to insure the serious social content of urbanization which carries on in the face of progress by providing the investment necessary to create a new well developed system of urban planning. This type of urban planning will take the problems and conditions which confront the development process at the present time into consideration.

Major Projects and Programs of the Reconstruction Ministry to Be Carried Out in the Framework of the General Plan

1- The New Cities and the National Policy

As we mentioned earlier, the redistribution of population is an accepted policy of the government. It is recognized that the formation of new cities is considered an important link in this policy and that all of the recent actions taken by the government are taken in this direction.

It is obvious that in the last 6 years, the government has paid special attention to the creation of an administrative framework capable of handling the difficult and complicated task of assembling the expertise and resources required to successfully develop new cities in the land of Egypt. But the real test of the government's adherence to the goal of building new cities is represented by the ambitious program which was established after the 1973 war. As it was expected, the liberation of the east bank of the Suez Canal shifted the emphasis on building and planning from the densely populated Cairo zone to the canal zone cities which were totally or partially destroyed and evacuated during the war. The three major cities: Suez, Ismailia and Port Said were treated as newly created cities and were zoned on that basis. When the reconstruction work of those cities began and normal life resumed, the emphasis shifted again to the Cairo zone and the overpopulated areas of the valley. In an effort to deal with this problem, the work started in some of the new cities before work had begun in the Sadat City and the 10th of Ramadan City. This was seen as the first step toward shifting urban development to the desert provinces. The locations of the two cities were chosen to be at a mid-point on the road between Cairo and Alexandria respectively. It is easy to reach both cities, and their location is convenient for establishing new industries which will assure the economic development of the two cities.

The construction of two other new cities has begun. These two cities are: El-Ameriah Al-Jadidah, southwest of Alexandria, and the 15th of May, east to Helwan. Although the 15th of May was planned to absorb only 150,000 of the industrial workers, it is considered very important since it alleviates the government's concern of opening the way to future city development and new planned communities. The four new cities were designed to absorb 1,650,000 people up until the year 2000. This figure represents less than 10 percent of the population which the Five-Year plan to build new cities aims to absorb. The construction of a fifth new city, the 6th of October has recently begun. This city is located on the Oasis road which branches from the road leading to Fayoum 32 km to west Cairo. The aims for population of this city is set at 350,000 people. The main economic activities planned for this city are: tourism, light industry, medium industry and housing as shown in table No. 1. In other words, these five cities could be a beginning to what is to be considered the largest program for building up new cities which had been started in the forties by Britain during its occupation to Egypt. The suggestion under study now, to construct three new cities in the Cairo zone, is considered a new step on the road to making this program a reality. It also confirms the adherence of the government to the continuation of the establishment of a successful new cities policy which started in the early seventies.

The plans which were prepared to establish the first five cities reflect this important policy of the government. As table number one indicates, these cities were planned as cities and tourism and industrial communities. One city was

designed for housing the industrial workers who were already there, and the other three cities were designed so that at least 40 percent of their population will be industrial workers. In other words, those settlements were established to meet the needs of blue collar workers more than to meet the needs of professionals and white collar workers who were already in control of the new settlements in the Cairo zone. In reality this indicates recognition of the future trends and peculiar futures of population growth. These plans, as approved by the ministry, assure that basic changes will occur in the framework of the new urban communities. These changes are represented by the concern for less density of the population, which ranges between 35 people to 61 persons per acre in the city of 15th of May. Compare this to the average density of the population prevailing in the populated areas of greater Cairo; the average is 100 people per acre. It's noteworthy that the population density in the four big cities is low, while it is relatively high in the fifth one due to the difficulty of the natural terrain where that city is being constructed. Another important trend appears to be the allocation of large spaces to allow for good ventilation and open areas. These spaces range from 10 percent in the 10th of Ramadan City and 18 percent in the 15th of May City. In other words, it could be stated without hesitation that one of the main goals of the government's policy to establish new cities is to eliminate the over-crowding which characterizes both large and small cities in Egypt at the present time. The policy also aims at creating communities that have a natural environment more atuned to man's health needs.

There is another aspect of the government policy which is represented by an emphasis on the redistribution of economic activities. The first new cities had been planned to be industrial communities. It has also been taken into account that those cities would grow to become strong attraction centers for various economic activities. This aspect could be achieved through a set of factors. The main factor is that direct government business which require new firms in the new cities and that the quality of the environment be improved in these cities in order to attract industrial investors. Improving the environment in order to attract investors is considered an important factor if we realize that the government expects the private sector to play the major role in the industrialization of the new cities during the five-year plan 1978-1982. (see table No. 2)

In general, the experience acquired from developing the 10th of Ramadan City and the Sadat City indicates that the government gives top priority to the development of the economic base and the projects of the basic industrial framework in the new cities. This increases its effectiveness by attracting people to accept it as a place for permanent residence, as well as an area for employment. This also reflects, the serious commitment of the government to guarantee the success of its policy to develop new cities. As a result, the central government views the new cities as an important means to achieving the national goals. These goals can be summarized into three major categories:

1- Solving the housing problem.

2- Reducing the population density in the presently populated area which represents only 4 percent of the land, and creating new urban environments based on better standards.

3- Preserving the cultivable land against housing construction expansion.

B- The Complete Provincial Development Programs

1- The provincial plan for the west coast was prepared in 1976. This plan indicated great potential for development in this area. Therefore, the ministry has prepared a sub-plan for urban development in the area between the 34 kilometer and the 100 kilometer west of Alexandria.

2- The government intends to give up 10,000 hectars of the land which could be cultivated to provide a complete project for agricultural development in the Karkar (phonetic) valley in the High Dam Lake area in Aswan. It is west of Aswan City 35 to 40 km.

C- Development of the Ports

Based upon the recent studies of the development of the Egyptian ports which paid special attention to the reduction of the transportation costs, the agreement has been made to build a new major port in Damietta. According to the plan, its capacity would be million ton in 1985 which would increase to 16.5 million tons by the end of this century. This new port in Damietta is a part of general plan for social and economic development which will be reflected in many fields such as world trade, internal transportation, industrial development and the creation of new communities.

Summary

These projects and programs which are presently being carried out require a climate of international cooperation. There are many opportunities for investment by the private sector. These profitable opportunities are of mutual interest and should be evaluated from two angles:

--The social and economic side

and

--The opportunities that will be available in the long-run and the short term.

The ministries of Reconstruction, Housing, Land Reclamation and the New Communities Organization welcome the participation of the world and private investments in cooperation with both the Egyptian private and public sectors.

The Egyptian National Assembly enacted a new law last year which enables the government to provide the best conditions and terms for building and developing new communities all over Egypt.

Table 1

The New Cities - A Comparative Analysis

Statement	Sadat	Ramadan	AAmeria	May	October
Distance to the Nearest city(km)	95	58	50	4	32
Population	500,000	500,000	510,000	150,000	350,000
Industrial workers	36%	40%	40%	(1)	30%
Total area (hectar)	4,841	5,678	4,780	1,034	--
Total area (acre)	11,423	13,400	11,280	2,440	10,500
Housing facilities	25%	37%	31%	24%	26.7%
Utilities	27%	7%	27%	21%	(2)
Industry	21%	20%	14%	(1)	31%
Open areas	21%	10%	11%	18%	6.1%
Roads	13%	25%	8%	37%	17.3%
Tourism	--	--	--	--	17.8%
Population density (person/acre)	175	98	145	256	100
Total population Density	44	37	45	61	35

(1) The 15th of May City had been planned for industrial communities which are existent.

(2) Utilities are included in roads.

Table 2

Distribution of New Cities

Investments 1978-1982

Sector	Investment in thousand Egyptian pounds	% of Total	% for New Cities
Agriculture	5000	1.86	1.55
Irrigation	--	--	--
Industry	16,000	.86	4.97
Petroleum	--	--	--
Energy & Electricity	25,000	4.65	7.77
Transportation	50,000	3.75	15.55
Commerce	9,000	5.30	2.80
Housing	18600	14.56	25.37
Utilities	85000	14.03	26.44
Services	50000	7.56	15.55
Total	321600	4.82	100

Source: Ministry of Planning Five-Year Plan 1978-1982

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CORRELATION BETWEEN EDUCATION, ENVIRONMENT SEEN NECESSARY

Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI in Arabic 6 Oct 80 pp 14-17

[Article by Mahmud Murad: "Education Throws Off the Cloak of 'Holy War'"]

[Text] As we said in our last article, education in modern Egypt came into being under the cloak of holy war, inasmuch as the army needed specialized personnel for its branches. Then, in Muhammad 'Ali's time, it developed in compliance with the demands of the state, in accordance with his domestic and foreign ambitions. It suffered a relapse under 'Abbas and Sa'id after the 1840 London Treaty, which embodied the West's plot against Egypt aimed at making it powerless, a consumer market for Europe's products, and at the best a milk cow with her body in the Nile Valley and her udders over there beyond the sea. The setback, during which Rifa'ah al-Tahtawi and his colleagues and students were banished to the Sudan, continued until Isma'il came along and revived education. Then it really started moving with the beginning of the twentieth century, and flourished after the 23 July 1952 revolution, with its doors open to all segments of the population. Throughout this history, there have been 72 ministers and any number of philosophies, but nowadays the government is leading an educational revolution, having formed a "Committee for Direction and Supervision," chaired by the minister, and including representatives of political and popular organizations and a number of prominent personalities. It held its first meeting last week to discuss its plan of action for supervising and directing the recent development, actually begun this school year, aimed at getting education to effectively contribute to the formation of a democratic personality capable of sharing in decisionmaking, exercising its rights, producing and participating in the development plan.

But how will this come about? In plainer words, how do we transcend glittering words and beautiful poetry to arrive at action and implementation? How do we link education with the society, and with the real development of the man, the society and the state?

What immediately comes to mind upon hearing the words "linking education and development" is primary education, which basically makes the man, and then technical education, which qualifies him for certain specialties, especially in an age which requires this type and quality of specialization.

First: Basic Education

The system now in effect is a 6-year elementary study course. But educational experts elsewhere in the world speak of a combined, basic 9-year system, comprising what is known here as the elementary stage (6 years) and the preparatory stage (3 years). As Minister of State for Education and Scientific Research Dr Mustafa Kamal Hilmi says, Egypt decided on this system, the universalization of which throughout the Arab world was demanded at the 1977 Abu Dhabi conference of education ministers. The conference actually approved the proposal, and some states began applying it, except for Egypt, which saw its belated implementation and application in 650 schools on an experimental basis. At the same time, Egypt believes that this stage of education ought to be expanded as society progresses, and as the need to provide all the people with an essential degree of education increases.

The new thing about this stage, besides the universalization of the 6-year system, is the linkage of education with the local environment, whereby the student receives a certain amount of comportment training and knowledge in addition to the kinds of practical skills which correspond to the school's local environmental circumstances--agricultural, industrial, commercial, settled or nomadic. This additional element is intended to help form the good, productive citizen who, if he is content with this stage and does not complete the full course of education, will have acquired some of the keys to life by means of the education and comportment he acquired, as well as some practical skills which correspond to his environment and which qualify him for productive work contributing to the production development plan.

The boy or girl student will begin learning these practical skills from the fifth to the ninth grades; i.e. a period of 5 years will be enough to educate him or her. This is, in addition, to three important factors which I feel must be achieved:

1. The boy or girl student must be raised to respect manual or skilled labor of whatever type, and consequently its worth and its pursuit.

2. There must be no separation between what goes on in school and what goes on in the student's home or society. In fact, the family, particularly in rural areas and low-income quarters, must be made desirous of its children's education, since at the very least they will acquire from public education a profession which will help the father. This is much better than having the son pay to be an apprentice or the like!

3. When he grows up, assuming that he has completed his education to the highest grade, the student must not think himself above fixing things around the house, instead of resorting to a high-paid workman for every small or big thing.

4. With reference to this point, the minister of state for education and scientific research says, "Basic education is characteristically a flexible education, for it stresses the diversity of practical fields in accordance with the diversity of local milieus, while taking into consideration the firm connection between education and the activities needed to develop these milieus. Also, this education is functional in its philosophy, since it stresses concern for the application of everything the student studies, whereby the external environment, production sites, and the environment's resources become sources of knowledge, research, study, work and activity for most of the school subjects."

In order to achieve this, an urgent group of measures must be taken:

1. The existing curricula for elementary and preparatory education, both of which will be incorporated into the basic stage, must be immediately developed.

2. Existing preparatory schools must be expanded to accommodate all those moving up from the sixth to the seventh grade.

3. The existing 14,000 elementary school teachers, of which only 1 percent are university graduates, must be trained in two ways: (a) training existing teachers at study courses held at the colleges of education, the first class of which will include 40,000 teachers, or (b) changing existing teachers' institutes into branches, the graduates of which will enroll in the elementary education branches at colleges of education.

Thus existing teachers will be developed, and later on trained teachers will join the faculties. Dr Mustafa Kamal Hilmi stresses the splendid, admirable efforts which the men and women elementary school teachers have made and are making, be it in Egypt or the Arab world. They are the ones who are efficiently taking on the task of educating the children of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, Libya and elsewhere, and who are bearing the burden and responsibility of Arabization in Algeria.

This organization, or this new development, actually began at the start of this school year. As the minister says, it has been decided to carry it out gradually, completing it within 5 years.

Second: Technical Education

About 55.5 percent of all secondary students are taking technical secondary education--commercial, agricultural and industrial--i.e. an increase of 10 percent. But the new plan intends raising this percentage to more than 60 percent, so as to meet the needs of the development plan and the local market, as well as the foreign labor market, especially in the Arab countries and several African countries. The plan is also aimed at teaching about 90 specializations in technical education. As we learned from the education minister, however, the problem is that the ministry does not yet have a list of the real needs of the future--either the number of personnel needed or the specializations. But as a reply to this, I report what I heard from Deputy Prime Minister for Financial and Economic Affairs Dr 'Abd-al-Razzaq 'Abd-al-Majid, who said that the planning agencies are now almost finished with the first manpower budget in Egypt's history, outlining the manpower needs on all levels of 104 professions and specializations until the year 2000.

So there is concern on the part of educational authorities, and the requirements are on the way to being clarified.

More than that, development has actually begun, with the goal--as official documents say--of preparing a skilled labor group by means of the 3-year technical schools and a technician group by means of the 5-year technical schools, in the fields of trade, agriculture and industry.

According to experts, this type of education has expanded greatly during the last 10 years, and for the first time in Egyptian history it is accepting more students than are the general secondary schools. Along with the quantitative growth, the ministry has introduced 90 new specializations, as well as number of specialized professions, in addition to expanding the 5-year technical schools to prepare technicians in about 38 other specializations.

For the same purpose, the ministry is linking technical education with production and service organizations, which necessitates, firstly, developing technical education programs and providing the necessary equipment, workshops and tools, for which purpose a number of international agreements have been concluded, and, secondly, training the teachers to keep pace with the new curricula and to make them capable of teaching students according to modern technology. This training will be done through the technical education branches of the colleges of education.

After all this, development obviously has to occur, and it has actually done so in the general secondary stage. But we have concentrated on basic and technical education in order to link them directly to development, and to prepare manpower capable of working and producing according to environmental requirements and societal needs.

But there are other important factors in the educational revolution which relate directly to educational upbringing, methods of evaluation, and student drop-out rates. These factors can be outlined quickly as follows.

1. The student's educational upbringing: this is a cornerstone of the educational vocation, and all opinions agree that there is a need to adopt various curricula and activities which will deal with this situation, especially with respect to religious, moral and patriotic upbringing and the inculcation of democracy in the minds of the young people, in addition to providing other educational activities such as sports, social and artistic activities, food, health care, educational counseling and psychological guidance for the students.

For this purpose, beginning this year the schools will provide meals for about 3 million students, mostly in the countryside, in addition to all the students at teachers' institutes, secondary technical schools and military schools. It is hoped that the number of students receiving food can be increased, because of the effect this has on their abilities and performance, in addition to its contribution to building strong, healthy bodies.

Furthermore, comprehensive school health units will be established to diagnose and treat illnesses; the educational and health sectors will be jointly responsible for this. Also, a visiting nurse and a once-weekly visiting doctor system will be instituted, whereby the doctor will spend enough time in each school.

Experts feel that all kinds of other activities must be pursued, and that manpower and material resources must be made available for them.

2. Methods and systems for evaluation and examinations: studies conducted by educational research agencies indicate that the existing examination and evaluation systems are useless, since they do not give a correct, true picture of the students or their abilities. Therefore, a number of experiments are now being conducted to arrive at a better solution. It can be said that this solution will be implemented beginning this year, and will change the form and content of the examinations.

3. Student dropping out: the figures show that the efforts which have been made have led to a decrease in the elementary student drop-out rate from about 40 percent to 12 percent, but this figure is still too high. Therefore, there ought to be redoubled efforts to put an end to this phenomenon by dealing with its problems and eliminating its causes, so that no reason will be left for ignoring educational opportunities.

Although all this deals with government education, reference should be made to private education and its role. It has some positive aspects, in expanding and deepening knowledge and educated persons, and it has other, negative aspects represented by the dissemination of foreign trends and cultures at the expense of the national culture. As the minister said, it was thus until the 23 July 1952 revolution decided the matter once and for all; the constitution stressed that the state would supervise all education. Then the private education law of 1969 was issued, to get the foreign schools supervised by the ministry to follow the state's plans and curricula.

Buildings, Equipment and Educational Aids

In order to accommodate all students in the first stages of education, a great many new schools must be built, and existing schools need complete renovation of their buildings and facilities. In order to solve this problem, educational experts, in light of past experience, feel that the Educational Buildings Organization must be reestablished. This organization had existed earlier and was then abolished, its powers being given to local government agencies in the governorates, but the situation now calls for its reestablishment. It would have branches in the governorates, and its function would be to plan and construct school buildings and submit simplified models of such buildings, so as to standardize them and make them suitable, for the standpoint of required specifications, for educational purposes.

The minister of state for education has estimated that investments of about 710 million Egyptian pounds would be required for building and equipment works over the next 5 years, of which 250 million pounds would be for constructing and equipping 3,700 schools so as to eliminate the second shift in elementary education (there are 4,100 schools operating double shifts), and about 45 million pounds to construct and equip 400 schools to eliminate the second shift in preparatory education. This is in addition to 415 million pounds for education plan investments, including renovation, utilities, equipment and other necessities, especially for technical education.

The Education Budget

As Dr 'Abd-al-Razzaq 'Abd-al-Majid said, it had been estimated that this year's education budget would be 450 million pounds, or 5 percent of the national income. But he raised it to 700 million pounds after meeting with Dr Mustafa Kamal Hilmi.

Why was the budget increased? Because it had become clear that about 80 percent of the previously determined 450 million pound budget would go for salaries, wages and stipends, as stipulated in the first chapter of the education budget. Therefore, only 15 percent would remain for practical educational necessities and aids stipulated in chapter 2, and 5 percent for buildings and equipment stipulated in chapter 3.

For these reasons, the budget was raised to 700 million pounds, as the minister announced at the first meeting of the Director and Supervision Committee.

Administration, Data and Communications

Finally, all these measures ought to be carried out by a revolutionary educational administration, be it on the central, ministerial level or on the decentralized, local level, by which I mean the governorates. Perhaps for this reason, the ministry reached an agreement with Cairo University's administrative development center, headed by Dr 'Ali al-Salmi, for studying ways to develop the administrative systems and methods and eliminate red tape and bottlenecks.

It was decided to prepare training programs for employees of educational departments, or programs for selecting managers, along with developing work methods and using computers for planning, evaluations and programming.

A study is also now under way on establishing a data system which would permit releasing data from service centers and various executive levels to specialized ministerial agencies, so as to achieve easy, quick communications between the central administration in Cairo and the local governorate offices, especially after the expanded application of the local government system and the transfer of education to the State Ministry for Planning, Research and Follow-up, and the transfer of executive powers to the governorates.

The proposed system will be culminated with the establishment of a network of communications channels between the various centers and the ministry, achieving the desired goals.

With the same desire for democracy which he wants to plant in the soul of every student, Dr Mustafa Kamal Hilmi calls on everyone to assist this educational revolution, saying, "Hundreds of people in various fields and on various levels, all having experience and informed opinions, will join forces in a major, coordinated, ongoing national action based on clear visions of the future we are seeking, how we will achieve it, and the basic role of all aspects and levels of education in building the Egyptian man--the possessor and creator of this future."

Table I

Enrollment	1953-54	1969-70
Elementary Education	1.4 million	4.3 million
Preparatory Education	350,000	1.6 million
Total Secondary Education	135,000	990,000

Note: In 1969-70, 75 percent of all eligible Egyptian children between the ages of 6 and 12 were enrolled in elementary education. During the same period, only 55 percent of eligible 12 to 15 year olds were enrolled in preparatory schools. For the same period, only 40 percent of the eligible 16 to 18 year olds were enrolled in secondary education. This illustrates the high rate of dropping out and non-enrollment.

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REVOLUTIONARY GUARD LEADER DISCUSSES WAR WITH IRAQ

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 20 Nov 80 P 13

[Interview with Revolutionary Guard Leader Mohsen Reza'i by Walid Nuwayhid: "A Revolutionary Guard Commander Talks to AL-SAFIR. The Tasks of the Guard and the Army are Complementary; the Former Is Not a Substitute for the Latter"--The interview took place in Tehran, date not given]

/Text/ Mohsen Reza'i is one of the most prominent commanders of the Revolutionary Guard on whose shoulders lie the main tasks in the war underway between Iraq and Iran.

Reza'i was previously a leader of the six Islamic organizations which waged guerrilla war against the Shah and Savak for a number of years and united once again after the triumph of the Islamic revolution.

The importance of the meeting with Reza'i in these circumstances lies not in the distinctive role the Revolutionary Guard is playing on the battlefront alone; it lies also in the distinctive political role the leaders of the Revolutionary Guard are expected to play after the conclusion of the military battles now underway on the borders with Iraq.

Although the names of the commanders of the Revolutionary Guard are not well known abroad, due to the circumstances of the nature of their work, they are now playing a special role in political life on all levels in Iran and the Iraqi-Iranian war has underlined this. It is expected that that role will increase to the point where it may constitute a turning point in the domestic political balance and may perhaps lead to a kind of internal coup, depending to a large extent on the results of the fighting in the Khuzestan region.

AL-SAFIR met Reza'i in the Revolutionary Guard comman headquarters in Tehran after the appointment was postponed three times because he was preoccupied in pursuing matters related to the war.

Our concern in the conversation with him was to ascertain the nature of the composition of the Revolutionary Guard and its distinctive role in the domestic and foreign contexts.

The discussion focused on the issue of the army and its destiny following the war, the role of the military armed forces in the battles going on now and the coordination in effect between the army and guard commanders.

Military Activity and Mass Activity

[Question] Could you give us an idea about the growth of the Revolutionary Guard, its formation, its composition and its political and historic foundation?

[Answer] In 1965 we started our armed Islamic activity against the Shah and Savak. In 1975 disputes arose among some political orientations which had deviated toward the left and Western views.

As a result of these disputes some brothers in the Islamic movement were encouraged to seek the essence and causes of problems, and this led us back to Islamic principles and roots, which are continuous among the people.

These Islamic transformations continued for a period of about 2 years; in 1977 we succeeded in forming armed Islamic groups working from within and enjoying the confidence of the people who constituted the shield of this popular movement.

When our armed Islamic activity began, Imam Khomeyni's initiative had set forth and expressed itself in a popular tide and mass demonstrations against the Shah's power.

It is worth observing here that during their activities over the 2 years the armed Islamic groups had crystallized work methods which were suitable for the condition of Iranian areas and the circumstances of the people. They actually began to be transformed into a deep-rooted popular movement in various areas.

The imam's calls occurred in 1977 as a goad to our armed Islamic movement, since our brothers benefited from the overwhelming mass atmosphere which the imam's movement had created.

There is no doubt that the green light the imam gave during his exile in Iraq helped our brothers to keep the secret armed activity abreast of the mass movement which was formed in the various areas under Khomeyni's leadership.

In this period, we managed to carry out a series of successful military operations in a number of areas. These operations were diverse and were in accordance with the conditions of every area and the circumstances of every social group clashing with the Shah.

These successful military operations amounted to experimental steps to ascertain the degree to which our theory corresponded to the political reality being experienced in Iran.

Our experimental military operations met popular acceptance, since the people met around us, forming protection for our fighting brethren. Only a short period after our activity started before we felt total support from the masses, to the extent that the people would hold popular celebrations after every military operation, because they considered our struggle an indirect response to the state of repression and terror which the Shah's army was carrying out against the masses.

Thus we succeeded rapidly in bringing the political movement back to its proper Islamic path through our practical experiences on the ground. This path soon was closely joined to the path of the emam, and an objective relationship was formed between the armed path we had ventured on and the mass path Emam Khomeyni led.

This solidarity between the two paths resulted in the birth of armed Islamic groups in a number of Iranian regions. Armed organizations were formed which pursued the Islamic path in the cities of Tehran, Tabriz, Esfahan, Mashhad and so forth.

Although there was no comprehensive coordination or organization among these various organizations and groups, they, in their totality, agreed on one path and a common ground which expressed itself in the application of armed operations with the mass situation being experienced.

During this period, the notion of forming a consolidated Islamic army throughout Iran began to crystallize in the minds of our brethren, along with the task of coordinating these groups, and joint planning took place to strike out at the centers and positions of the government army everywhere we could reach.

However, the Islamic movement developed rapidly and caused the regime to collapse before we could take the initiative of forming this Islamic army.

The development of conditions and circumstances with the speed you have seen led to the creation of armed military confrontation, the regime fell, and the emam returned to Tehran where we met with him and our brethren came to know one another. Immediately after the triumph of the revolution, we took the initiative of forming the nucleus of "revolutionary guard committees" which were basically composed of armed groups and organizations spread about over the various towns and areas of Iran.

Two Main Groups

Thus the armed forces and the staffs and persons who had been working in a number of Islamic organizations inside and outside Iran gathered together and were formed two main groups from them, which broke up into two axes:

The axis of Khomeyni's Islamic committees and the axis of the revolutionary guard committees.

The revolutionary guard committees oriented themselves toward applying their previous idea, which was to form a strong armed ideological Islamic army which would be able to protect the revolution, defend the people and help spread the revolution outside Iran.

We still believe that the taks of the committees and the guards in protecting the revolution and defending the people are complementary.

We, in our current activity, are not restricting our efforts to the development of our military capabilities alone — we are striving to consolidate our forces with an ideological motivation which will allow our political role also to move forward to perform our duties as thoroughly as possible.

Therefore one can consider that the forces of the revolutionary guards are tantamount to a liberation army resembling the liberation movements in existence throughout the world.

The difference between us and other armies is that ours is ideological, relying on Islam, in addition to its distinctive organization relations and its constant military training.

Therefore, some time after its formation, our army noticed that some armed groups which had participated with us at the start of the formation of this combative nucleus retreated.

The reason these groups left is that they were not able to harmonize themselves with our Islamic path and our total alignment with the emam's path.

One can say that the revolutionary guard forces were the basic force which, following the emam, said that it was necessary to bring about unity in the Islamic nation which is now borken up, fragmented and occupied by certain eastern and western countries and Israel, as well as being broken up into a number of different sects and nationalities. We ourselves consider that it is possible for this nation to be united and in harmony under one command and one army.

The Tasks of the Army

/Question/ What are the different aspects of the dispute between the army and the revolutionary guard? How can one distinguish between the two parties?

/Answer/ In fact, we, in our repeated meetings with the emam, through the constitution, are trying to specify the various tasks and duties of the revolutionary guard and the army.

There is a stipulation in the constitution which specifies that task of the revolutionary guard is to protect and guard the revolution against domestic and foreign dangers.

We believe that the task of the revolutionary guard is not just defensive and domestic but that it has other duties as well. Therefore we can understand why it is participating in the fighting on the front now, for reasons which are not related to its constitutionally specified task alone but for necessary ideological reasons also.

We consider that our role in the current stage is very important because it is not restricted to supporting the army in areas where it needs us but also participates in the various defense and combat sectors on the front.

In addition to that, we are performing the mission of mobilizing people for combat or combat training. The army cannot perform this task for a number of reasons, among them the fact that it does not possess the intrinsic power to perform such a duty.

The army is now playing a specific role on the strategic level, especially since it is still going through a stage of reconstructing and reviving its technical, fighting and command forces, staffs and capabilities.

However, the war is not confined to these technical and strategic issues alone; it requires a perseverant spirit, popular mobilization and preparation of the people for a long war in a stage in which the danger of the great powers to the Islamic nation stands out.

From this angle, we consider that it is necessary for us to form the necessary force to be able to stand as it must in confronting the conspiracies of the great powers.

So we, as a revolutionary guard, are responsible for the ideological aspect and the Islamic and doctrinal aspect of the confrontation with these great powers, especially since we are now establishing good proper relations with various liberation movements and have brethren fighting in southern Lebanon and various other places.

We also consider that our task is not confined to the domestic Iranian aspect in preserving the Islamic revolution but that our action includes aid to our brothers in liberation movements, supporting them at all levels, especially the military ones, from the standpoint of combat support and training revolutionary force personnel to protect themselves and confront the great powers.

Proceeding from this viewpoint, we believe that it is our duty to stand alongside all our brothers in the liberation movements who are fighting against the conspiracies in their countries.

Therefore our mission is different from that of the army in many respects, among them:

First, there is the ideological aspect; second is the foreign aspect, represented by resistance to tendencies hostile to the Islamic revolution in the Islamic world.

By saying this I do not mean that there is a contradiction between these tasks of ours and the task assigned to the army. The army has its special role which is related to strategic military matters from the standpoint of the use of the air force, navy, artillery and heavy tanks. Our role, as a revolutionary guard, is based on reliance on people's war, guerrilla war, guerrilla operations, and help in mobilizaing the people to be permanent participants in general confrontations.

Coordination between the Guard and the Army

/Question/ It is said that the revolutionary guard will in actuality substitute for the army when that is dispensed with. Is that true?

/Answer/ In the constitution, as I told you, there is a distinction between the tasks of the revolutionary guard and the tasks of the army. The guards are an institution independent in itself, and the army is an institution independent of the guard.

/Question/ Are you thinking of merging the army and the revolutinary guard within the framework of a single institution at a subsequent stage?

/Answer/ No, each institution will be separate from the other, because, as I explained to you, each institution has tasks separate from the other.

However, that does not mean that it is not possible for there to be unity of action between the two institutions. This unity of action on the level of actual operations constitutes a state of joint coordination among the functions of each institution, as is happening now to a considerable degree on the battlefronts, in both the western and southwestern areas.

Now there are a joint operations room and coordinating committees through which we are essentially trying to apportion the tasks and the various roles.

One can say that coordination between the two parties now is properly based on a number of factors and issues, from the standpoint of the general mobilization of the people and from the standpoint of combat missions on the front.

The Siege of Abadan

/Question/ The emam has requested the army to break the siege of Abadan; how do you envision translating this demand into reality?

/Answer/ Naturally as you know there are many missions and plans with respect to the battlefront in Khuzestan. There are positions and lines for both the army and the revolutionary guard in the context of joint coordination.

As you know, the front is broad. It is not restricted to a small area. Therefore the emam's appeal is not a strategic turning point in the confrontation underway now, because ultimately it will be translated into military commands issued by the officers to the troops to devote all resources to breaking the siege of Abadan.

One can view the emam's appeal from the context of the discussions taking place in the Consultative Council or the Higher Defense Council, and we can consider it a further encouragement and incentive to fight and confront.

Thus the appeal is occurring as an order or as a resolution to the outcome of the discussions which went on in the Consultative Council and the Defense Council concerning combat problems at the front.

/Question/ Do you believe that this appeal for the most part is directed to the army, that is, that it is an indirect signal to give the army a more effective role in the fighting?

/Answer/ I believe that it is an overall appeal which embraces everyone. Perhaps its object is the army more than the revolutionary guard, in order that the army may speed up the combat and liberation operations now that it has become apparent through experience that it is weak in some aspects and lacks preparation in some aspects.

In spite of that, one cannot interpret the appeal as being directed only to the army. Rather, it is for everyone, and for different forces. Therefore, through joint coordination, we have managed to break the siege of Abadan and push the Iraqi forces back after the issuance of the emam's appeal.

The Military Situation

/Question/ Could you give us a general idea of the military situation at the front?

/Answer/ Before we present an idea of the military situation now, it is necessary to present a picture of the situation before the war, going back a few months.

Iraq had previously massed several military divisions on our borders, among them four which were concentrated for the main part in the Khuzestan area, in addition to two reserve divisions which were ready to intervene at a subsequent stage to back up the Iraqi forces in the event they lost their military equipment and ability to move.

To that should be added four Jordanian brigades, two concentrated in the north to fight the Kurds and two in the south to back the Iraqi forces up with artillery and rocket fire.

Iraq launched its war against us after concentrated preparations preceded by massive military supplies from the Soviet Union to guarantee a long strategic reserve to supply the attacking forces.

The goal of the Iraqi regime in these military concentrations was to direct a quick blow, enabling it to occupy Khuzestan in a week, provided it was preceded by the destruction of the military capabilities and economic institutions of the Islamic revolution in Oran in order to paralyze their movement on all levels.

The forces of the Iraqi regime moved in one thrust and penetrated our borders at seven focal points. In the first 5 days, they managed to achieve some progress against the forward positions.

In this big broad attack against our borders, they used all the military ways and means Israel had previously used against our borthers in southern Lebanon, blowing up villages and driving out civilians with the goal of emptying the territory of inhabitants in the desire to occupy it. Whenever they entered a section, town or village, they would seize the members of local councils and in many cases would carry out group death sentences.

If you go to the Khuzestan area and meet the Arab people and tribes, you will hear their opinions about Baghdad's talk about the Arabs and Arabhood.

However, their success of the first days did not stand up. We managed to recapture the initiative after a while and have now begun to retake some positions in the Qasr-e Shirin area in the northwest and other areas in the west center. We are now advancing continuously and only a few areas remain, which I mentioned, before we will be able to purge our territories of the occupation.

As regards the southwestern area (Khuminshahr), the military balance of power is still in their favor.

The Army Was Not Prepared

As you know, our army was not prepared for combat, for a number of reasons which you know, among them the fact that the army was scattered after the revolution and that many of its generals and officers had fled the country. The remainder of it was preoccupied with peripheral battles in Kordestan and Baluchestan and was compelled constantly to reorganize itself and fight in several areas at the same time.

This state of fragmentation led to the weakening of its technical and professional powers, as opposed to Saddam's army, which was adequately prepared and equipped to attack us.

You must remember that the Iraqi regime received adequate support in the form of arms, ammunition and spare parts, while we are going through the opposite situation, since the great powers are besieging us from all sides.

In spite of these difficult conditions our troops and brothers in the revolutionary guard are going through, our forces managed to wage noble defensive battles, stopping the Iraqi army in a number of positions and managing to recapture some positions, regaining the initiative at a number of focal points, because they are waging an ideological war in defense of Islam and are rushing to combat for matters of principle which give them the incentive to sacrifice and commit martyrdom on its behalf.

Some people ask us why we are not pushing the Ba-thist forces back beyond the borders. Our answer to that is that our plan was not based on just purging our occupied positions but on exhausting the forces of the Iraqi regime, inflicting the biggest possible losses on them and inviting some of them to join us in order to weaken the regime and exhaust its strength.

This is our basic plan, which we are applying effectively in all positions on the front.

As you know, the Iraqi army is spread about over broad areas. This provides us with an opportunity to conduct a guerrilla war and guerrilla operations exhausting its strength and bleeding it as time goes by, so that in time it will be unable to keep the focal points it is holding onto and defend its positions.

So far, our plan has been a success; we have been able to entice it into certain positions and have imposed a long war on it which is costly in human and material power. In our opinion, the longer the war lasts, the more that will benefit us and the plan which we agreed upon at the beginning of the fighting.

Therefore it is not to our advantage to decide the military struggle quickly, because our basic objective is the downfall of Saddam Husayn's regime. That will happen only through a long war, which will give the Moslem Iraqi people an opportunity to choose a force to replace the existing regime after it falls.

Most simply, we reject all mediation for a cease fire and the suspension of this war because this approach will guarantee that the Baghdad regime is weakened and will pave the way for revolution against it.

According to our information, there is the beginning of unrest in Iraq. The morale of some army detachments has started to collapse because they are not convinced of the fruitfulness of this war and are not impelled by ideological consideration to embark on war against a nation of Moslems instead of embarking on one against the common enemy.

Naturally in the end we will push the Ba-thist forces back beyond the borders, but we will not do this until we have prepared a force to substitute for the regime in Baghdad after it has collapsed and fallen -- which will occur only through the continuation of a long war.

We have many plans in this regard, but excuse us for not being able to talk about them for security and political reasons.

One can say that our main general plan now is to prompt more joint coordination between the army and revolutionary guard, under the command the supervision of Emam Khomeyni himself, and you will soon notice the results yourself.

Our main general military plan now is to keep the Baghdad regime's forces in some areas, to wear them down through guerrilla operations and to push them back in other areas to weaken their morale. This military plan does not depart from the general plan of the war, which is to keep the Iraqi army spread out and prevent it from concentrating so that we can offer ourselves an opportunity to carry out more of the operations based on the tactics of guerrilla war.

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GULF WAR SEEN TAKING HEAVY TOLL ON IRAN'S ECONOMY

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 10 Dec 80 p 13

[Article by Ulrich Tilgner: "War Pushes Iran to Bankruptcy: Foreign Currency Reserves Will Last Half a Year"]

[Text] The Gulf War is having an ever-increasing effect on Iran's economy. Industrial plant utilization in areas outside the war-affected territory has declined to 30 to 50 percent. At this time Iranian foreign trade continues to have more flexibility than is often assumed, but the currency reserves of the country will only last for a few months. The head of the Iranian Central Bank, Ali Reza Novari, stated last week that Iranian reserves amounted to 6 billion dollars, and that the country was able to pay for necessary imports for 6 months, even without any oil exports. The Iranian estimate did not include the estimated 8 billion dollars of frozen assets in the United States nor the gold reserves of the country.

It is estimated that Iran has to contribute between 1 billion and 1.6 billion dollars monthly for imports and debt service. Observers estimate, however, that the current earnings run at a maximum rate of $300 million monthly. Besides $50 million from non-oil exports, and about $25 million in interest, the country earns about $200 million from exports of oil, primarily from the island of Lavan.

The war has not only caused a drastic change in the country's currency situation, but it has also closed the three gulf ports of Khorramshar, Abadan, and Bandar Khomeyni, resulting in a reduction of Iranian import volume by half. During prewar August a million tons of goods were sent from the Gulf ports to the interior; the next month the figure had sunk to only 365,000 tons. These figures indicate that the war has a considerably greater effect on the country than the economic sanctions. Five months after the decision of the EEC countries regarding economic sanctions the imports had not yet declined. German exports to Iran were even greater in 1980 than in 1979 (DM 2.3 billion.) During the fall there was less and less adherence to the sanctions. The German-Iranian chamber of commerce criticized the decisions of the politicians in a circular to its Iranian members. The economic boycott was said to be an unsuitable device for solving political disputes, serving only as an increased stress on the relations. "Since businessmen and production plants were not included in the tension-filled situation, they will

certainly find unconventional ways to fulfill their tasks." This statement of the chamber was followed by the remark that "elements eager for profit" both within the country and abroad would certainly take advantage of the situation.

The actual experience with the sanctions indicated that Iran has been able to obtain most of the desired goods, but that price increases of 15 percent had to be taken into account. According to Iranian data the country had to pay $3 billion for additional transportation costs and price surcharges during the first 6 months of the sanctions.

In the country's bazaars there were hardly any shortages of regular consumer goods. Fabric vendors proudly said that Italian goods had been imported by way of Switzerland, and many a German product found its way to Iran by way of Austria. The Iranian government, however, used the boycott to pursue a policy of progressive governmental influence on the economy. Every week lists of goods requiring import approval by the Ministry of Trade were published. As early as May of this year the Revolutionary Council issued an order for the formation of centers for goods supply, in an attempt to take the first step toward nationalization of foreign trade as envisioned by the constitution of the Islamic Republic. The sanctions were skillfully used to pursue a protectionist economic policy.

If the displays in the watch stores have become more meager, then this is not as a direct result of the economic sanctions. While the effect on imports were not all that spectacular, the Iranian petroleum exports decreased suddenly after the sanctions decision. Since May the tankers of Western oil companies have avoided Iranian oil ports. For example, the value of FRG oil imports from Iran sank from DM 383 million in April to DM 58 million in August. Financing of the Iranian operating budget was only possible by a resort to foreign currency reserves. The war escalated these financial problems, since petroleum exports declined from about 500,000 barrels a day to 100,000 barrels. Last week another step to conserve currency reserves was taken. Private importers must deposit a bond in the amount of 200 percent of the value of the goods with the trade bank before obtaining a letter of credit.

While the Iranian state has achieved a dominant position in industry, banking and foreign trade since the revolution, it has been only partly able to realize its economic plans. Even before the Luxembourg decisions, i.e., within the first 12 months after the revolution, only about 50 percent of the $12.5 billion earmarked for development projects in the budget was utilized. The result of the sanctions was that only a few projects were launched in the summer of this year.

The effects of the sanctions have reinforced the tendency to turn to the CEMA countries. Increased Soviet-Iranian trade relations have resulted not only in the planning for a speedy development of transportation links between the two countries, including waterways, highways, and railroads, but also in agreement regarding new major projects. The capacity of the steel plant in the central Iranian city of Isfahan is to be increased to 4 million tons a year. Agreement was reached regarding increased cooperation in the exploitation of natural resources In addition to the construction of a power plant and an aluminum smelting plant an offer by the USSR to construct the largest machine factory complex in the Middle and Far East is ready to be signed. This complex would, in the words of the Soviet economic attache, mean "self-sufficiency in the industrial sector" for Iran. And thus a report on an interview with the attache in the TEHRAN TIMES bore the title: "U.S. Sanctions Open Paths for Iran's Relations with the East Bloc."

9240
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GOVERNMENT POLICY IN TERRITORIES CRITICIZED

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 10 Oct 80 p 16

[Article by Zvi El-Peleg: "The Failure of the Policy of 'Non-Intervention'"]

[Text] When I left ZAHAL in 1967 after serving in the reserves as a military governor in Nablus and in the Gaza Strip, I wrote a long letter to M. Dayan who was then defense minister, Yitzhaq Rabin, and Yeshayahu Gavish, major general of the Southern Command. In my letter I expressed surprise over the system of government implemented in the Territories immediately following the war and the fear that this system would create situations which could be dealt with only by resorting to severe measures. That letter accomplished little. Aside from a friendly conversation with the coordinator of activities in the Territories, nothing happened.

During the years following the war, when the declared aims were not achieved and the situation in the Territories steadily deteriorated, analyses of what was occurring appeared in the newspapers and in various other forums. Two main claims were emphasized: First, that in 1967 it was necessary to create a military government from scratch, without skilled manpower, without experience in working with an Arab population and with no specific knowledge of the Territories which had fallen into our hands during the war. Second, outside forces, both regional and worldwide, worked against Israel, creating objective conditions which made it impossible for us to achieve our aims in the Territories. These claims are unfounded, but before attempting to examine them, we ought to clarify what Israeli aims in the Territories were and how we went about achieving them.

There were two general aims: The first was described by definitions such as "normalization of life," "prevention of conflict between population and military government," "improvement of the Israeli image," and "Arab-Israeli integration." The second aim was not defined, but it was understood that Israel hoped to encourage the population to reach some formula for self-rule which would handle civilian affairs and lead towards achievement of a final political solution.

This is fine. Who wouldn't wish for the well being of the Territories' residents, for good relations between them and the military government and for the positive image of Israeli rule? The controversy was not over the aims, but the means for achieving them.

How did planners for the Territories hope to achieve the first aim?

In the days following the war, it was defined as a "policy of non-intervention."

This meant that the military government would be concerned with security matters and would attempt to intervene as little as possible in the functioning of civilian affairs. In order to guarantee the restriction of the military government to security matters and prevent its involvement in civilian affairs, a directive was issued (attributed to the defense minister) which states that the military governors would be commanders of field units which they would activate as dictated by security requirements.

Because of this policy of "non-intervention" and because of the above directive, officers with no knowledge of the Arabic language or of the Arab population were appointed as military governors. The idea was that the less the military governors understood about the workings of Arab society, the less they would intervene in civilian affairs. This was the reason for appointment of inexperienced military governors, untrained in Arab affairs and not, as has been claimed, (by Reserve Major General Shlomo Gazit in DAVAR, 24 and 26 September 1980, and by others elsewhere) because "ZAHAL had no commands prepared for the undertaking, particularly no manpower trained for military government positions" and so on.

This is simply unfounded. First, ZAHAL had a group of officers who, until the end of 1966, were military governors in the Galilee, in the Triangle and in the Negev. In addition, ZAHAL had three commands of military government in the reserves. In these commands there were regional governors, sub-district governors, staff officers and hundreds of others who had long been prepared and trained for their positions and the eventuality of a war in which ZAHAL would be required to deal with a civilian population. Among the officers were many who, for years, had served in the framework of the security network among Arab populations. Years before 1967 such units studied areas beyond Israel's borders and files concerning settlements, installations, institutions and individuals were prepared.

What would have been more logical and practical than filling military government posts in 1967 with these regular army officers who knew how to deal with the Arab population and who, in effect, remained without real positions following the cancellation of military rule in December 1966? And what would have been more logical than to utilize the same military government reserve forces to fill posts created in the Territories following the war?

We can all agree that the political position of the entire population of the territories conquered in the Six-Day War strongly opposes occupation. The question is over the relationship between political beliefs and political actions. This relationship is not entirely apparent in any society. It cannot be presumed that because political beliefs are hostile, they need find expression in hostile actions. If a gap between beliefs and actions is common in all societies, how much more so in an Arab society which has been subject to a thousand years of conquest. The Arabs learned to live and prevail under occupation. Their past and present history are full of examples of loyalty under occupation, mixed with hopes for a change in an existing situation and the end of occupation. The Arabic language is full of expressions illustrating a philosophy adopted by these people over many generations.

Generalizing, one can credit the reaction of Arabs under conquest to their philosophy. The opposite also holds true--the cause of conflicts should be sought in the behavior of the rulers. When the gap between political belief and political actions closes, it means that the rulers are in error. Such errors can occur when the occupied and occupier belong to the same society and culture. King Husayn, who was not favored by the majority of West Bank politicians, twice attempted to radically alter the pattern of his rule over the Palestinians, once in the mid-1950's and again in the late 1950's. Both times he nearly lost his throne and his life. Only at the last minute did he succeed in restoring balance to his kingdom by resorting to drastic measures. The mistakes are more common when the ruling power and the conquered population belong to different cultures. In such a situation there is the problem of cultural dissimilarity in addition to the complexities of occupation, and sometimes a failure in communications between rulers and ruled occurs.

The rulers may create a provocation of some sort and wait for an expected reaction. The reaction may be entirely different from the one expected, leaving the provokers helpless. In the real case of the Territories it was supposed that allowing free expression (through a national and hostile press) and allowing residents to maintain contacts with enemy forces in the Arab countries would "let off steam" and perhaps "ease the burden of occupation." Such an approach, it was supposed, should contribute to better relations between the population and the military government. But the actual result of this freedom to speak out strongly and associate with hostile factors was violence and actions aimed at pleasing those hostile factors.

Take the example of "non-intervention." This actually means the residents' independence from the military government. At face value, nothing could be better. Unfortunately, it just doesn't work that way. The whole undeniable philosophy [Palestinian] justifying a tolerant attitude towards occupation collapses in the absence of dependence upon the occupational government. The inhabitants of the Territories are called upon by the terrorist organizations to stage strikes, demonstrations, to aid the terrorists, etc. How can the Territories' residents refuse to cooperate with terrorists so long as their livelihood and comfort are not at stake?

Every government needs cooperation in order to maintain normalcy and prevent aid to terrorists. Why should the Territories' residents cooperate with the military government if they can get everything they need without cooperating?

Remember that we are not talking about a policy aimed at bringing about a political solution, rather, about an attempt to create a comfortable situation in which life is possible until a political solution is achieved. Thus, achievement of the political goal does not depend upon the method for control. It depends upon policy. This can be illustrated by the patterns of rule in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip prior to 1967.

In the West Bank, the Jordanian monarchy ruled, and in Gaza, republican Egypt. Jordanian policy involved annexation of the West Bank and undermining Palestinian identity, while Egyptian policy was geared towards leaving the Gaza Strip open as an option for the creation of a Palestinian state and strengthening Palestinian

identity. But the patterns of rule were similar in both places: evening curfews, strict censorship in publishing, restrictions on all forms of organization, and above all, a close connection between the right of the government to reward the residents and the loyal obligations of the residents to the government.

Moreover, the structure of political organization in the West Bank and Gaza are more or less comparable to family structure there. This is largely a society based upon clans. Despite modernization and progress, there are no two members in the municipal councils of Nablus or Gaza belonging to the same clan. There are elections, there are contests, and there are political slogans, but in effect, representation is by family. There is competition among clans and there are contests for control and power. What did the Jordanian monarch who ruled the West Bank prior to 1967 do? He maneuvered between clans in order to neutralize the great enmity towards him. The fact that clearly demonstrates this is his appointment of no less than 100 (!) Palestinian cabinet members over a 19-year period, meaning, he appointed and dismissed based on the needs of the regime and in order to increase the competition between the rival families over the regime's favors. Husayn also took advantage of the perogative, granted him by Jordanian law, to appoint heads of municipal councils.

What did we do? We renounced the power which was ours by law, didn't interfere, didn't use influence and thus found ourselves, in effect, left out of the system. Left out, but inside, that is. Without influence but with problems...

Again, this did not happen because our intentions were bad, but because our understanding was poor. In connection with this, the question arises: Who is supposed to understand all the complexities of a different society and culture? What qualifications must a person have in order to remain afloat in this tempest?

A wrong notion which has taken hold of us is that historians of the Arab World have the skills for solving the problems connected with this population. The truth is that historians, even if they are called "orientalists," have little to offer in this realm. At least, not by virtue of their being historians. Some historians successfully filled positions as advisers on Arab affairs, not because of book learning, but because of their experience in the field.

Extended contact with the Arab population, life among them, study of their customs and examination of the meaning of their behavior sharpen intuition and prepare a person for a position among the Arabs.

Military government officers who served in ZAHAL before 1967 and hundreds of reservists who gained experience and prepared themselves for future positions should have filled positions in the Territories from the moment we found ourselves controlling them. They were not commanders of units whose aim was to overcome violent demonstrations, but they knew how to administer occupied territories in such a manner that situations necessitating such intervention would not arise.

Disturbances, strikes and demonstrations were, in effect, brought about by the person who, at the end of the Six-Day War, ordered that experienced officers would not fill positions in the military government, that the purpose of the military government would, rather than faithful management of the civilian

establishment, be mobilization of units to deal with disturbances, end strikes and disperse demonstrations. This is what happens when, instead of coordinating a military government staffed by social anthropologists of sorts, wearing uniforms and managing the population without having to resort to the garrison, and authorities make the garrison itself the military government.

Undoubtedly, the decision in 1967 about "non-intervention" and the staffing of the military government with functionaries, whose skills did not enable them to deal with Arab society, was "revolutionary and daring." But it was equally ill-advised.

Our first aim was "normalization." Normalization is not only readiness of the residents to accept salaries, to take loans, to study in high schools free of charge and to buy subsidized products. Normalization is also amicable behavior, a tolerant attitude towards Jewish visitors and perhaps readiness to obey orders of the military government and not to consistently follow PLO directives. If that is normalization, we have not achieved it.

The other aim, consolidation of self-rule in the territories, has not been achieved either; more about that in the next article.

8770
CSO: 4805

LABOR MOVEMENT ASKED TO BUILD COEXISTENCE WITH ARABS

Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 10 Oct 80 p 5

[Article by Aharon Ephrat: "A Time to Act on Israeli Arab Society"]

[Text] The title of this article should not be taken to mean that nothing is being done in the Israeli Arab community. Much is, in fact, being done, both positively and negatively. In the centers of Israeli Arab life, political movements are rapidly taking shape and changing the political scene. This process will have a far-reaching influence upon the political and democratic structure of Israeli society and the state. The same indistinct excitement and confusion also exist in Israeli political circles among creators of solutions, presenters of proposals and planners of programs for the parties in power, parties not in power and all parliamentary factions.

I chose to deal with "Arab society in Israel" in this article on account of the "Practical Dictionary" presented about a year ago by DAVAR's reporter on Arab affairs, Danny Rubinstein. In it he describes the sad confusion guiding the media and prevailing in the political establishment in dealing with Israeli Arabs.

When he speaks of Arab society and its problems, he includes the terms "the Arab segment," "Israeli Arabs," "the minorities," and the "Arab Street." "Villagers" is a term referring to Arab farmers; "intellectuals" refers to the Arab intelligentsia; "notables" refers to certain groups of businessmen. The use of these terms arises from a conscious or subconscious failure to accept the class, social and political "normalization" which is characteristic of Arab society in Israel. Particularly dangerous intended or inadvertant misconceptions mar interpretation of events in the network of interaction within Arab society, and in particular, their interaction with the social, cultural and political establishment in Israel since the Six-Day War and the subsequent renewed contact between 600,000 Israeli Arabs, the outside Arab world and the Palestinian population outside of Israel's borders.

The dramatic encounter with Arabs in the territories began at the same time as an accelerated process of modernization in the lives of Israeli Arabs, marked by improved living standards and rapid demographic growth. This created a dynamic reality which should not have been ignored. The Labor Movement holds a heavy responsibility in misinterpreting the growth of a young intelligentsia with a modern social identity. Labor also paid dearly in the election returns as a result.

"Our Sin"

I don't deceive myself into thinking that seeing the process, distinguishing the problems and formulating solutions for problems of Arab society can separate them from historical Israeli-Arab conflict which intensified greatly following the Six-Day War. But for several years Arab activists have given me evidence for supposing that the vast experience behind the Labor Movement in Israel could give us uncommon tools for building a more firm foundation for coexistence, despite the seriousness of the general conflict.

Therein lies our greatest sin.

This sould searching and these feelings about "our sin" as part of the Israel Labor Movement, about the things we didn't do and things we did half-heartedly and should have done with our whole hearts, has seized me. There were also things done improperly, if one considers the essential aim to be building a foundation for coexistence in this land.

Two trips I recently made again brought to my attention the full significance of the misunderstanding in the relationship between the network of public institutions and organizations of the current needs of Arab society in Israel. One trip was to hilltop settlements in the western Galilee, the other, to examine health services run by Kupat Holim in Arab villages in the vicinity of Nazareth.

I later had conversations with several Arab friends about the organization of various Arab factions for increased mutual understanding, such as the "Arab Lobby" countering RAKAH activity at the Shfar'am meeting and toward the forthcoming so-called "Congress" of the Arab masses. In the course of these discussions it became clear to me that the tragic "Land Day" 4 and 1/2 years ago was the saddest of turning points.

I remembered things said to me during a visit to Arab villages only 4 days after "Land Day." The atmosphere was tense, and at a very crowded meeting a high school teacher, a respected and educated Arab skilled in public relations, said: "You MAPAM members justly thought that the Arab minority in Israel would serve as a bridge to peace and brotherhood with Arab states and Palestinians outside Israel; but this good will was completely distorted when Israel became a conqueror. Continuation of the policy of conquest daily weakens the foundation of this bridge. Israel must stop being a conqueror. When this happens, we won't be daily confronted by our brothers to explain who we are to them."

It rapidly became clear that the influence of "the achievements of Israel's Arabs," vis-a-vis the "backwardness" of the West Bank and Gaza Arabs, is not unequivocal, and that these achievements carry relatively little weight next to national solidarity and other "achievements" of brothers on the other side, under Jordanian rule. With the passage of time since 1967, the Palestinian factor increased in Israeli Arab consciousness. The living link with residents of the territories, together with a process of Israeli Arab cultural and social progress, exposed even more clearly the poverty we ignored: the desperate shortage of thousands of classrooms, the poor conditions in thousands of classrooms in old and rented houses, a low level of health and other public services by comparison

to neighboring Jewish villages, a serious shortage of land for young couples' housing, lack of suitable employment for the young Arab intelligentsia. These together constitute the failure of the past 25 years which we have failed to see.

To See Both Sides of the Coin

No Arab forces struggling for greater cooperation can present only one side of the case for the needs of the state and requirements for peace. Writing in 'AL HAMISHMAR, Kasem [Zayad] gives us continuing and varied reports about what is happening in Israeli Arab society. It can, I feel, be stated that he does an excellent job as an Arab reporter presenting important information in a daily Hebrew paper. His writing is characterized by its "compromise," as they say, despite emotional and nationalistic pressures in Arab society, and also by its even-handedness without kowtowing to the Israeli political establishment.

Kasem [Zayad] is one of the proponents of an organization called the "Arab Lobby." I think it is clear that they do not intend to create a political party or list to run in the election. But we must not demand that they refrain from presenting the whole story, the wide range of demands, for civil rights, equality in rights to land for community development, a satisfactory educational network with decent facilities, cultural activities and public life, development of modern sources of employment in Arab communities, absorption of Arab intelligentsia in public services, and for satisfactory representation in all fields. It seems that we and our partners in the Alignment still have much to learn about the complexities of Arab society in order that, with the return of a Labor Party government, we will be able to answer the good will in evidence among broad groups within Israeli Arab society.

If we take the General Labor Federation as an example, the most obvious example since it is the greatest contributer to development of services in Arab communities, many questions arise.

Has the Histadrut found a satisfactory answer to basic demands? Instead of the Arab departments, a staff or branch for "coordination" was established. The change in "terminology" from "department" to "coordination" is of no apparent consequence. In an attempt to suggest a new approach, the Histadrut could show highly significant achievements, but we have reached a point where there are obstacles. The benefit accrued to Israeli society as a result of accepting Arab employees as full members in all professional organizations within the General Labor Foundation, together with all the social achievements of health insurance, pension, annual vacation, maternity benefits and sick leave, can't be described without qualification.

Health services can't be described at all without mentioning 90 clinics of Kupat Holim in Arab villages in all parts of Israel, providing medical services to 400,000 insured.

The great contributions to Arab agriculture and the standards of village life cannot be described without mentioning 206 cooperative unions for provision of drinking water and water for irrigation, electricity, agricultural product marketing and transportation, as well as 12 unions for construction.

To all appearances, these are considerable achievements. However, they are small in relation to the Histadrut's power and potential, which, only now, in light of the new situation, is under reevaluation.

Only a few weeks ago active members in the economic sector "achieved" Hevrat Ovdim's first discussion of its role in economic advancement in the Arab sector (Hevrat Ovdim is responsible for the entire Histadrut economic establishment). Plans were drawn up. It was pointed out that in the entire ramiform Histadrut economic establishment, there is not a single factory in the Arab sector. There was a feeling of regret and desire to correct this situation, as well as a simple calculation of increasing the Arab contribution to the national economy, for the sake of export and economic prosperity. Correction of this situation is still a long way off.

Arab members in villages and the agricultural cooperative unions are still fighting for their basic right to acceptance as equal members in the Agricultural Center. It is hard to find a good reason why this door is still closed to Arabs.

In the Kupat Holim organization, the largest human service organization, there are some second thoughts. Of the 90 clinics, a significant numerical achievement, over 80 are still located in rented buildings with poor facilities. Only eight or nine clinics have been built by Kupat Holim and are modern structures suited for use as medical facilities. Only a few Arab doctors and only 400 Arab employees out of the 25,000 employees of Kupat Holim serve 400,000 insured. There are positive indications in the number of doctors and other health related professionals engaged in advanced study under Kupat Holim auspices, but the general picture is not encouraging and demands more thorough examination.

The local Arab authorities are strongly influenced by RAKAH, not only because of the general historical conflict. They are bitterly fighting for the development of their settlements, for allotment of land for housing, for public institutions, for schools, for clinics and necessary services. RAKAH took advantage of the failure of Israeli governments, all of which neglected the coordination of Arab municipalities in public services.

Precious years were wasted. Numerous chances for true integration of Arab settlements in public life and in the Histadrut, which would have increased their feeling of belonging and participation, were missed.

Could it be that an organization which earnestly strives for coexistence in Israeli society would not present the whole picture as a basis for common spiritual, organizational and political efforts to insure true integration?!

"Congress"--"Pact" On One Side, "Lobby" On The Other

It would be wrong to place full responsibility on three years of Begin-Burg and Israel [Koenig] (northern governor) government. They only deepened existing distortions. In three years they succeeded in proving that chauvinistic hypocracy and their political stupidity were falling upon fertile soil. The anger among the Arabs grew, their weapons were resharpened and once again we are sitting on a keg of dynamite.

It is not surprising that RAKAH and its supporters are using this pressured atmosphere in an attempt to create "new" tools with surprising names and headlines: Congress of the Arab "Masses," The National "Pact" of Israeli Arabs, etc. The Shfar'am Conference was initiated by RAKAH in competition with the "Village Sons," a PLO inspired organization which arose after "Land Day" for fear of domination by the "Young Moslems," Khomeyni supporters who wear white robes on Friday at Un el-Fahm. This conference adopted the terms "Congress" and "Pact" and added "recognition" of the 1947 borders. It turned out that, because of the prevailing atmosphere, the leaders of [Murarabin] currently discussing its future in the Knesset with the Labor Party, were tempted into cooperating with them. So were various public figures who were pulled along with the rising wave of nationalism.

Against this initiative only one public group, apart from traditional and non-traditional parties, dared to send out feelers towards the Labor Movement's various factions. At the time of writing this article, it is not known if this group, dubbed "the Arab Lobby" by the news media, found support among political parties or groups capable of rallying support and commitment for problems on the agenda of Arab society. It is not to be supposed that this group can survive on a basis of one sided and meaningless cooperation with the political establishment in Israel.

A large public partner, which will dare give answers to the questions troubling Arab society, must be found for Israeli Arabs willing to take a stand against the destructive nationalism of Khomeyni supporters and the "Village Sons." Otherwise, there is no hope of breaking through to the Arab public.

An initiative creating a "more open" framework, not linked to past mistakes and with a new rallying call, could also expose the danger in widening the breach while boldly attempting to overcome past mistakes.

8770
CSO: 4805

FORMER MINISTER SAYS IT IS TIME TO INITIATE PARTY SYSTEM

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 7 Dec 80 p 17

[Interview with 'Abd-al-Ra'uf al-Rawabdah, former Jordanian minister of Health and Communications by 'Abdallah al-'Atum; in Amman; Date of Interview not Given]

[Excerpt] [Question] Let us discuss the issues that are hot now in the Arab world. Let us begin with the Lebanese war which has been going on for a long time. What do you think about it?

[Answer] The Lebanese war is not a local war that is being fought among Arab parties only. The war in Lebanon is rather a struggle among the forces that control the destiny of the Palestinian question so as to make the Arab citizen feel permanently threatened.

The creation of this drain in the side of the Arab nation is designed to waste efforts. Since these forces have conflicting interests, Arab positions have accordingly been conflicting. This struggle will continue to flare up and to subside according to the international movements that take place towards a final solution of the Palestinian question and the question of the Zionist occupation of our territory. Hence, the role of the Arab nation becomes clear in the need to stop this drain of Arab effort.

Iraq and Iran

[Question] What about the Iraqi-Iranian war?

[Answer] The Iraqi war is a war [that is being fought] to regain occupied Arab land and to resist the expansion of [Iran's] dominion over Arab land surrounding the Gulf. Despite the fact that this war is a local war launched freely and willfully by Iraq, it is like any other struggle that breaks out anywhere in the world: the superpowers are trying to benefit from it, chiefly the United States and the Soviet Union.

The recent U.S. elections relieved the government there of the possibility of assuming firm positions and making unequivocal resolutions.

U.S. measures remained behind the scenes. Israel is the balance or the standard which these agencies use to gauge their positions. Although the United States has a vested interest in weakening the Iranian regime under these circumstances for several reasons, it is nevertheless careful at the same time [to see to it] that the Arab regime in Iraq does not become strong so that it would not become an effective power in the Arabian Gulf, the principal source of the oil wealth, and so that its strength would have no efficacious effects on the battle with Israel.

[Question] In whose interests is the war being prolonged?

[Answer] I believe that prolonging the war is not in the interests of any one of the parties in the area. It is the superpowers who are benefiting from it. They are trying to draw a new map for the area, especially after the occupation of Afghanistan and the military coup in Turkey.

Therefore, it is the responsibility of the Islamic nations, one and all, to use their influence to bring this war to an end in a manner that would ensure for Iraq its rights and ensure for Iran [the ability] to build the framework of its united nation so it would become one of the principal pillars of the Arab and Islamic nation in its crucial battle in Palestine.

[Question] What are your expectations regarding the ongoing war?

[Answer] Iraq's declared and obvious position is that it has no ambitions on Iranian land and that the war was forced on it as a result of Iran's absolute refusal to return the occupied Iraqi territory and to establish relations of good neighborliness and cooperation.

I am convinced that in the next few weeks the two parties will be seated at the negotiations table and that the Iraqi forces will withdraw.

Jordan's Position

[Question] Is there any explanation for the Jordanian enthusiasm for this ongoing war?

[Answer] I am not in a position of responsibility and therefore cannot talk about Jordan's official position. However, the Jordanian citizen is convinced that Jordan cannot assume any other position; any other position would be unacceptable. Jordan has acted upon nationalistic assumptions ever since it was established, a stronghold of the Arab revolution to liberate Greater Syria. Jordan is supposed to stand with any Arab country facing aggression on its land, occupation or a threat to its interests.

Jordan has anticipated these positions without taking profits and losses into account, as some people like to explain nationalistic positions. Since Iraq constitutes the strategic depth for the confrontation

countries in our battle with Israel, it is consequently necessary to preserve Iraq as a strong power and a firmly established regime so that this depth can remain prepared to play its role in our national battle. Iraq would not be able to play this role while its land is occupied and its stability is threatened.

[Question] Some people are saying that the intensity of Jordan's support for Iraq has tended to abate. What do you think about that?

[Answer] I do not think this is a retreat from the position that was declared when the war broke out. After this unequivocal and clear material as well as moral position was declared, Jordan was convinced that Iraq needed no more than moral support in those battles that are going on. Jordan, as is its custom, always plays a calm role that would help put an end to this ongoing battle so as to ensure Iraqi rights and guarantee Iran's efficacious participation as an Islamic nation in our crucial battle.

Nationalistic War

[Question] Is the ongoing war nationalistic or religious in its orientation?

[Answer] I am not convinced that the Iraqi-Iranian war is a religious war even though the Iranian Revolution has a religious orientation. However, in its organization of Iranian affairs, in its attempts to export the revolution and to hold on to the Arab islands and Arab land, the Iranian Revolution is nationalistic in content. I am convinced that this war is not an ideological war, but rather a war to liberate part of the Arab soil that is occupied.

Towards Palestine

[Question] Those who oppose the Iraqi-Iranian war talk about its negative effect on the Palestinian question. What do you think about that?

[Answer] Anyone who thinks that the ongoing battle between Iraq and Iran will have a negative effect on the Palestinian question is making a mistake. I am convinced that a strong, experienced Iraq and an Arab nation that knows victory will give the Arab course and effort a new thrust which will definitely turn towards Palestine.

[Question] By the way, what about the European initiative to solve the problem of the Middle East?

[Answer] Setting up the issue of the Israeli occupation as a tug of war between the two superpowers hardens conditions as they stand at present. This gives Israel the capability of assimilating [the territory] it has taken in and turning to [further] expansion later.

I believe that a European initiative undertaken by the European nations will set the question in motion and will get it out of the framework of a bilateral struggle between these two powers. Hence Jordan's insistence that the European countries have a clear understanding of Arab rights and of the interests of these countries in the area so that they would become an effective force in ending the occupation and letting the Palestinian people recover their rights.

[Question] What do you think of partisan life in Jordan?

[Answer] Partisan life is the principal foundation upon which parliamentary life is based. Accordingly, democracy cannot be complete, in substance and in practice, without a partisan life.

I am convinced that the time has come for the establishment in this country of party organizations that adhere to the country's course, believe in its convictions, emanate from its territory and do not derive their support from outside Jordan. [I am talking about] party organizations which believe that unity is [our] fate and destiny and that the question of Palestine is the crucial question for the Arab nation and for Jordan in particular.

8592
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PRESIDENT'S RECORD FOR LAST 4 YEARS REVIEWED

'Unfairly Blamed'

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 22-28 Sep 80 pp 32-33

[Article by Jubran Tawini: "You Are Responsible"]

[Text] May God help you, Mr President, amidst security plans, cabinet crises and international situations.

These are the words of simple people who are looking for excuses to justify what did and did not happen during the last 4 years of your administration.

On this occasion in particular we want to ask you, Your Excellency Mr President, if you are thinking of completing the remainder of your administration in the same manner in which you spent two thirds of it.

So that we too would not be simple and resort to making excuses for you out of fear of facing reality, we would like to tell you quite frankly and affectionately that you are the one who is responsible.

[You ask] responsible for whom and responsible for what?

You are responsible for Lebanon, for its people and for their futures.

What would you say if you were to be asked by a court of history--and no ruler can escape appearing before such a court--about what you the president of the Republic of Lebanon, did?

Will you tell the court that you did what you could have done?

The situation being what it is, the court will surprise you by saying that it is the duty of rulers to do more than they can.

If you were to tell the court that you were not responsbile for the general conditions that impeded your course, its reply would be [as follows]:

"The first official cannot be not responsible!"

"No one forced you to assume the responsibility, and no one forced you to take the oath of office."

The court would also tell you: "Do you remember when the competition among the presidential candidates was at its keenest and you were one of the front runners?"

If you were to say that you had hoped that something other than what did happen would have happened and that you could have done more than you did do, the reply of the court of history would be:

"The pursuit of government is a realistic pursuit and not an exercise in wishful thinking. How would that pursuit be if we are talking about governing a country such as Lebanon under circumstances such as those of Lebanon?"

If you were to say that you did not know the secrets of Lebanon's circumstances in 1976, the court would reply [as follows]:

"Why then did you assume the responsiblity of a situation whose affairs you could not control?"

And if you were to say that you had been relying on countries' guarantees and on their assistance to manage Lebanon and to save it from ruin, the court of history would tell you that countries "do not protect those who do not protect themselves."

If you were to say to the court that these countries had pledged themselves to you to help build a better future for Lebanon, the answer would be:

"Countries do not give a future to those who do not build their own future themselves."

You, a responsible official, should have risen to the level of your responsibility!

This is what would have happened were your term of office expiring today.

But you still have 2 years ahead of you.

And whether you are being unfairly blamed--and this is what we believe--or whether you are in the right, the primary responsibility is ultimately yours.

Responsibility presupposes that there is confidence between the president and the people and between the president and parliament, the parent constitutional institution.

There can be no confidence, which is the foundation for the relationship and the dealings between the president and the people, unless that confidence is based on candor and disclosure.

The candor of a responsible president who told the Lebanese people: "I am one of you; I am with you; I work for you."

Candor compels a president to tell people the facts and to take candid, clearly defined positions, thereby giving the people a choice between their country and the countries of others, and they are many.

Perhaps the president's position had an effect on the friends of some of these small countries that may replace their hostilities towards the president, may change their opinions of him and may bring their attacks against him to an end.

If those people were to accuse the president of impotence, they would be in the right.

If they were to accuse him of weakness, they would be in the right also.

If they were to accuse him of hesitating, they would most certainly be in the right.

It is known that the masters of small countries--all small countries--are one of the reasons for the impotence, the weakness and the hesitation of the president.

Ultimately, however, they are not responsible.

They waited for you at the beginning of your administration.

We are not forgetting that none of them bears the responsibility that the constitutional oath would place on him.

None of them is responsible for managing the state's constitutional institutions.

This is not a justification for the war lords, nor is it a denial of their national responsibility; it is, however, the truth. You are the one who is responsible.

Everyone of the war lords was defending his position. In view of this fact, you had to defend your positions, and you should have from the outset assumed positions dictated to you by the provisions of the constitution and by the constitutional oath.

You had to fight for the constitution.

No matter who he is, a president has no right to reduce the sin of hesitation, impotence or weakness; nor does he have the right to declare himself innocent of those sins--not errors--under the pretext that circumstances were stronger than he was and that no one was allowing him to operate.

In the course of evaluating politicians and heads of state it is said that they either have or do not have the ability to face the future on the basis of the fact that the known present is easier than the unknown future.

In the next 2 years, Your Excellency Mr President, you have to prove that you are not one of those who yearn for the presidency because you consider that position to be a mere presidential picnic.

We think that you do realize that the presidency does involve hard work [and that it requires] effort and courage. Let it not be said in the next 2 years that you are only good for a quiet presidency in a quiet time of abundance and stability.

The presidency involves leadership; it is not a job, Your Excellency Mr President.

The presidency involves danger; it is not peace and stability, Your Excellency Mr President.

If they can still hope, the people are hoping that in the next 2 years you can pursue your responsibilities in a style that is different from that of the past 4 years.

Today, the people are waiting for you to take a position--a position that will make up for what is past.

Today, Lebanon is waiting for a position and a solution.

Will you accept being the last president [of Lebanon], or will you aspire to become the first president of a new Lebanon?

'Significant Accomplishments'

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 22-28 Sep 80 pp 32-33

[Article by M.K.: "From Home to School, from court to Television; His Accomplishments Were Eaten Up by Security Jolts"]

[Text] In every area a candle has been lit: in homes, schools, justice, in the media and in reconstruction. You have planted your seeds, and your seeds have been waiting. There are errors and concessions, but there is also work, and there are miracles. What is important is that what the war cannot strike does remain.

Political actions capture the limelight from government work despite the fact that political actions in Lebanon have so far been less successful in realizing hopes. But President Elias Sarkis's administration which was built on the ruins of a bloody war and which did live for 4 years in a atmosphere of a shaky truce, has succeeded in accomplishments which political and security jolts have almost relegated to oblivion or whose importance has at least been reduced with the citizen who is always looking for prominent political action and firm security [measures] to continue.

Working quietly and austerely between 1976 and 1980, the president, who used to be the chief executive officer of the Bank of Lebanon and who is accused of being a bureaucrat and a technocrat, established successful educational and media institutions. He set into motion the inertia that had for long paralyzed the institutions of justice and official business in the ministries, thereby giving the legitimate government firm roots wherein the capability is available for protecting the minimum actual presence of the government. This means dealing directly with the citizen through his official business [with the government]; such business does not wait for security, for the accord or for a solution to the Middle East question.

Evacuees, Rents and Salaries

It must be acknowledged that social questions after the war--and perhaps it would be better to say after 1975 because the war has not yet come to an end--have become intricate and related to each other so that the real remedy for them does require a genuine peace. Therefore, the administration had to resort to [the use of] anesthetic measures to reduce the pain. Because evacuees were failing to return to their areas, the administration relieved them of the burden of rents by forbidding the issue of sentences to evacuate houses that had been confiscated until God should set us free, and every person would go back to his original place of residence. Laws have also been issued in the aftermath of events to regulate relations between landlord and tenant so that the damage to either one of the parties would not be

prolonged. This is despite the fact that a rent law has been under study for 10 years and reports have been written on this law on what amounts to 10 kilograms of paper.

Social revival [efforts], with the cooperation of charitable organizations in Lebanon and abroad, sought to distribute rations to the evacuees and those who were hurt [by the war]. This helped in reducing the burden of the families who had lost their source of income; it helped them devote themselves to activities that would guarantee them a minimum, respectable income.

The state has also allocated educational grants to the children of government civil servants who had spent some time in the service. The grants were designated after the state raised minimum salaries and increased pensions to arm the people against the dreadful high prices which are increasing by leaps and bounds even though a civil servant is granted [only] an ordinary or an exceptional grade.

One of the most important educational accomplishments was the decentralization of the University of Lebanon which many people had feared would disintegrate and collapse. Despite limited capabilities the university faced the challenge with a power for survival, and it harbored thousands of students from various areas. The university branched to Sidon, Tripoli and Zahlah in the hope of expanding afterwards--with agriculture in al-Biqa' and engineering in 'Alayh. Second branches were also established in more than one town [and] in the eastern suburbs of Beirut. The basic colleges continued to stay in West Beirut and its suburbs. The struggle had begun with a demand for two national universities instead of one and for the appointment of two presidents. This would have meant total independence of the branches of the first university from those of the second. The matter came close to becoming a political issue around which parties were polarized. However, a decision was made to appoint one president for the university with its various branches and to increase the authorities of the deans so that they would have the power to make decisions. It is understood that no matter how many branches it has, every college has one dean, and the branches have directors. This courageous formula preserved the unity of the university and of its council of deans which has now gone back to meeting once a week to make decisions on urgent matters and to draw up educational plans for the current critical stage. The unity of Lebanon in one of its most important forms was victorious: the unity of educational plans for the new generations. This may be the cornerstone for a better Lebanon.

As the university spread out on the map, its financial allocations were increased and its demands were strengthened by increasing the number of grants to high-achieving students who wished to specialize [in studies] abroad. A new salary scale was also adopted for university professors who have a contract with the university and those who have doctorate degrees. This salary scale sought to strengthen full-time preoccupation with university work and scientific research; that was an area in which the university was lacking.

Perhaps the recent basic accomplishment [of the university] was the transformation of the College Education, after many questions were raised about its destiny, into a higher institute for training specialized teachers.

And...Official Examinations

An important accomplishment too was the return to holding official examinations after having given students notices [that they had completed their school years].

These notices were mostly rejected by Lebanese universities as well as by universitites abroad. The first challenge was a failure, but it was necessary to make public opinion aware of the importance of having serious, honest examinations. This year the Lebanese [school] certificate is merit worthy.

In the schools an agency to monitor the increase in fees and supplemental payments was established, and a parents' council system was approved in government and in private secondary schools. Ever since schools resumed operations in 1977, the government had tried to remedy the effects of the events on the relationship [between schools and] faculty members in private schools, especially with regard to the payment of salaries to those to whom those salaries were due. Despite two teachers' strikes in private schools and one teachers' strike in government secondary schools, reasonable solutions every time averted a clash and prevented the paralysis of this vital facility whose return has stimulated the revival of the people. A board of directors for the Private Schools' Teachers Compensation Fund has been formed.

Mention must be made of the loans that have been given to St Joseph University, to the American University and to Beirut University College.

Mention must also be made of the fact that vocational education institutions were stimulated by the close cooperation of European countries which rushed to contribute by supplying the vocational schools with the equipment that had been ravaged by the war. A law was also promulgated to establish the Higher Technical Institute for Marine Scineces in al-Batrun.

What about the situation in the judicial area?

The proverb which states, "Instead of cursing the darkness, light one candle" applies not to work in the judicial area. The judiciary had been totally paralyzed, but life has been restored to most of its parts, albeit slowly, because the impact of events continues to stigmatize its innermost parts. Among the most important achievements in the judiciary was the restoration of the Ministry of Justice to the purpose for which it was established: judges have resumed their positions on the bench; litigants are filing suits; and studies are continuing in the Higher Institute of Law. An important decision was made when operations were restored to this vital facility with the renewal of suits and court transactions that had been lost during the events and the determination of a methodology for restoring the makeup of some of the components of the real estate register that have been lost or destroyed. Judges in sequential classifications and outright judges were appointed to a staff of court justices. A new book of laws was also distributed to the various administrations in the five provinces, and a fifth chamber was established in the State Consultative Assembly.

It is naturally not logical to boast about the fact that the courts are "open" because it is the stability of security and political conditions that bestows Justice, strength and power upon the people. Many incidents have been turned over to

the military courts, but so far it seems that the sentences that were issued were suspended.

The Same Media Despite Everything

Before we delve into the affairs of radio and television, we must make a note of a new symptom with regard to the return of normal business to the government's ministries and institutions. The first step was difficult after many civil servants had refrained from going to their places of work. But security problems were dealt with in a logical--not a divisive--manner. A partisan civil servant was appointed to the ministry that was closest to his residence if his qualifications enabled him to replace a civil servant who replaced another in a safe place of business. A difficult question was thus quietly solved; it had almost delayed the onset of official business. If we come to radio, which has numerous analogues now, we find that since President Sarkis came to power it has regained its unity and the unity of braodcasting and programming. A touch of objectivity and universality has also been added to news bulletins, and that was lacking before 1975. Of course we may not affirm that these broadcasts attract all listeners, but they are now capable of satisfying the thirst of those who look for news or those who try to understand the state's point of view.

Television used to be [provided by] two private firms; it is now [provided by] one firm half of whose stock is owned by the Lebanese government. It is now called the Television of Lebanon, and it operates on most channels. The basic objective of this new company is to unigy the political course of the organization that has the most influence on the citizen; it enters his home without knocking on the door.

The change [in the media] became evident in the single news bulletin that is transmitted from Tallah al-Khayyat one week and from al-Hazimiyyah the other week; all workers can thus take part in it. One person was appointed chairman of the board of directors. That person has resigned, but his resignation has not been accepted. Now he has two directors; this was by way of coming up with a real solution to the problems that confront every station in dealing with the conditions of its workers and in stimulating the sluggishness that has begun to creep into all its departments.

Reconstruction Awaiting End of Destruction

In the area of economics the state has tried to establish institutions that would be capable of inspiring confidence in Lebanon again. The Bank Deposits Insurance Organization, Incorporated was established and loans for agriculture, for hotels and for industry were exempted from interest. The National Bank for Agricultural Development was established; and terms were granted to stimulate the economic sectors to rebuild the country and to rebuild the industrial, tourist and hospital sectors. A national credit council, an institution to ensure investments and a national bank for industrial and tourist development were formed.

The Development and Reconstruction Council which was supposed to replace the Ministry of Design in making plans for the future remained a paper dream. It was satisfied with concluding paper contracts with Arab and international funds, but it has not yet implemented any of the projects, especially the commercial ones, because security conditions have so far prevented that.

We must make reference to the fact that attention was also focused on repairing telephone and telex cables to ensure local and international communications. In the past 2 years [you] have succeeded in restoring part of the confidence that had been lost in the telephone.

In the area of health, government hospitals are still lacking. Therefore, government has tried to contribute to the expenses of recovery in private hospitals.

An obvious concern has been noted for extending [the terms of] municipal and elective councils lest there be a vacuum in these vital institutions.

We are enumerating these accomplishments today as though they were miracles. We are doing that for one reason: the war which has paralyzed everything--every government business--for a long time has made us despair of the restoration of this business. Therefore, we consider these accomplishments significant because the gloomy background from which they emerged is still enveloping security and accord.

No Room for Promises

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 22-28 Sep 80 pp 34-35

[Article by Mayy Kahalah: "Verbal Promises and Plans That Lack Credibility"]

[Text] Four years add up to a long journey of big promises. There is no room for now for any more promises. What if a promise were to be carried out even before it were made? The Lebanese people remember all these promises--the ones that have been made and those that have not yet been made.

President Elias Sarkis's speeches are like a creditor's account in a bank of promises. When the chief executive officer took over his official duties, the state's treasury was empty with regard to politics, security and finances. However, relying on local, Arab and international verbal support, the president had tried on more than one occasion "to cash" the resolutions. These checks were returned to their senders because the accounts on which they were written were imaginary, and the promises that were made became a mirage because they were not supported by actions.

But it would be unfair to stop at Sarkis's words without conducting a real, in-depth inquiry into his predecessors. Ordinary circumstances, however, make politics ordinary, and prosperity and affluence, even when they are not genuine, do not awaken a sense of injustice despite the impact of decisions and their grave consequences.

It is for this reason that no Lebanese had pondered the speeches and statements of former presidents. It is for this reason that no Lebanese had ever reminded them that they had promised reforms but had not kept their promises or that they had prescribed medication for the state's ailments but that they had neither purchased the medication nor given it to the patient.

It is for this reason also, after the outbreak of the cruel war which divided the people and made them lose their sense of confidence and stability, that official words now have meaning. A promise is like a towline thrown to a drowning person who holds on to it in the hope of escaping the wrath of the violent waves.

Would it be fitting to go back to the day when the president assumed his duties in Shturah? This was because the road to B'abda palace was impassable to him and to others, and the Chamber of Deputies in the heart of the capital was being bombarded by various groups. Let us go back to this historical day and evaluate the actions and the promises that followed. This would make the president's account a creditor's account because in 4 out of 6 years of his administration he has run out of all the things that a president of a republic can do to be gracious to his citizens.

On 22 September 1976 the president took the constitutional oath of office. He considered his task to be a difficult one, but he was hoping that it would not be impossible. [He said], "The time has come for us to engage in an open and a sincere, constructive dialogue. I have pledged myself to devote my life to make the Lebanese people use dialogue as their only means for settling disputes and solving small or major crises." And yet, the language of bullets is still clearer [than human dialogue]. He also said, "I am determined to play a positive role so that political solutions can be achieved as a result of that dialogue. This would safeguard supreme Lebanese interests without hurting the Palestinian question. Regardless of the obstacles that I may encounter on the way, I will always assume the position that is prescribed by my national duty and my sense of responsibility."

Programming the Cairo Agreement

Everyone believed that the winds of government would not deflect the ship of promises. One year after he had assumed power, Sarkis affirmed, "Through the meetings of the Tri-partite Lebanese-Syrian-Palestinian committee that were held recently in Shturah (22 July 1977), we were able to program the implementation of the Cairo Agreement in south Lebanon, and we drew up a detailed plan for the implementation of this program. We prepared a Lebanese force to go into south Lebanon to preserve the peace there, and we carried out the necessary communications on the broadest scale and in every area to ensure the success of this step. We did so before embarking on this step so as to avoid a possible setback whose consequences we can do without."

We need not remind [readers] that this plan was forgotten. It was followed by Arab summit meetings that in turn did not succeed in implementing the Cairo Agreement because the Lebanese interpretation of the agreement was at variance with the Palestinian interpretation and because Arab climates every time required the postponement of an inquiry into its details.

Building the Army

On 11 August 1977 Sarkis emphasized that "the state was continuing its plans to build the strong army that would preserve independence and sovereignty and be a symbol of national unity and self-sacrifice for the homeland." Large groups of people are still accusing the army of partisanship and of favoring one group and not the other. Recent clashes in al-Hadath have affirmed, however, that sensitivities were still taut in the army and among the Lebanese forces. What is important is that the deployment of the army was still partial, especially in the south. [What is also important] is the fact that the political resolution concerning the army and some of its departments has led to "a political divorce" between the

president and the prime minister and has created a crisis of commissioning and organizing a government. No one knows how this crisis will end.

Collecting Weapons

Ever since the al-Riyadh summit during which Arab kings and heads of state pledged their support to Sarkis and made many promises to support the legitimate government and to preserve the independence of Lebanon and the unity of its territory, Sarkis has tried to make the four-member committee a partner [in government]. This committee was commissioned to communicate with the various disputants and to unify the points of view around a middle-of-the-road formula [to settle] the dispute, after successive and numerous meetings, however, this committee adopted a hands-off policy despite the partial success it did achieve in adopting a resolution to collect the heavy weapons from organizations and parties. It gave a limited quantity of those weapons to the Arab deterrent force. But then the search for the steps that have to be taken came to an end, and the committee that was charged with supervising the implementation of the agreements failed. Once again all the problems were deferred.

Is the president adopting a wait and see policy? On independence day in 1977 he said, "A series of decisions and measures have also been taken in the economic, social, health and educational fields to expedite the restoration of matters to their normal course....What we are striving for is an integrated prosperity that would become evident in a revitalization that would include all the sectors, in a stability that would encourage the investment of capital and in a reassuring national accord for which we are at present working to overcome all the obstacles that impede its realization. This accord is a basic condition for the stability and prosperity of the economy." The Lebanese people are waiting, but they have not yet seen any of this.

Settlement and the Cruel Year

The chief executive officer did express one time a clear and a candid position against settling Palestinians in Lebanon when he said early in 1978, "The peace that we are hoping for will only be based on justice. I would be unfair for the question of Palestine to replace our question on the basis of creating a new question for Lebanon and for the people of Lebanon."

However, the Israeli invasion of south Lebanon took place this year, and that led to the decision to form the UN Emergency forces which spread out instead of the Lebanese army throughout the southern terrain. But the UN forces failed to expand to the Lebanese-Israeli borders because Maj Sa'd Haddad took possession of what is called the border strip and has recently proclaimed it the Free State of Lebanon. Thus part of the homeland fell, rejecting the legitimate government before the deterrent forces left all of Lebanon. In that year too war broke out openly between the Syrian forces operating in the deterrent forces and the Lebanese forces, and Sarkis wavered between resigning and continuing his responsibilities. After difficult efforts were made, an announcement was made on 3 October 1978 about "a security plan that would be implemented in 10 days. Principal activists would be asked to participate in a new government one of whose first tasks would be to deal with our current crisis." Weapons were temporarily set aside and Saudi soldiers

replaced the Syrians in the eastern areas. Scores of days and months went by, however, and no security plan was put into practice, and a government of activists was not formed.

The Legitimate Government and Construction

On the second anniversary of taking office the president tried to remind the factions that "the power of Lebanon lay in its being one country for one nation on one land with one capital not two...[a Lebanon] with an army from all the homeland for all the homeland. The development of Lebanon lies in a broad administrative and developmental decentralization and in fraternal relations with the Arab countries." No one, however, was listening.

Even "the examination of conscience" which Sarkis advocated on the third anniversary of his coming into office remained a mere resounding echo: "I have said repeatedly, and I am saying again that the utmost of heroism lies not in challenging the state, violating the law and giving oneself rights, but that it rather lies in achieving victory over oneself by voluntarily abandoning all circumstantial gains, supporting constitutional and national institutions and rallying around the legitimate government."

He added, "We still have to strengthen the structure of the state's institutions, to raise the ability of the government by making national sovereignty respected and effective. We have to achieve national accord and rebuild the structures that have been destroyed, and we have to regain the development that we had lost."

The Accord, the Accord

In a clear attempt to define another position President Sarkis proclaimed the incontestable principles that were issued by the Council of Ministers defining his real view of the broad features of a future Lebanon. These principles focused on "insisting upon guaranteeing the implementation of UN Security Council resolutions pertaining to the south" and on "the necessity of properly and fully executing the agreements with the PLO in a framework [that safeguards] Lebanon's sovereignty and safety."

But in his visits to the leaders of sects this year Sarkis appeared to be asking the men of the cloth to "bless" the accord which politicians were finding difficult to achieve. He was always admitting the difficulty of the situation: "If we can form a government of accord from political activists, we can put into practice the security plan that we have been hoping for with the least amount of problems and losses." Sarkis said that when he met al-Shaykh Kasan Khalid, the Mufti of the republic. When he visited the vice president of the Shi'ite Islamic Council, he affirmed the necessity of "continuing the effort to convene a spiritual summit that would give the principles of accord a push." However, during his visit to al-Shaykh 'Aql al-Daruz he repeated to everyone, "I swore to preserve the unity of Lebanon's territory, people and institutions. I will not violate my oath." It was with such statements that the president tried to affirm his determination to guarantee the minimum that was required of him after the errors of 4 years, that is, to turn Lebanon, at least geographically, [to his successor] without any [territorial] loss as it was turned over to him. The effort to make the Lebanese citizen maintain

his Lebanese identity and deal with the institutions of his state and not with other institutions is the minimum that can be done, but it is not easy.

The Miracle

It may be said that the president exaggerated once when he said, "Freedom will be our principal guide in front of the choices to which we will commit ourselves." But he was extremely realistic when he affirmed, "The crisis of Lebanon is tantamount to a catastrophe, and the process of saving it must be in the order of magnitude of a miracle."

It is not within the power of God, the saints or the prophets to realize the miracle. The miracle can be realized by turning the political and military balance of all the factions to the state treasury so that when the president makes a promise, he can rely on a realistic political and military balance, and he can [accordingly] "endorse his own checks."

Questions About Future

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 22-28 Sep 80 pp 35-36

[Article by Emile Khuri: "Sarkis Says, 'I Fear I May Not Leave My Successor Anything but the Presidency'"]

[Text] He did! He didn't! He won't! He will! Critics and interpreters of President Sarkis's positions during two thirds of his administration.

He is right! He is not! The last word is that a miracle in Lebanon is impossible!

Only 2 years of this administration's term remain. What will President Sarkis do that he was not able to do in the past 4 years?

When President Sarkis took office, he said, "We are starting with nothing." Will President Sarkis deliver the presidency and Lebanon to his successor at zero minus or at zero plus?

In the light of the factors that he has at his disposal and the limited power he has, President Sarkis is convinced when he says that what the legitimate government has regained and what it is regaining from the small illegitimate states will remain its own; it will not give up what it gains. The boundaries of the legitimate government may grow but they will not shrink. The red lines that separate the legitimate government from the illegitimate [government] may not be penetrated and surmounted by anyone. The evidence for this is what happened in the area of al-Hadath. No retreat was made in front of any power from the temporary borders of Sarkis's state in the process of waiting for that state to have the power to remove the borders of all the states and to return to the borders of the full state of Lebanon with its 10,000 kilometers.

Therefore, President Sarkis can neigher forgive nor be lenient with any power that penetrates the borders of his small state even though it is the smallest of the states that surround it.

The question that is being raised now is this: can President Sarkis during what is left of his administration deliver Lebanon to his successor with its borders intact and with its sovereignty safe, or will he deliver it to his successor just as he had received it from his predecessor?

President Sarkis does not claim much for himself. He says that if he cannot deliver Lebanon to his successor with its borders intact, with its sovereignty safe and with its entity and its unity sound, he would agree to deliver it as it is now, not as he received it even though he fears that he may not deliver anything of the republic except the presidency if the solution to the Middle East crisis is made at Lebanon's expense and he would have to pay the bill for the peace after having paid a high price for the war.

If Sarkis delivers Lebanon as it is now, he would be delivering to his successor a vital and united legitimate [government] with its institutions; an armed forces [organization] that is holding together; land, a portion of which has been regained; and a crisis which although not expired has not been able to make Lebanon breathe its last.

What can President Sarkis do to deliver to his successor more than he himself did receive? The answer to this question depends on who is giving the answer.

Some say that President Sarkis is wrong because he lost many opporutnities that would have enabled him to govern. He should have unsheathed the weapon for the occasion; he should have made decisions; and he should have made a selection from the bill of fare himself instead of consuming what was prepared for him. After 4 years in the government's mess hall, the time has come for him to order à la carte instead of from the menu. If there are forces that he cannot face which are preventing him from doing so, resignation would be the last resort.

Others are saying that it is not President Sarkis's fault, but rather that of the superpowers who linked the solution of Lebanon's crisis to the crisis of the area. Anyone who believes that President Sarkis can make Lebanon one of the super players instead of a toy in their hands is exaggerating. The only thing that President Sarkis is trying to do is to get Lebanon out of the game because Lebanon is not up to the game. The small player loses [when he plays] with the big player because the small amount of "cheating" that takes place in front of him would not enable him to take the risk.

President Sarkis has been expecting the birth of the accord for 4 years. When the time came for its birth, it became evident that the newly born accord had been miscarried. The midwife had left him to suffer the labor pains because she was not a legal midwife.

The Ceasarean operation that would take place to get rid of the fetus may kill the mother, but if the surgery is not performed, the fetus may die in its mother's womb.

What might any president have done other than what President Sarkis did do? The American ambassador in Beirut says that any person in President Sarkis's place could not have done more than President Sarkis was doind. No one is prepared to

give up anything to the authority of the state to help in its establishment. Others are saying, "President Sarkis has been accused of wavering and refraining from taking positions. When he made up his mind and made decisions, no one helped him carry them out."

Therefore, he preferred not to make any decisions that would remain unimplemented because it was not making decisions but rather carrying them out that was important.

What is Known and What is Being Said

[President Sarkis hears from his visitors questions like]: Why don't you carry out the decisions that you make? If you cannot carry out the decisions, why do you make them? Why don't you go on a tour of the friendly countries to set forth before them the question of Lebanon? Why don't you expose [the identity of] those who are impeding the establishement of the state? Why don't you resign if all roads are blocked to the restoration of life to Lebanon and sovereignty to the government? Why don't you ask for the withdrawal of the UN troops from the south if they are merely a false witness to Israel's veiled occupation or a mere cover for Israel's aggression? Why doesn't Lebanon withdraw from the Arab League and from the United Nations Organization if these organizations are merely a wailing wall? Why doesn't Lebanon order the army to go into the south and into areas other than the south and let what happen may? A drowning person is not afraid of getting wet.

When President Sarkis hears such questions from his visitors, he responds to them with bitterness in his heart. "Not everything that is known is being said. What is being said is known, and there is no need to repeat it."

The government made two decisions to respond to those who have been accusing it of hestitation and weakness. One decision requires the army to fill the vacuum that would be created by the withdrawal of the deterrant forces. The other decision proclaims the principles of accord and charges Prime Minister Taqiy al-Din al-Sulh with the task of forming a government of activists to execute the accord. The result [of these decisions] was that voices were raised a few days later opposing the fact that the army was charged with the task of filling the vacuum. Leaders were making conditions that were impossible to meet so as to impede the formation of a government of activists. The president was compelled to apologize. [These decisions] also resulted in the fact that the voices that had been calling upon the government to make decisions began to blame it for making them despite the fact that it was not confident it could carry them out. The government was at a loss whom to please among its critics.

When Sarkis visited the Vatican and Paris, he heard nothing but declarations of affection for Lebanon and statements insisting upon its unity, its sovereignty and its independence. If he visits the United States, he will not hear anything else because Lebanon now exists on paper and there is no solution to its crisis before the crisis of the area is solved. What is being requested is that everything remain in its place until it is time for the solution: the UN troops are to stay in their place; Sa'd Haddad's troops are to stay in their place; the Palestinian forces are to stay in their place; and the army is to stay in its barracks or wherever it is permitted to enter. UN resolutions and Arab summit resolutions are not to be implemented since the establishment of the Lebanese state is impossible to expect those who are in a crisis to be the ones to come up with solutions for it.

It is easy to say from a position of no responsibility that [the president] should expose those who are impeding the establishemnt of the state or resign, and it is easy to call for the withdrawal of the UN troops and for withdrawal from the Arab League and from the UN organization.

But what would happen then? What would happen after the deluge? It would be easy to take those positions if they provided a cure and did not kill. Many people live a life of illusions and believe that [viewing a war through] field binoculars is like fighting a war with field binoculars.

President Sarkis knows what is ailing Lebanon and what is its malady, but he neither has the remedy for it nor the cost of that remedy. When the disease is malignant, there is no need for the patient to be overwhelmed by it; the patient may experience the fear of death or he may live in a state of despair and despondence. If a remedy for his ailment is discovered, it is to be given to the patient one dosage at a time and not all at once.

The Last Decision

The question that remains is what can President Sarkis do in the 2 remaining years of his administration? Will he continue to manage the crisis, or will he enter into a cycle of solving it? Will he begin his administration upside down, contrary to the administrations of presidents? This means that he began as a weak president and ended as a strong one. It is during the fifth year of every administration that weaknesses begin and the search for a successor begins. Will President Sarkis's government become forceful in the fifth year after 4 years of weakness, and will the search for him continue begin because he is a survivor?

President Sarkis does not wish to remain crucified. He can come down from the cross, and the world would then come to an end. If he doesn't he would be counting the remaining days in his administration so he can set himself free and rescue himself if he cannot rescue Lebanon. Every day that goes by brings [another] days closer. Those who crucified him have to rescue him and not to tell him sarcastically, "Rescue yourself!"

The 2 remaining years may be like the past 4 years, or they may be the beginning of the government and not its end if the crisis in the area begins to find the road to a solution. The forces of Sa'd Haddad would then withdraw to implement the Security Council resolutions; the Palestinian troops would go back to the Palestinian homeland; and the state would be established in place of the small states so as to carry out the resolutions of Arab summit meetings.

This is the significant and the final decision that President Sarkis expects will shift his role from that of a middleman and an arbiter to that of ruler. It is a decision that refused to capitulate to the small states while it waits for peace for the state.

Will the dream prove to be true?

Security Policy Discussed

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 22-28 Sep 80 pp 36-37

[Article by R.S.: "The Government Has Not Relinquished Security to Anyone:]

[Text] The security difficulties which President Sarkis faced on the first day of his administration are still the same after 4 years. In fact, they have increased. But the president's power in security matters has also increased in proportion to the deployment and the effectiveness of the army.

It may be difficult for the neutral and objective observer to evaluate the last 4 years of President Ilias Sarkis's administration in the area of security and the relationship between the government and the parties. This is because the difficulties that faced the president on the first day of his term of office are the same ones that are facing him on the last day of the fourth year of his administration. In fact, there are certain conditions that developed in past years which did not exist before 23 September 1976. The reasons that caused the security situation in Lebanon to develop and fluctuate from one that was calm some times to one that was disturbed and inflamed other times are not necessarily local, but they rather constitute the essence of Arab, regional and international inter-reactions that affected the Lebanese scene negatively because it was weaker and more likely to explode than others because of its sectarian, social and demographic makeup.

The objective observer will have to give these reasons credit for having directly and effectively affected the security situation and for having made it fluctuate between the negative and the positive.

Hence, the task of President Sarkis in the area of security was not easy. Those who promised him they would make everything easy so that the government can control security reneged on their promise and started putting away the clubs in closets.

Sarkis proclaimed the slogan of security before a loaf of bread ever since the first moment of his election. He promised the Lebanese nation he would work to turn this slogan--this hope--into a living reality. He was right: the Lebanese citizen who lived through 2 years of a bloody war does prefer now to live for at least 1 hour in peace with his dignity intact instead of eating his daily bread as a cowering citizen controlled by the moods of the armed parties who usurped a government that was not theirs and rationalized their action in a manner that was suitable to their thinking. Sarkis devoted his attention to rebuilding the security agencies--the army, internal security and general security--because the borrowed security that was achieved by the presence of an Arab deterrent force will be gone one day--and it was hoped that this day would have come very soon. Therefore, through his aides, Sarkis tried to revive these agencies, and what he wanted with regard to the internal and general security forces was achieved. The members of these two agencies returned gradually to pursue their work with the cooperation of the Arab security agencies in the country.

But the process of unifying the army on new national bases lasted 2 full years; afterwards the army was able to undertake limited security missions. The barracks are now jointly occupied by Christians and Moslems, and the friendship camps that were established by army commander Gen Victor Khuri guaranteed the graduation of soldiers who have no sectarian inclinations and who believe in a united Lebanon.

The competencies and the basic positions are treated fairly, and the doors of the Ministry of Defense have been opened to fellows in arms without discrimination. Cooperation re-emerged despite occasional attempts to make such efforts fail. The main characters involved in those attempts were those who did not for one moment want to rebuild the army because such reconstruction implied the awakening of Lebanon. Those people proposed, among the proposals that they made, the question of dismissing the officers who were considered symbols of war. The dismissal operations were frozen, and the course of building the army suffered its first setback in February 1978 following the clash that took place between the army and the Syrian forces operating in Lebanon in front of the al-Fayyadiyah Barracks.

The government, however, was able to overcome this setback whose effects remained evident in the area of mutual confidence. The government faced other shakeups that were manifested in the introduction of a new defense bill that would achieve the national directions which a number of political parties had called for. After difficult labor pains a new defense law was born with many loopholes. Certain political circles viewed it as [a measure] that would split the army from the inside instead of affirming its solidarity.

Despite the concessions that were contained in the new law and the erosion of the full powers of the army commander, President Sarkis did not wish to oppose the law lest it be a "visa" that would allow the deployment of the army--an army whose numbers and materiel were continuing to grow. But there was no reaction to the president's ambition: the army stayed away from the center of the two areas even though it was scattered in the outskirts of both areas and in some suburbs.

Negative Positions

If the army were a model of the government's policy in the last 4 years, the measure of cooperation between Lebanese and non-Lebanese parties and the leadership of the army reflects the cooperation of these parties with the president himself, who has become the patriarch of the new unified army. The fact is that none of the parties made the work of the army easier. The Lebanese Front would not have accepted the presence of the army in some areas which it controlled had it not been for the bloody events that took place in those areas. It was these events that made residents of those areas call upon the army for help. This is what happened 3 years ago in al-Hadath, in 'Ayn al-Rummanah, in Furn al-Shubbak, in B'abda and in al-Hazimiyyah.

This fact is reflected by the regional reactions, especially the Phalangist reactions, to what recently happened in al-Hadath and to the campaigns to which the army was subjected because it settled the situation. It is known that the settlement was somewhat harsh, and the leadership could have alleviated its intensity.

The National Movement, however, did not give the army the green light. On the contrary, its principal members were still accusing the army of partisanship and were asking that it be made national. They were impeding every action by the army in the western region or in the regions that are controlled by their parties. The earnest concern for the army which the National Movement manifested after the events of al-Hadath was merely an affected concern; it was the product of emergency conditions that would disappear with their disappearance. It was the National Movement and its Lebanese and non-Lebanese allies that hindered the deployment of the army in some locations of the capital. The movement's consent to the symbolic

deployment of the army in south Lebanon came only because the movement was given one choice: either Israel and war or the UN forces and the army. The movement chose the second solution because it was the lesser of two evils.

Despite the fact that the chairman of the National Movement, Mr Walid Jumblatt did on several occasions manifest moderate positions towards the army, calling for its deployment and asking that it be given new and partial security responsibilities, it was the opinion inside this movement that tipped the scales in favor of dealing negatively with the army. That opinion remained predominant. It must be acknowledged that this involves some suggestions and some conflict of interest. This is because as soon as the army stands on its feet, it will close party doors from any direction whatsoever.

At the present stage the traditional Islamic team is incapable of offering anything because the amount of influence its principal members have on the Beirut scene is almost symbolic, and their will is paralyzed. They are, therefore, implicitly supporting the deployment of the army, but they are taking their time to announce their position until "the picture becomes clearer."

The Other Side

In its relations with the government the Palestinian side reflects another side of the [security coin]. This is because, based on the resolutions of the al-Riyadh and Cairo Summit Conferences one of the first security tasks of President Sarkis was to put into practice the agreements that were made between Lebanon and the PLO to regulate the armed Palestinian presence on Lebanese territory. The Arab deterrent force was entrusted with realizing this matter. But the regional, Arab and international conditions with which the government was confronted in the past years made the Palestinians refrain from putting these agreements into practice. Arab nations which had made the resolutions, and especially Syria because it was to execute and guarantee that agreement, were no longer able to exert pressure on the Palestinians to make them carry out these agreements. The visit which Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat made to Jerusalem and the complications that followed that visit cut all hopes for any Palestinian flexibility. This is because the resistance considers any concessions it may make in Lebanon in the interests of any team to fall into the category of conceding to al-Sadat and to Israel. This is based on the revolutionary course in whose context the resistance is working to regain the usurped rights of Palestinians.

Thus the Palestinians did not give President Sarkis anything either. In fact, the ratio of armed Palestinians increased; they became more widespread, and their influence on some parties increased due to the principle of Lebanese-Palestinian solidarity.

Because armed Palestinian presence is not only confined to south Lebanon, but it is also evident in Beirut and in the suburbs, many areas in those parts became practically closed to the Lebanese state. This is because the army cannot enter into those areas so as not to clash with the resistance. The role of the other security forces in those areas was confined to regulating traffic, filing reports and [sending] cables. This fact created an imbalance in the government's ability to demand its security rights because the president was no longer able to ask the Lebanese Front to give up its weapons. He knew that he could not even make that request

of the Palestinians who complain of continuing conspiracies against them and of the fact that the Lebanese people participate in those conspiracies.

As a result of this equation which seems logical in some of its aspects, the government was not able to gain concessions from the parties. On the contrary, agencies benefited from this conflict over land and established new alliances within and beyond the regional framework. Among these alliances were a few that went beyond the Arab framework also.

Syria, the Active Party

It is the Syrian party which remains in Lebanon as the fourth principal party; events prescribed that the Syrians play an active role in the events. In addition to the relations Damascus has had with Lebanese leaders and because its forces are in the deterrent forces, Damascus now has the decisive word in security as well as in political affairs. This is due to the fact that during its first 2 years the government had sought deterrent aid because it did not have an effective security force. Despite this security presence, however, several setbacks did take place. Among them was the bombardment of the eastern areas in the summer of 1978, the assassination of Kamal Jumblatt in addition to other incidents which assumed a sectarian character that limited the movement of these forces in several areas and, accordingly, diminished their effectiveness.

Along with officials in Damascus the government tried to establish a new formula for security cooperation that would open the doors to a new role for the army. The government was able to secure a limited agreement which guaranteed that the army would be deployed in the areas from which the Saudis had withdrawn, in the southern suburb and in parts of al-Jabal. Damascus, however, did not approve of the deployment of the army in the markets, in upper North al-Matn and in the North despite the decision that it had made following the meetings of the National Front in Damascus. These decisions had stipulated that Syrian forces operating in Lebanon be withdrawn so that they can devote themselves to the national battle against Israel. Lebanese messengers are still going back and forth from Damascus to establish some coordination that would give a more effective role to the Lebanese agencies, especially the army, and reduce the burden of the Syrian forces somewhat. Officials recognize the fundamental role which these forces played in restoring solidarity to the areas of Lebanon. But they do blame Syrian officials for not being totally responsive with regard to exerting pressure on the Palestinians to put the Cairo Agreement into effect. This is due to the Arab, regional and international variables that made it impossible to exert any pressure on the Palestinians at the present stage. In this regard a prominent Lebanese official states that Syria is incapable of forcing the Palestinians to withdraw from the south or to relinquish the rights they gained in Lebanon because it is not offering them any alternative. The Middle East crisis has not been solved in a manner that would preserve the rights of the Palestinians; nor are the Arab countries capable of waging war against Israel. The results of such a war are not guaranteed. There is no hope in the horizon that peace in the Middle East can be achieved through negotiations. Therefore, any action taken by Syria to change the positions of Palestinians in Lebanon is not countered by a gain that would equal this change, not to mention the fact that Damascus cannot risk its Arab assets for Lebanon's sake. Damascus has pan-Arab reasons and sensitive internal factors for not taking that risk.

The Present and the Future

These given factors and others paint a clear picture of how the Lebanese parties dealt with President Sarkis during the past 4 years. What is being said with regard to security in these dealings is also being said with regard to politics. The biggest evidence for that is the fact that the president was not able to form the coalition government and that he failed to bring together the political parties who have been getting farther apart from each other in the last few days through the negative convulsive positions they have taken. The president, however, has not despaired. Although he repeats in front of his visitors that he is disgusted with this situation, he continues to build and to prepare the army so that "one day" it would have an effective role and it would be ready when the time comes.

The army, which has been deployed in parts of Lebanon throughout the past 4 years appears on the threshold of the fifth year of Sarkis's administration to have a free hand in the southern suburb of Beirut. It seems to have a limited ability to act in the eastern area, in Kasrawan, in Jubayl and in al-Matn; it seems to be paralyzed in the South; and totally absent in the border strip, in the western area of Beirut and in the areas which are controlled by the parties of the National Movement and the Palestinian Resistance. If we consider President Sarkis's security power and the measure of his control over the country to be proportionate to the deployment and the effectiveness of his army, it would become clear to us that the government in the past 4 years has been waiting for opportunities to establish its control over security. Sometimes it succeeded; sometimes it failed; but the desire and the ability to try as well as the possibilities for success are still available.

President Sarkis thought that during this period of his administration he had been able to restore to the legitimate security agencies some of their regard after that had been gone. He was able to restore peace to areas that had lost their tranquility and calm, and he restored to government its prestige. He showed those who are near and far that a desire for something is one thing and the ability to accomplish it is another. The obstacles were something else. Above all, he exposed all the political parties and showed them in their true light. It became possible to distinguish those who made things easy from those who impeded matters. He let history pass judgment against them or for them.

However, the president's security policy in the last 2 years does take the following into consideration:

1. Continuing the process of building the army so that the army would consist of 40,000 [persons] armed with advanced and modern equipment.

2. Ensuring the deployment of the army along the sensitive contact lines, especially in the markets, in al-Jabal, and in the North.

3. Getting rid of everything that would hurt the unity and the solidarity of the army, especially the separatist phenomena in the army, such as the army of Free Lebanon on the borders and the Arab army of Lebanon.

4. Rallying public opinion around the army since it is the means of deliverance, and providing support for the army from the active political and popular leaders.

If all, or at least some, of these given factors are realized, the next 2 years may bring security gains to the government that would do away with notions that occur to some regarding self-security, government, mastery, control and the eradication of the distinctive Lebanese personality.

Arab View

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 22-28 Sep 80 pp 37-38

[Article by Nihad al-Mashnuq: "The Administration As Seen by Arabs and by Other Nations: 'We Were Not Able To Live, but We Were Able To Stay Alive"]

[Text] The administration and other horizons for the [next] 2 years on the Arab and international scenes. Counting on Washington without carrying out its wishes. The love of an affectionate mother and what she can do suffice. An insistence on the Syrian role and on support for the Palestinian question.

Early in the sixties former Minister of Foreign Affairs Philip Taqla had addressed the Chamber of Deputies to define foreign policy. He said that the Lebanese [officials] who were in charge had to look inwards with one eye and outwards with the other eye when they determined what their foreign policy would be.

This recommendation, which had resulted from the famous al-Khaymah meeting between the two late leaders, President Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir and Prime Minister Fu'ad Shihab on the Lebanese-Syrian borders, is still operative in an administration whose president has begun to play the role of minister of foreign affairs. President Sarkis continues to play this role to the degree that this appears to be his only task. The task of building the army requires weapons from abroad, and the role [the army plays] requires foreign approval to which is attached the approval of Lebanese parties.

If one may say so, the [establishment of the] inter-Lebanese accord requires keys that are foreign to these forces.

The Lebanese-Palestinian accord requires foreign intervention so it can begin. How will this be brought about if the administration wants it to succeed?

The formation of an activist political government has made it appear as though the obstacle to the accord came from outside. There are numerous such examples.

Therefore, President Sarkis began his administration abroad where the political and military Syrian initiative to stop the civil war in Lebanon became an Arab initiative which yielded the Arab deterrent forces at the Cairo Summit.

But the Arab cover for the Syrian role did not make President Sarkis count on overstepping the Syrians to the Arabs or on exerting pressure on them. At the Cairo Summit President Sarkis surprised President al-Sadat by defining what in his view was a clear foreign policy for Lebanon.

Four Trends

There were four trends to that definition.

The first was that the Lebanese regime insisted on its sovereignty over all of its territories without exception or loss of its rights.

The second was that Lebanon, while establishing normal relations with all the Arab countries was resolute about [establishing] a special relationship with Syria.

The third was that Lebanon supported the Palestinian question in all Arab and international assemblies.

The fourth was that Lebanon was intent upon the truce agreement with Israel.

President Sarkis may not have succeeded in implementing his foreign policy despite the major singificance that he ascribes to that role. This has led to the statement that the administrations's best minister of foreign affairs was President Sarkis himself. So far, however, the fruits of Sarkis's policy did not fail in his view or in the view of those who counsel him in determining this policy.

A judgment about this policy cannot be made by looking superficially at those matters which indicate that Lebanon did not achieve political or security progress throughout the past 4 years. But a judgment can be made through information and ideas about what did happen and what may have happened in Lebanon with regard to Lebanon's sovereignty and the unity of its people and its territory had it not been for this policy.

Just as Philip Taqla changed and Prime Minister Shihab died, new factors were introduced into the scene, and old established facts in Lebanon's Arab and international traditional policy were changed. Lebanon's foreign policy was based on four established facts: first, the Vatican's concern with the formula of Lebanon and the state of coexistence between Moslem and Christian Lebanese; second, France the "affectionate mother"; third, Whasington, the leader of the free world; fourth, Cairo, the indisputable leader of the Arab world. Minister Taqla's theory about Lebanon being the first to obey and the 1st to disobey in Arab relations is to be taken into consideration.

This formula remained in effect until the beginning of the Lebanese War in 1975. New factors came into the formula. These are, first, Syria with its political and military initiative; second, the PLO whose leaders and political and military popular base are now in Lebanon; and third, Israel which had been asking for a truce agreement and now has a geographic and a human base on the Lebanese-Israeli border. It is Lebanon who is now asking for the implementation of the truce agreement.

Naturally, all this is followed by the fact that Cairo got out of the equation of Lebanon's foreign policy and left the Arab equation in its entirety after the Camp David accords were signed. Lebanon is now at the bottom of the list of France's concerns at a time when the importance of Arab oil is increasing. Willingly or unwillingly, Arab oil has always been inclined to support the PLO and not to ask the organization for what it cannot offer. With regard to the Vatican there is the famous question about the number of soldiers in the army of the Catholic Pope. Washington continues to act according to what it perceives are its interests. This covers accusing Kissinger of starting the war in Lebanon and [it includes] the small state of Sa'd Haddad in the south as well as the tightfisted operations of arming the Lebanese army.

The Administration and Israel

What did the administration do vis a vis these new facts?

Let us begin with Israel. After President Sarkis assumed his responsibilities and Gen Victor Khuri was appointed army commander, a military delegation representing the Lebanese side in the truce agreement with Israel went to al-Naqurah to meet with the Israeli side. While the discussion was going on, it was time for lunch, but the Lebanese officers declined. The Israelis were surprised by the Lebanese officers, Brig Gen Sarduk had brought with him a bag that contained lunch for him and his companions in the delegation. The discussion became vehement; and the two parties did not reach any conclusion.

The commentary that was attributed to the Israeli side and relayed by UN observers on the day following the meeting was that the Lebanese officers either lived outsice Lebanon during the war or they had not learned from it. In fact they conducted themselves as though Israel lacked the means, such as Sa'd Haddad and others, of exerting pressure [on Lebanon]. Hence President Sarkis has been intent throughout the past 4 years of his administration on dealing with Israel through the truce committee either regarding Sa'd Haddad or when the Israelis occupied the south. It were as though Lebanon were a sound, healthy nation adhering to the truce agreement for which it had no political alternative.

The Palestinians and Syria

The give and take with the liberation organization is another matter. The Palestinian excesses, which began iwth a roadblock on the Corniche al-Mazr'ah and erupted in 1969 leading to the signing of the Cairo Agreement, are now stretched from the south to the north except for some areas. The Palestinians have a military and a media presence as well as an intense military presence which the state does not find beneficial.

But this large political and military presence did not change the administration's position. The administration supports the Palestinian question politically, but it cannot sign anything that goes beyond the Cairo Agreement militarily. The administration considers this agreement to be an error that may not be repeated, but that it is sufficient to insist upon it.

Despite everything President Sarkis kept his promise to support the Palestinian question but not the armed Palestinian presence on Lebanon's territory. Throughout the 4 years Palestinian leaders were not able to accuse him of abandoning the question politically. The excesses did not make him relinquish this support despite all the pressures that were exerted on him to make the Lebanese question an obstacle to the Palestinian question.

Syria then replaced Cairo in the Arab political equation. In fact it replaced all the Arabs, acquiring the primary Arab role. There was nothing curious about this; nor did President Sarkis object to it. Syria forced itself militarily and politically into Lebanon to stop the civil war and then to participate in the task of rebuilding Lebanon. President Sarkis, therefore, has always been intent upon saying that there can be no solution unless an understanding with Syria is reached. He is thereby showing the positive military and political role of Syria.

Hence comes the statement that Arab interference through the follow-up committee as well as other actions have made the Lebanese crisis more complicated. The Arab countries wanted to help Lebanon by taking on part of the Syrian role themselves without giving it to Lebanon. Therefore, President Sarkis sees no benefit in having any Arab country play a role unilaterally or collectively under the logo of the Arab League. He reaffirms what he said early in his administration, "Normal relations with the Arabs and special relations with Syria." But this special feature in Lebanese-Syrian relations does not make the foreign policies of Damascus and Beirut identical. Difference, however, does not mean opposing the other's position. An example of this [occurred] when Lebanon voted against Soviet intervention in Afghanistan but Syria abstained from voting. Lebanon attended the Conference of Islamic Nations in Pakistan in that regard, but Syria did not.

The Affectionate Mother and Washington

France has abandoned her policy of being Lebanon's "affectionate mother," and it has become a country with interests in the Arab countries to which it is devoting a major portion of its policy, even in Lebanon. President Sarkis, therefore, was careful during his visit to the French capital--or it is said that he was asked--not to ask France to do what it cannot do for Palestine and for the Arabs. Sarkis was satisfied with what the French government wanted to give him politically and militarily. The case became more positive in the Pope's letters to the U.S. president. But the effect such letters have is limited.

Washington officials, however, have been trying to ask President Sarkis to do what he cannot do. This includes accepting the settlement of Palestinians as well as suggestions about a federal state. It seems that the fact that Washington's requests have not been carried out is the obstacle to [providing] more arms to the army or to clarity in the political position with regard to supporting the legitimate Lebanese government.

President Sarkis's refusal of the United States' demands does not make him despair of a relationship with Washington. The wisdom of this policy became evident in Israel's withdrawal from the south. This is what is happening for the first time in the history of the Israeli occupation of Arab lands.

Likewise, this rejection does not remove the role the Soviets played in the Lebanese crisis through the Middle East crisis from the adminstration's foreign equation. President Sarkis, therefore, took pains to commend the Soviet role repeatedly. He received similar commendations from Moscow.

Once again we ask: Has the administration succeeded in its foreign policy?

In view of all these forces and of the internal fragmentation which Lebanon is experiencing, it seems that the official Lebanese decision is independent even though it suffered setbacks in some instances. The best example of the administrations's condition in its 4 years was what the late 'Abd-al-Ghani al-'Arisi-- who was executed by the Turks--said at the 1913 Peace Conference in Paris: "We were not able to live, but we were able to stay alive!"

In the next issue, the characteristics of the seventh president.

8592
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CHOICE OF NEW CABINET MINISTERS ANALYZED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 1 Nov 80 p 29

[Article by George Bashir: "United States to Lebanon: 'Do Something for Yourselves in New Middle East Map; Appointment of Mu'awwad and Nasr as Ministers Means Undeclared Truce Between the Phalange and Franjiyah; Appointment of Marwan Hamadah Means Junblatt and National Movement Are Satisfied With Regime"]

[Text] Beirut--Has President Ilyas Sarkis realized the condition on whose basis he had changed his mind about resigning from the presidency 3 years ago?

Those who have kept up with the endeavors made by the Lebanese president since that date and until the present, whether the endeavors to form a cabinet representing the main political leaderships in the country or the endeavors to gather the disputing parties around the regime's table to establish national detente, have realized since Prime Minister Shafiq al-Wazzan announced his cabinet that even the Lebanese president's "heart is will but flesh is weak."

When President Sarkis formed Prime Minister Dr al-Huss's second cabinet, he had reached with his major aides the conviction that the regime can do nothing at the level of the fateful phase being undergone by Lebanon and the area unless the government includes ministers actually representing the parties outside the government and unless such ministers take part with the president of the republic in adopting important decisions and cling to their implementation. The regime, and along with it any cabinet of the type of the new cabinet, will not be able to implement a single decision to solve any of the difficult problems existing in Lebanon without the approval of the aforementioned leaderships. The proof of this is that the three cabinets formed by Dr al-Huss prior to Prime Minister al-Wazzan's cabinet were able to do nothing to deal with these problems.

Announcement of the new cabinet in Lebanon just one week before the date of the U.S. elections has not been incidental, according to the informed sources. The U.S. official circles, whether in the White House, in the Department of State or even in the Pentagon, have been urging the Lebanese authorities concerned to speed up formation of the cabinet, any cabinet, before the said date because it will be dangerous for Lebanon not to have a cabinet at a time when a "new Middle East with a new political, economic and military geography is being born," according to what Maurice Draper, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for Middle Eastern and Lebanese affairs, and Gen Joseph Skaff, one of the Pentagon's prominent military strategists, told the Lebanese communities in the annual conference held by the

Lebanese-U.S. League in Washington 2 weeks ago. Perhaps the Lebanese political circles still remember the similar statements made by John Gunther Dean, the U.S. ambassador to Lebanon, following announcement of the acceptance of the resignation of Prime Minister Dr al-Huss's cabinet when the ambassador said: "The Lebanese must hurry up to turn over the page of their differences temporarily and must encourage the regime in its endeavor to form a cabinet because the Middle East area is on the threshold of strategic, geographic, political, economic and military changes that may actually be reflected on Lebanon and may affect it seriously if it is without a cabinet."

However, will the danger of the ramifications of the strategic changes actually taking place in the Middle East be contained in the presence of a cabinet such as the one Prime Minister Shafiq al-Wazzan succeeded in forming at the end of last week without the actual representatives of the political and partisan leaderships? This is the question whose results the observers expect to find out in the coming weeks and months. The U.S. morphine injection is still, it seems, having its effect, especially among the government leaders, because the formation of a cabinet from whatever is available and in this manner will contribute to freezing the main problems from which Lebanon has been suffering for 6 years, particularly the security and development problems, the price instability, the inactivity of the judiciary, the absence of police activity in all the areas and the state's loss of its sovereignty and prestige, and even its presence, in the most sensitive areas, such as the south, the north, some parts of Mount Lebanon, Beirut and al-Biqa'. Yet, the Americans, especially their ambassador in Beirut, are still exerting pressure and still urging Job's patience and the freezing of everything until relief comes and relief is, according to the assurances of Ambassador Dean, imminent. Otherwise, President Ilyas Sarkis's wish to resign would have been realized and would not have been frozen, especially since this wish is confined to guaranteeing the regime's ability to exercise its full powers over the homeland's soil, particularly the power of forming a strong cabinet capable of adopting decisions and abiding by their implementation, i.e. a cabinet formed of the main political leaderships.

There is a common proverb which says "he who sees the misfortunes of others finds that his misfortunes are easy." But the misfortune that has afflicted and continues to afflict Lebanon can withstand no more waiting and freezing by the U.S. morphine injection, even though some say in the course of their efforts to help the regime swallow the misfortunes that "even the resolutions taken by the Arab governments in their summit meetings are unimplementable because the protagonists of the game have not yet shown sufficient readiness to implement them." Lebanon's concerns are not as big as the misfortunes of the Arab governments. Therefore, all Lebanon can do is wait.

It is true, in the view of observers, that President Ilyas Sarkis has made important steps with his success in ending the cabinet crisis which almost turned into a crisis of the regime because what is most significant in this cabinet is that it has been formed, "even though it is not a cabinet of strong and capable leaderships," and that the ghost of the regime's crisis has disappeared, even if only temporarily. The second important step is that President Sarkis has succeeded in including another youth similar to Salim al-Huss in the prime ministers club and in including real representatives of some of the estranged leaderships whose continued estrangement under this particular circumstance creates a concern for the regime, for President Sarkis and for any future regime and president.

The new cabinet includes Deputy Rene Mu'awwad, one of the leaders of the north, and Dr Qaysar Nasr, one of the prominent people close to the Phalange. This is expected to bring about progress in the indirect dialogue between President Franjiyah, even though he is annoyed with the appointment of Mu'awwad to the post of minister, and the Phalange. Moreover, the appointment can bring abour relaxation in the tense relations between Franjiyah and the regime.

As for the appointment of Marwan Hamadah, who is close to Walid Junblatt and the National Movement, it means that Junblatt is continuing his dialogue and his positive cooperation with the regime and that he is willing to take up the provisions of the national detente formula, declared by President Sarkis 6 months ago, for serious discussion with the Lebanese Front.

But will Lawyer Shafiq al-Wazzan, the new prime minister, be able to move with the National Movement chairman from the phase of talk about the detente provisions to the phase of serious discussion to implement the detente, thus making the current cabinet the bridge over which the leaderships cross with the regime toward detente?

There are "rumors" of the sort behind the scenes. However, the positions of the game's protagonists have not become clear yet, especially since there are those who say that the game is still in its early stages. This means that Lebanon has to wait and has to live on the effect of the U.S. morphine. Here, those who are aware of the inner affairs are afraid that the regime will get used to living under the effect of the morphine and that "detente" will become hard to realize.

As to why the regime has not been able to form a cabinet of leaderships, why Taqi-al-Din al-Sulh has declined to form Shafiq al-Wazzan's cabinet [sic] and why the Lebanese Front and the National Movement do not meet in a single cabinet, no answer is permitted for these questions, at least for the present.

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PHALANGIST LEADER DISCUSSES EVENTS AT 'AYN AL-RUMMANAH

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 10 Nov 80 p 19

[Article: "Bashir al-Jumayyil Tells AL-QABAS That Army and Government Need Phalangists; Sarkis, Army Commander and Prime Minister Threatened To Resign After Events of 'Ayn al-Rummanah"]

[Text] The fighting in 'Ayn al-Rummanah has come to an end until further notice, but the complications of the violent events seen in this area between the Phalangist and the Liberal parties and then between the Phalangist party and the Lebanese army have not. It seems that these will not come to an end before several surprises occur in more than one field.

Ever since the "do-gooders" were able to bring the second round of the war of annihilation to an end between the liberals and the Phalangists--it is known that the first round was fought last October 7--a whole series of rumors, expectations and speculations have recurred. Although not all of them are true, it is said, "There is no smoke without fire." Among these rumors and speculations are [the following]:

* President Sarkis's insinuations that he would resign if the bloody struggle between the Phalangists and the Liberals does not come to an end.

* Army Commander Gen Victor Khuri's threat to resign if "punitive measures are taken against some army officers." These officers had been held responsible for creating a climate of tension in 'Ayn al-Rummanah and for helping the Phalangists against the liberals.

* A statement made by the new Prime Minister Mr Shafiq al-Wazzan that he would be compelled to submit his resignation unless what really happened in 'Ayn al-Rummanah is publicly explained and firm measures are taken accordingly against any army officer or soldier implicated by the investigations of participating in these events on the side of the Phalangists. This is what Mr al-Wazzan himself said.

* The possibility that [former] President Camille Sham'un may declare his ultimate resignation from the Lebanese Front. In this case he would become the second person after [former] President Sulayman Franjiyyah whose conflict with the Phalangists compelled him to give up his seat in the afore-mentioned front.

* The violent reactions to the events of 'Ayn al-Rummanah in the ranks of national and ethnic forces and parties against the government and the army are continuing. It is being said in this regard that if the state chooses not to deal firmly with the situation against "the supporters of the Phalangists in the army," these forces will boycott the regime and the government and will not cooperate with any of its symbolic figures, its organizations or its tools.

These are the most important [matters] that are being discussed in official and political circles regarding the probable consequences of the events of 'Ayn al-Rummanah. It becomes evident in view of these discussions that these events have cast dark shadows on the political situation which is becoming more troubled and more neglected. This has strengthened fears of the possibility of a broad breakdown in security in more than one area and between more than one of the parties that can be found on the Lebanese scene.

All this is now possible because of what happened in 'Ayn al-Rummanah. Some politicians and observers are saying that "History repeats itself." About 5 years ago, specifically on 13 April 1975, shots were fired at a bus carrying a group of Palestinians in the area. This triggered a series of continuous events from whose painful wounds Lebanon has not yet recovered.

At the present time the recent events that occurred more than a week ago in the same area are threatening to create a similar situation of "continuous security incidents and eruptions."

How and why [do these events happen]?

Politicians are saying that when the Phalangist party began liquidating the liberals last 7 July in al-Ashrafiyah, in Juniyah and in some neighboring areas, the belief prevailed that the war of "the comrades-at-arms" had come to an end at that point because the other areas that had been candidates for similar incidents--and these are 'Ayn al-Rummanah, Furn al-Shubak and al-Hadath--were living in an atmosphere of discipline and stability because they were under the direct control of the Lebanese army.

The first blow to this belief occurred in al-Hadath when several clashes occurred about 2 weeks ago between armed liberals and armed Phalangists. It was then said that the army in that area did not interfere until it received clear orders to get matters under control.

But it was also said that the events of al-Hadath occurred because some army officers who support the leader of the Liberal party, Camille Sham'un decided to "avenge" the total liquidation of the liberals to which they were subjected in al-Ashrafiyah, in Juniyah and in neighboring areas. They did so by harassing Phalangist members and officials in al-Hadath. This led Bashir al-Jumayyil to make a decision which AL-'AMAL, the newspaper which speaks for the Phalangist party, described as a decision "to teach the liberals and those who cooperate with them a lesson" in that area.

But expectations in 'Ayn al-Rummanah were different. The army was surrounding the city and was to be found on its streets. Furthermore, the violent clashes that had occurred in the city between the liberals and the Phalangists before the army came into 'Ayn al-Rummanah had diminished the military power of both parties and forced hundreds of armed individuals on both sides to leave the city and go to other areas in East Beirut and near it.

Therefore, it seemed that 'Ayn al-Rummanah was protected. No one expected that there be any local fighting there, especially since the presence of the army had all but eliminated all forms of emotionalism and provocations between the armed people there.

But the surprise came on 27 October when the Phalangists decided to launch the second round of the war of annihilation against the liberals.

In the early hours of that round the gunfire exchange was confined to the few Phalangists and the liberals who were in the area. The army did not interfere to stop the gunfire.

After a few hours several reinforcements of fighters, heavy weapons and munitions arrived for the armed Phalangists. These reinforcements entered Furn al-Shubak and 'Ayn al-Rummanah despite the fact that the army was there.

At that moment there was quite an upheaval against the army, and different charges were made against it. It was said that these reinforcements would not have arrived without the assistance of the army. [It was said] that some army officers and soldiers had taken part in firing on the positions of the liberals and that a secret agreement had been reached between the commanders of the army and Phalangist commanders to liquidate the supporters of Sham'un. Many of these accusations were made, but accounts about their accuracy differed, and reactions to them were controversial. All the speculations about the deteriorating political and security situation became imminent.

The Phalangist Story

Phalangist party officials denied the statements that were made about the army's help to them. Bashir al-Jumayyil said that when his party makes up

its mind to execute a decision it had made, it does not need any help from anyone, whether that decision was to be carried out in 'Ayn al-Rummanah or in any other area.

Al-Jumayyil, Jr said [the following] to AL-QABAS in response to a question about the circumstances and conditions that are closely related to the events of 'Ayn al-Rummanah:

"As far as we are concerned, what happened in 'Ayn al-Rummanah was natural and desirable. The army did not help us; we are the ones who are helping the army. We are always asking the army to tell us what it needs so it can establish its authority and its effectiveness."

[Question] But if the army had opposed you in 'Ayn al-Rummanah and Furn al-Shubak, you would have found it extremely difficult to execute your decision to liquidate the liberal party there!

[Answer] First of all, I want to make it clear that we do not want to liquidate the liberals in 'Ayn al-Rummanah or elsewhere. Our ties with this party and with its leader, Camille Sham'un are more than ties of ordinary friendship. We are allied against enemies that are known and well-defined. To put it briefly, what we did in 'Ayn al-Rummanah was to remove the corruption and the vices there. Residents' complaints in 'Ayn al-Rummanah had increased recently, and scores of residents had come to us asking that we shut down the houses of gambling and the hashish smoking dens which had proliferated among the people. Therefore, we decided to take action. We tried to liquidate people in 'Ayn al-Rummanah who were not liberals. Why? Because our decision was clear; our decision was to liquidate the wicked and those who were breaking the law.

Al-Jumayyil paused briefly and then went on to say, "The background to our decision was evident in the strict instructions we gave to our people after we concluded our mission in 'Ayn al-Rummanah. According to those instructions we forbad the setting up of roadblocks, the carrying of weapons and moving about with weapons. What we did was to purge the wicked and those who pursue their own self interest from our ranks. I am saying quite frankly that Phalangist members were breaking the law in more than one area and that we banished and punished them without any fanfare. Others, however,"--and he was referring to the liberals--"were not able to do so. This led us to assume this responsibility. Since this is the case, we do not need assistance from anyone; we do not need assistance from the army or from anyone else because we are liquidating people who are viewed with disfavor. Let me re-emphasize that we are not a substitute for the army or for the government, but be sure that it is the army and the government who want us to help them and not the other way round."

Sham'un: Putting Officers on Trial

The Phalangist story, however, did not persuade many people. Chief among those [who were not persuaded] was President Sham'un. Not even Prime

Minister Mr al-Wazzan and the nationalist parties and personalities were convinced.

The fact is that all these parties had dealt with the events of 'Ayn al-Rummanah on the basis of the fact that they constituted a war of annihilation led by Bashir al-Jumayyil against the liberals. If the purpose behind the Phalangist decision was to liquidate the dens of evil, such a task belongs to the army and the official police forces. The Phalangists cannot take the place of the legal forces especially in those areas that are controlled by those legal forces.

Furthermore, the problem on which these parties focused [their attention] went beyond looking into the nature of the Phalangist decision to that of raising questions about the role played by some army officers who were present in the area to serve the interests of the Phalangists.

President Sham'un affirmed that the army "acted in collusion with the Phalangists against the liberals." He asked the prime minister publicly to put on trial those army officers whose assistance to the Phalangists is established by the investigations.

Leaders of the liberal party expressed different views on the subject that stated that there was no conclusive evidence that the army had acted in collusion with the Phalangists. What is certain, however, is that the army did not take action to stop the fighting, and it continued to observe [the events] at a distance. According to these circles this means that "As far as responsibility is concerned, overlooking a crime is just like committing it."

These circles add that among the facts that have also been established is that of the army command receiving direct threats from Bashir al-Jumayyil who had threatened that he was capable of dismantling the whole army in no more than 5 minutes.

The same circles are saying that Bashir al-Jumayyil had sent a similar threat to President Sarkis. Al-Jumayyil had sent a messenger to President Sarkis to tell him that the Phalangist fighters were capable of annihilating the army in 'Ayn al-Rummanah and Furn al-Shubak and eventually going to B'abda Palace, the presidential palace, where they would seize control and overthrow the president of the republic.

But these statements were not substantiated by solid evidence to affirm their authenticity, especially since President Sarkis and the members of the army command had in turn insisted on carrying out all the necessary investigations to explain the circumstances that were related to the events at 'Ayn al-Rummanah.

It is worth mentioning in this regard that the army command prepared a detailed report that included all the information it had about this

matter. It is also worth mentioning that the Supreme Defense Council looked into the matter and took the measures that were necessary after assuring itself first that the army had not become involved with the Phalangists and that it had been unable to take any action to stop the fighting.

A senior officer in the army command told AL-QABAS, "Let us be realistic. Neither the Lebanese army nor any other army can carry out any action unless such action is supported by a political decision which is usually the result of a political agreement. Not even the Syrian army, which came into Lebanon in 1976 and whose forces outnumbered the present forces of the Lebanese army two to one or more, was able to enter an area by force until a political decision was made and a political agreement was reached."

The senior officer added, "The problem of the Lebanese army is that attacking it has become one of the easiest things to do in Lebanon. Some parties and agencies have acquired the habit of making accusations against the army. But the army is the army, and the next days will prove that it is the only power which constitutes the present and the future hope for Lebanon and for the Lebanese people."

And yet, as we wait for this future, no one can predict the extent of the complications of the 'Ayn al-Rummanah events.

All that can be said is that the army is in an unenviable position and that many of the reinforcements that were added to its structure in recent years were undermined by the force of political tremors and upheavals.

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RAMIFICATIONS OF SITUATION IN 'AYN AL-RUMMANAH EXAMINED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 8 Nov 80 pp 10-12

[Article by Ghassan Bayram: "'Ayn al-Rummanah: Legitimacy and Dead End; Prime Minister al-Wazzan Resorts to Peaceful Solution to Contain 'Ayn al-Rummanah Incidents Because They Were not Aimed Against His Cabinet But Against Legitimacy; Sarkis Supports al-Wazzan's Decision not to Let Army Confront Combatants"]

[Text] On the morning in which formation of Prime Minister Shafiq al-Wazzan's cabinet was announced, Bashir al-Jumayyil, the Phalange Party military commander, attended a popular rally and delivered a political speech which was confined to generalities. Bashir's friends were surprised that he finished his speech without announcing the basic measures that he had intended to declare in order to complete the symbols of his full autonomous authority over the entire Christian areas that have come to be known as the Phalangist mini-state. Bashir justified his refrainment from exploding this bomb by saying that he did not want to embark on such steps at a time when a new cabinet was being formed and promised to choose the right time to declare his new steps which include the formation of national guard.

All the initiatives and military and non-military steps taken by the Phalange Party generally have come to be coupled with the name of Bashir al-Jumayyil, the second oldest son of Pierre al-Jumayyil, the Phalange Party chairman. It is no longer possible to distinguish whether these initiatives are party resolutions or whether Bashir is the maker and executor of the decisions. But what has become understood and well known is that throughout the past 2 years, Bashir al-Jumayyil has been able to settle the party decision in his favor most of the time, especially on the fundamental security and military issues, by virtue of the growth of the Phalangist military force as a striking force under the command of Bashir who is now actually able to say in the field: "I am the party and the party is me."

Since the operation of 7 July which he led and in which he liquidated the military wing of ex-President Camille Sham'un's party, Bashir al-Jumayyil has been pursuing the remaining armed Sham'unite bands and gatherings to subjugate their members and commanders and force them to join the Lebanese Forces or else be liquidated in military battles if they refuse to submit to this will.

This military pursuit has continued unabated at a time when there have been constant political meetings between ex-President Sham'un and Pierre al-Jumayyil under the slogan of uniting the forces of the two parties in the crucible of the Lebanese Forces which are led by Bashir al-Jumayyil.

'Ayn al-Rummanah was the last stop for Bashir al-Jumayyil's endeavors to liquidate the remaining armed groups raising the slogan of affiliation with the Liberal National Party. 'Ayn al-Rummanah group was under the command of a person called Ilyas Hannush, nicknamed al-Hanash [the snake]. For some time, this group had been receiving one ultimatum after another demanding that it declare its joining Bashir al-Jumayyil's forces or suffer the consequences in military liquidation.

Before storming 'Ayn al-Rummanah, Bashir al-Jumayyil visited Deputy Kazin al-Khalil, their [presumably meaning the Phalanges'] traditional friend who is also known for his old alliance with ex-President Sham'un, and complained to him that his brother Amin al-Jumayyil and Danny Sham'un were preparing a scheme aimed at uniting the remaining armed Sham'unite groups with the militia led by his brother Amin al-Jumayyil in northern al-Matn. Shaykh Bashir had been watching those contacts with strong concern and dissatisfaction because the success of such an endeavor would lead to disputing his influence and his military leadership in the Christian areas and would keep off him some of the limelights that have made him so far the strongest and the most influential man in everything.

Kazim al-Khalil tried to pacify Bashir and to tell him that he was exaggerating and giving matters bigger dimensions than their real ones. "The endeavor by Amin and Danny Sham'un about which you have been talking and which you fear is an old endeavor that has produced nothing. The idea was projected fundamentally by your brother Bashir and not by Danny."

Kazim al-Khalil then recounted to Bashir al-Jumayyil the details of a meeting held at his home in al-Hazimiyah between Amin al-Jumayyil and Danny Sham'un in the wake of the 7 July battles, saying: "At that meeting, Shaykh Amin presented to Danny a plan to unite his military organization in northern al-Matn with the remnants of the armed Sham'unites, thus making it primarily and initially possible to impose full control on northern and southern al-Matn areas and on other areas and to create some sort of a balance with the forces of Bashir al-Jumayyil and to block the path in the face of Bashir's complete domination and the face of the so-called one-party or one-person rule."

At the same meeting, Kazim al-Khalil said: "In principle, the idea is not bad. But is Bashir pleased with such a step and have you discussed this issue with him?"

Amin al-Jumayyil replied: "No, I haven't discussed this issue with him. He has his situation and we have ours."

Al-Khalil then said: "In case Bashir decides to oppose this plan by force, are you ready to clash with him?"

Amin answered: "Of course not. We will not let matters reach this point. If we disagree, we will go to the party for arbitration."

Kazim al-Khalil concluded his recount to Bashir al-Jumayyil by telling him that the meeting ended at the time without any decisive conclusion and that [the plan] then started to wither gradually until it was frozen finally.

Afterwards, Kazim al-Khalil said in his private meetings that the latest incidents in 'Any al-Rummanah were not aimed against the state and that Bashir al-Jumayyil's blow against the armed Liberals in 'Ayn al-Rummanah was aimed against the ideas and aspirations of his brother Amin and at any extension of Amin's military influence outside his election district in northern al-Matn and, consequently, at destroying any military nucleus capable of uniting the Sham'unite groupings and the military force controlled by Amin al-Jumayyil so that the military leadership of all the armed forces in the Christian areas may remain under the control of Bashir.

Nobody doubts that Kazim al-Khalil is extensively informed of what takes place between the Phalange Party and Sham'un's Liberal Party and even of what takes place within each party separately. But he has found this time those who accuse this conviction which he holds of shortsightedness and of the inability to comprehend completely what is happening and what Bashir al-Jumayyil is planning in order to purge his areas primarily of any weapon that does not submit to the Phalangist will prior to preparing and getting ready to establish the autonomous Phalangist authority in these areas before moving to the next phase in which he can realize his dream of liberating other Lebanese areas that can complement in the future the promised Christian state, in case the comprehensive solution to the area's crisis comes to impose resettlement [of the Palestinians in Lebanon] and partition.

This is why the anti-Phalangist forces on the Lebanese arena have put the latest incidents in 'Ayn al-Rummanah within this framework and have approached their consequences within these dimensions and why these forces have not viewed the incidents as a mere battle between a Phalangist and a Sham'unite organization. It is within this framework and on the basis of these dimensions that the reaction has come to the army's failure to intervene strongly as of the first day to settle the situation in favor of the legitimacy and its authority.

'Ayn al-Rummanah is about the only area in which the army has been deployed strongly for almost a year in the wake of destructive battles between the Phalange and the Liberals and the only area where this army has established its full control, thus turning it into a model of calm, security and stability and into a prominent example showing the effect and results of the state's presence and of how the situation becomes when the legitimate authority takes charge of the security responsibility in an area.

Since the first day in which the battle between al-Hanash group and the Phalange started, numerous questions began to be raised about the authority's stance, about how the authority could permit such security deterioration in an area where the army has a strong presence and about why the army didn't intervene to put an end to the issue and arrest these armed elements. The questions then began to multiply rapidly and some people thought that some sort of a tactic was involved. But what actually happened is that Phalangist reinforcements entered the area and settled the battle against the Sham'unite al-Hanash who fled with his supporters to the western section of Beirut after it became evident that he had been in contact and cooperation with some organizations in this area throughout the preceding period.

It is said that this contact began more than a year ago when the Phalange Party tried to contain and liquidate ex-President Sham'un's militia and that this contact

turned into some kind of cooperation after the 7 July incidents in which Bashir al-Jumayyil brought to an end the presence of the military wing of the Sham'unite Liberal Party. At this juncture, al-Hanash and his comrades found that they were threatened by danger every moment and so they established bridges with organizations in the western section and received aid from these organizations. These revealed facts have weakened, not to say completely eliminated, the previously prevalent confiction that al-Hanash and his group had been in contact with the Lebanese intelligence and that this group is the one that manufactured at one time the ferocious battles with the Phalanges in order to justify the army's entry to the area in such force.

The Phalange have been saying through their information media that the authority forced them to launch this battle and that had the authority instructed the army from the outset to arrest al-Hanash group and oust it from the area or to disarm it, the Phalanges would not have been forced to launch the battle which started with al-Hanash and then turned into a battle between the Phalange and the authority, rather into a battle that has put the entire state in a totally unenviable position.

But what refutes these allegations is the information circulated behind the scenes on Bashir al-Jumayyil's determination not only to wipe out the Sham'unite al-Hanash group which had been dealing with organizations in the western area but also to oust the army from 'Ayn al-Rummanah and to regain the area and that in implementation of his plan, Bashir al-Jumayyil had warned the authority that he would clash with it if it opposed him and prevented his entry to the area to liquidate this group.

Whatever the reasons that prevented the authority from intervening and settling the situation in its favor, these reasons do not justify (in the view of both friend and foe) this stance which has ended with very serious consequences that threaten to upturn the situation, to drop many of the given facts and realities and to put the state before a dead end.

At the same time, new facts and realities produced by 'Ayn al-Rummanah incidents have surfaced in the Lebanese crisis.

The first of these facts and realities is that the authority's failure to intervene has foiled the security model created by the army's presence in 'Ayn al-Rummanah--a model which turned into a dream for which the other areas of Lebanon have been aspiring.

The second of these facts and realities is that the consequences of the authority's stance in 'Ayn al-Rummanah have dropped indefinitely any discussion of the security plans calling for the deployment of the army in other areas.

The third of these facts and realities is that what has happened in 'Ayn al-Rummanah has provided the pretext and the argument to all the Lebanese and Palestinian, and even Syrian, factions that have expressed reservations on and have opposed the security plans drawn up by the authority--plans which these factions have viewed with suspicion and have described as collusive plans serving the Phalanges' political and security interests.

The fourth of these facts and realities is that a big disappointment has been experienced by the various segments of the Lebanese public opinion which has been aspiring for an imminent day in which the legitimate authority would get stronger and would re-impose its power after elimination of the partisan mini-states and militias. It is no longer unlikely that the position of these parties and militias will be strengthened from now on and that a tendency will prevail among the people to return to affiliation with the influential militias and parties in search of protection.

The fifth of these facts and realities is that the return of the Phalange Party to 'Ayn al-Rummanah with such force has revived among all memories of those painful battles which centered around 'Ayn al-Rummanah-al-Shiyah axis and has revived the fear that this war will be renewed and its area will expand, thus leading to recurrence of the events of the two-year war.

The sixth of these facts and realities is the state of confusion which has prevailed in the authority in such a manner that poses the threat of the occurrence of new divisions and fragmentations that will take the state back to the zero point and to the condition in which President Ilyas Sarkis took it over when he was elected 4 years ago.

All these perils and dangers have erupted all at once in the face of Prime Minister Shafiq al-Wazzan's cabinet that has hardly seen the light and that hasn't put a sound grip on government yet. The new cabinet had begun to prepare its ministerial statement to be presented to the Chamber of Deputies when the timed bomb exploded in its face, putting the cabinet in the devil's palm and putting the new prime minister before two options:

Either gather his papers and go back whence he came; Or exert pressure in the direction of reaching an acceptable way out that preserves his dignity and restores matters to the way they were.

It is natural that it has occurred to nobody to urge and exert pressure on Prime Minister al-Wazzan to flee. Fleeing has not occurred to the prime minister either because he and all others are aware that this cabinet of his is the last of the bunch and that scattering the bunch means the disintegration of the state and the entry into dark labyrinths whose consequences are difficult to predict.

In the first meeting held at the presidential palace between the president of the republic, the prime minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Fu'ad Butrus, Gen Victor Khuri, the army commander, was summoned and asked to present the reasons and justifications for the army's failure to intervene and for its leaving the field open to the Phalanges to reach these results.

It is said that Prime Minister al-Wazzan was not convinced by most or all of the justifications offered and so asked the army commander to submit a written report on the reasons of the failure displayed. A similar meeting was held on the following day and the army commander brought the written report, which also failed to convince the prime minister, to this meeting.

What strengthened the prime minister's position is that President Ilyas Sarkis expressed most of the time views supporting the view of Prime Minister al-Wazzan.

At the end of the second meeting, the prime minister said that as a first step he will accept nothing less than the return of the situation in 'Ayn al-Rummanah to what it had been before the recent incidents, meaning that there should be no armed presence other than that of the army in the area and that any illegitimate armed presence there should be ousted and eliminated, even if the use of force is required, provided that the responsibilities be determined through an understanding between the president of the republic and the prime minister who told President Sarkis at the outset of the meeting: "Your excellency, I cannot consider what has happened aimed against me personally. It is aimed against you with all you represent. Rather, it is aimed against the existence and survival of the state as a legitimate authority. We are not engaged in oneupmanship to realize personal gains. The circumstance is sensitive and the destiny of our entire country is threatened."

There are numerous sides that have tried to exploit this situation and that have an interest in the retreat of the legitimate authority, rather in doing everything even to dismember the army. However, there are still those who say that this stumble by the legitimate authority in 'Ayn al-Rummanah must be a lesson and an incentive urging the state to rise quickly and to re-impose its presence as a framework capable at any time of absorbing everything in order to unite Lebanon's soil and people.

Regardless of the oneupmanship in which those harmed by the presence of the legitimate authority are engaged, the conviction that has continued to be prevalent is that accumulated small mistakes are what led to the failure displayed and that it is unfair to hold the army responsible.

The mistakes started when the authority was lured into and agreed to deploy the army, with the consent of some of the conflicting factions, is an ineffective and interrupted manner at a time when the army was still in the stage of being re-built and reorganized.

There are reasonable people who have blamed the army commander for the excuses that he has offered, including the excuse that the army's intervention in 'Ayn al-Rummanah would have posed the threat of a terrible massacre and would have, moreover, threatened the army's safety in some of the areas controlled by the Phalange.

These people have said that the army commander was supposed to offer neither this nor that excuse, was supposed to overlook the details, to get into the essence and to say that there was failure and that the failure was due to many reasons, including the attempts to use the army prematurely in tasks based on political settlements.

Had the army commander stated these facts, nothing in the situation would have changed because what has happened in 'Ayn al-Rummanah and the realities and consequences produced by the incidents have put the regime before a crossroad and the regime now has to choose whether to remain as it is or to take the fundamental decision, namely the decision to present the entire situation for discussion on the basis of reaching a comprehensive security plan that provides for:

Deploying the army everywhere, and strongly.

Rejecting to proceed with the political settlements at the expense of the army's effectiveness.

There is consensus that 'Ayn al-Rummanah incidents with all their symbols and significance constitute a serious turning point in the history of the Lebanese crisis. Numerous wagers are being made on what approach the regime will take to deal with and surmount the results and consequences of these incidents. In the light of this approach, it will become possible to judge the nature of the stumble that the authority has taken in 'Ayn al-Rummanah and to say whether it constitutes the fall of the authority or just a slip of the foot.

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CSO: 4802

MEDIATION EFFORTS BETWEEN FEUDING FACTIONS OUTLINED

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 12 Nov 80 p 21

[Article: "After the War of Annihilation Between the Nationalists and al-Murabitun in West Beirut; Syrian-Palestinian Efforts To Save the National Movement"]

[Text] The "mutual war of annihilation" that took place between two principal organizations of the Lebanese National and Progressive Movement--the National Social Party which is headed by Mr In'am Ra'd and the Independent Nasirist Movement (al-Murabitun) which is led by Mr Ibrahim Qulaylat--aroused a wave of conflicting predictions. Those who are making those predictions are saying that "The National Movement has collapsed completely, and Palestinian or Syrian attempts to give it a shot in the arm are no longer useful."

Can it be said approximately 3 years and 8 months after the death of its leader, the late Lebanese leader Kamal Junblatt, that the days of the National Movement whose organizational alliance was born during the Two-Years' War of 1975 and 1976 have come to an end? Can it accordingly be said that division and fragmentation has returned to the ranks of national and progressive parties and movements?

The principal figures of the movement are naturally trying to spread a few drops of optimism by saying that the movement will be able to overcome the "stumbling block" that it is facing now just as it was able to overcome the large and dangerous "stumbling blocks" in the past.

On this basis the destiny of the movement may be determined in the light of its previous policy vis a vis these "stumbling blocks." This was a successful policy, considering that none of these stumbling blocks led to anything but their own dismantling.

In this context some people are saying that the biggest "stumbling block" occurred after the death of Kamal Jumblatt. He was the safety valve for the survival of the National Movement. He easily overcame any disputes or controversies that developed between the parties that make up the National Movement; there are 12 organizations in the movement.

But the result [of Jumblatt's death] was completely different from all expectations. The death of the founder of the movement inspired a stronger sense of solidarity and unity among its members. Therefore, all the bets that had been made to suggest that the movement would collapse 1 or 2 months at the most after the assassination of Jumblatt were lost.

But arousing this sense of solidarity and unity postponed the disputes and did not abolish them. There is disagreement about numerous subjects. The most salient of them was that of the leadership position in the movement which became vacant after that assassination operation.

The problem began with the search for a new leader. The parties did not have specific positions or demands in that regard. But the boundaries of their positions revolved within two frames of reference. The first was that it was not necessary for Walid Junblatt, the leader of the Socialist Progressive party which is considered one of the largest parties of the National Movement, to be the leader of the movement. This would avoid creating an atmosphere of feudalist succession in assuming positions. The second was the desire of every organization to have its leader become the leader of the movement.

Nevertheless, the controversy around the succession to Kamal Junblatt's position was not very pronounced. What was rather evident was everybody's attempt to follow a "policy of indifference" to that position, especially since the absence of a leader for the movement did not diminish its political effectiveness and its organizational ability.

But the policy pursued by Walid Junblatt, which was characterized by moderation and broad popular support in various areas, and the increasing vehemence of the controversies between the national parties foiled many of the objections that were made and the positions that were assumed regarding the leadership position of the National Movement which was assumed through elections by the leader of the Progressive Party.

A short time before the elections al-Murabitun were saying in their declarations and statements that they were "not surprised at all by the discussions about electing a new leader for the movement. In fact, we were rather surprised that this matter had not been proposed at all sooner, regardless of the names, especially since there is an active file in the National Movement for developing a pact for the organizations of the Lebanese National Movement. Such a pact may lead to the formulation of new organizational establishments that would abolish the leadership position of the Central Political Council.

Four Principal Points Treated by Principal Members of the Movement

The fact is that these statements were appropriate. The election of Walid Junblatt president of the Central Council coincided with four principal points dealt with in depth by the principal members of the movement. These points are:

1. Relations between the parties of the movement were to be organized on a sound regional basis so that disputes can be eliminated or at least alleviated.

2. An integrated political plan to counter the Phalangist plan or the plan of the other group is to be devised. The parts of this plan are to constitute an acceptable beginning for all the parties of the movement to accept a dialogue with any other official or political Lebanese party.

3. Security in the nationalist areas is to be established. It had been neglected in a manner that caused everybody to complain.

4. A merger of the military forces of the movement is to be effected, and a "unified army" is to be formed to confront what other armies in Lebanon, such as the army of Bashir al-Jumayyil, for example, may have in store. This is what the principal members of the movement themselves are saying.

Meanwhile appeals were coming from various directions asking for "correcting relations" within the movement. The Popular Nasirist Organization--to cite one example and not to list all--stated that its secretariat general "found that the disparity between the political positions of the parties of the National Movement--both in the area of the political position or regional relationships--and the organizational framework [of the movement] was a negative phenomenon that deserved political review by the parties and organizations of the National Movement. The disparity is a question that transcends the boundaries of difference and borders on those of dispute--a dispute that would have unsatisfactory consequences on the relationship with the nationalist masses. This would make expedition in reviewing and correcting the matter a primary necessity."

This "necessity" was the subject of a lengthy investigation in numerous meetings that were held between the principal members of the National Movement. After one of his meetings with Walid Junblatt, George Hawi, the secretary general of the Lebanese Communist party said, "We exchanged points of view on the organizational developments in the National Movement, and we pondered the functions of the political and organizational development that are required in the actions of the National Movement so it can be more capable of performing its national role."

Later, after his meeting with Ibrahim Qulaylat, Hawi said, "We came to a complete agreement in points of view about the national requirements to confront the stage of political and security destabilization and the plan to break up the national rank. We came to a full agreement about the requirements for a general national awakening, about uprooting the national confrontation course of the isolationist plan and also about upgrading regional relations to a level that would allow the National Movement to play its leadership role in leading the struggle of the Lebanese people towards the achievement of their goals."

On the following day Qulaylat met a delegation from the National Party that included party leader In'am Ra'd who said after the meeting, "The organizations of the political council are an introductory step to completing the organizational structure of the National Movement and to furthering its political course."

First Radical Measure

This makes it evident that all the principal members of the National Movement were unanimous about the need to develop the movement's organizational form. Therefore, the first development operation settled many of the marginal questions with which those people were preoccupied. Walid Junblatt was elected leader of the movement, and all the members of the Political Council were installed as a constituent body with the stipulation that a leadership body called an Executive Committee emerge from the Central Council and assume the authority for executive action with all its agencies, offices and organizations.

The new organizational measure determined that the executive committee shall have 11 members. They are to be elected every 2 years by the Political Council from its members.

The Political Council had discussed this matter in the course of several meetings. It had reviewed all its organizational conditions as well as the prevailing conditions in the various agencies and establishments of the National Movement in the context of the work experience it has had ever since its establishment, but especially after the assassination of Kamal Junblatt whose [death] left a large vacuum that the council had to fill as best it can by means of controlling its organizations and strengthening its group leadership.

After lengthy deliberations the members of the council agreed on the following principle in this context: a commitment to the basic organizational provisions stated in the charter of the Central Political Council and dated 21 August 1976 was to continue and treatment of deficiencies wherever they existed and their termination wherever that was needed was to be considered adequate."

On that basis the political council made the three following decisions:

1. The staff of the Central Political Council was established as a constituent body with all its members enjoying the privileges of acquired membership. Conditions according to which parties, organizations and nationalist and progressive figures can become affiliated with the Central Political Council were determined.

2. The council's tasks and mandates were defined and detailed. The council undertakes these tasks and assumes these mandatory powers in its capacity as the supreme legislative planning and decision-making body of the nationalist and progressive parties and forces on the national level and in all political, organizational and financial areas.

3. A collective leadership body is to emerge from the Central Political Council. It is to be called the Executive Committee, and it is to become the authority for executive action in all the agencies, offices and organizations of the National Movement. Its decisions are to apply to all the afore-mentioned agencies, offices and organizations. It is the responsible agency that settles all the affairs of executive action.

In the light of these three decisions, Deputy Albert Mansur gave up the Social Affairs Office, and Attorney 'Isam Nu'man gave up the Information Office. Both kept their membership in the Executive Committee which included besides them Messrs Walid Junblatt--or whomever is delegated by the Socialist Progressive party--George Hawi, In'am Ra'd, Muhsin Ibrahim, 'Abd-al-Majid al-Rafi'i, Ibrahim Qulaylat and Muhammad Qabani.

In'am Ra'd, vice president of the movement's Political Council commented on this by saying, "The recently formed organizations in the movement are considered a first step towards the completion of its organizational structure and towards furthering its political course. The formation of these organizations is considered one of the essential means by which the movement can achieve a new thrust under its leader, Walid Junblatt and can launch initiatives that would achieve for Lebanon its unity and protect its Arab character against the rise in conspiracies."

Examples of Disputes

But the question that was raised after these organizational changes were made was the following: was the National Movement thus able to bring its internal disputes to an end? Those who were asking for administrative and organizational changes had tied them to the basic outcome of controlling these disputes.

What happened after that?

The fact is that the disputes continued, but they were confined to basic subjects, the most prominent of which was the movement's position on the government as represented by the president of the republic, Ilyas Sarkis. The communists--the Communist party and the Communist Action Organization--were asking for Sarkis's resignation, and they were describing his government as a "one-chief government" and "the supremacy of the single chief" and so on.

In this context the leader of the Communist party, George Hawi says, "Lebanon finds itself at a decisive crossroads. The matter depends on President Sarkis: he can turn Lebanon on the road to a comprehensive political solution that would constitute a foundation for a peaceful solution that would preserve the unity of Lebanon. If the road to a solution lies through decisive action that would put into effect the resolutions of the Bayt al-Din Conference, delaying the execution of these resolutions or weakening them will lead the country to a new disaster more terrible and more destructive than the preceding disasters."

Al-Murabitun are saying that Sarkis had failed the test and that he is no longer the man who is required to lead [the nation] at this stage of Lebanon's history. The nationalists do not differ from this opinion, but the Socialist Progressive Party does. Its leader, Walid Junblatt, is pursuing a moderate policy in dealing with President Sarkis. Accordingly, he is advocating that the president be given "a sufficient opportunity to free himself from the control of the Lebanese Front." Jumblatt was criticized for this position often by some of his allies who are advocating scuttling any truce with the Lebanese Front and with anyone who supports it inside or outside the Lebanese government.

This difference in positions also applies to two other areas.

The first area is that of the rapprochement between Walid Junblatt and former Prime Minister Sa'ib Salam. Al-Murabitun are basically refusing to deal in any way with all the traditional political personalities in Beirut. They consider themselves to be the only political power representing the Islamic mainstream, particularly in Beirut, and they deny having any background of sectarian or denominational prejudice. They link [their view of their role] with "a legal right to represent the masses."

The second area is confined to "the attitude towards the Lebanese Front." Some of the principal members of the National Movement are saying that cooperating with the Lebanese Front and forgiving it for what has transpired cannot come about until the front "disbands" itself as an instransigent and an intolerant political organization that used to deal with Israel. Some of those members of the National Movement are expressing their willingness to engage in a dialogue with the Lebanese Front if it meets only one condition: to cut all its communications with the Zionist enemy. Al-Murabitun represent the first view, and the socialists support the second.

The Last Breath of Life

It is evident that there are some differences within the National Movement about numerous subjects. At the beginning this was seen as a healthy phenomenon. Differences in points of view reflected an atmosphere of democratic debate between the parties of the movement.

But what happened is that those differences were always reflected in a negative way on the organizational unity of the movement which began to show signs of breaking up on more than one occasion. The most recent such instance involved the violent clashes that took place between the nationalists and al-Murabitun.

These clashes placed the movement on its deathbed. Many observers described its situation as [terminal]; "the movement is expiring, and its collapse is imminent."

But efforts were being consolidated. These efforts were led by PLO Chairman Mr Yasir 'Arafat and by senior Palestinian leaders. It seems that the Resistance is the power that is most interested in the survival of the National Movement because the alliance of the PLO and the movement has ensured for the PLO a political and a military climate it has not had since it was first propelled into action in 1967.

The Syrians are also showing great concern for the cohesion of the movement. They see in it a strong ally and a safety valve against the division of Lebanon and for the creation of a national regime that believes in the Arab character of Lebanon and not in its regional character. Accordingly, such a regime would deal with its neighbors and its brothers on a pan-Arab basis.

The Syrians have made major efforts recently to dissipate the disputes within the National Movement. The most notable of these efforts was that of reconciling the Socialist party and the Syrian National Party. This reconciliation was effected about a month ago at the request of and in the presence of President Hafiz al-Asad.

In addition, all the principal members of the National Movement themselves are convinced that they must preserve their organizational unity.

During the recent clashes in the western area the leaders of the movement were unanimous in finding that what was happening was strange "at a time when Bashir al-Jumayyil was continuing to execute his plan to destroy the government and to divide Lebanon." This is according to Walid Junblatt.

Everybody is in agreement about the necessity of insisting upon the cohesion of the National Movement. But how? This is the problem which the principal members of the movement, with the cooperation of Syrian and Palestinian leaders, are trying to solve as quickly as possible before the movement expires.

8592
CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

SOVIET NAVAL BASE--Work on the installation of Soviet naval bases in South Yemen has begun anew and is presently concentrated on the construction of installations in Aden for use as submarine pens, and on the base on Socotra [Island]. The civilian population of Socotra was evacuated in early December to enable the completion of this work. [Text] [Paris DEFENSE INTERARMEES in French Jan 81 p 9]

CSO: 4800

REVOLUTIONARY FORCES EXPRESS VIEWS ON IRAQ-IRAN WAR

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 6 Nov 80 p 13

[Article by 'Ubaydali Yusuf: "Gulf Liberation Movements Discuss Political Consequences of Iraq-Iran War; Change of Balances of Power in Gulf; Bolstering U.S. Presence in Area; Weakening National Liberation Movements"]

[Text] Cyprus--A number of leaders of the political parties and movements in the Arab Peninsula and the Gulf have taken part in the World Conference for Solidarity With the Gulf National Liberation Movement and Masses Against Imperialism."

Gathering them in a common meeting and determining the topic of discussion is a problem in itself. They are preoccupied with their private meetings, not to mention their political meetings with the other forces. The Gulf issues are numerous and each of these issues has its vitality and significance which are hard to ignore.

Oil and its social effects, the proportions and spheres of the U.S. presence, the Gulf's role in the settlement course...However, all these issues turned into second grade issues in the face of the Iraq-Iran war or, to put it in other words, have been heavily focused in this war which had been expected but which is still a surprise. AL-SAFIR has taken the question on the expected political consequences of the Iraq-Iran war to the Gulf forces that have participated in the conference. The first side to be asked the question was the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party which had its representative in the Iraqi Solidarity Committee.

However, Ja'far Qasim Hammudi, the [Ba'th Party] Regional Commander member, declined to answer the question, saying: "I have developed complexes because of the press and of journalists, even though I and my relatives have a [long] arm in this field."

The expectations of the other forces participating in the conference were as follows:

Iraqi Communist Party

A member of the Iraqi Communist Party said:

To start with, it must be said that Iraq has the capacity to occupy an important and advanced international position. This war is exhausting Iraq and is preventing it from playing the required role because of the aspirations of the ruling leadership and of the course which this leadership has followed in recent years.

The attrition of forces is the flagrant basic truth resulting from continuation of the war. The blame for this falls on the shoulders of Iraq primarily because with the absence of Egypt, Iraq is qualified economically, politically and militarily to lead the liberation struggle.

It is not unlikely that a new alinment of forces will develop in the Gulf, with the center of this alinment formed of the Gulf regimes supporting the United States directly. This is in contrast to what was happening in the past and is the result of illusions prevailing in the past 2 years and believing that the regimes will stand in the face of all forms of foreign intervention and will "fill the vacuum" in the area. These regimes can only be an ally of the United States because they can find protection only under the canopy of the United States and of the other western countries.

Another result is the fall of the masks, the emergence of the natural alinment of these forces and the disappearance of all illusions regarding the possibility of winning these regimes over in the battle against Israel and world Zionism. A third result is that the war has provided a major opportunity for making the so-called "area's security" dependent on the protection of the United States and the other western countries. This is the natural position of the Gulf regimes and of their political, intellectual and social inclinations.

A fourth result is the tendency of the United States to employ some forms of liberalism with which to cover its escalating direct military presence. This tendency is intensifying within the U.S. administration, especially in the wake of its defeat in Iran.

Islamic Revolutionary Organization for Liberation of Arab Peninsula

'Amir 'Abd-al-'Aziz:

1. To start with, it must be said that Iraq's war against Iran is in fact the war of the governments in the area tied to the United States. This war seeks fundamentally to weaken the strength of the Islamic revolution in Iran and to force it to retreat to within the borders of Iran because these governments believe that Iran has nurtured and continues to nurture the political movement hostile to the regimes in the Middle East. This fact determines one of the significant results expected to emanate from the war, namely the transformation of the struggle against the governments into a fight against the liberation movements and against all the influential popular forces in the area, especially in the Gulf--a fight taking advantage of the--assumed--compulsion of Iran to lick its wounds and to retreat to within its borders.

2. However, we believe that another result will develop if Iraq doesn't triumph and Iran is not defeated--and this is what I find most likely--in this war. This result will be in the form of a change in the relations between the Gulf states and Iran--a change whereby these states will display more courtesy toward Iran as a result of a real fear which will emanate from Iran's emergence from the war as a strong power, as a result of the Iranian military command's repeated threats to destroy the Gulf ports if they give refuge to Iraqi ships and as a result of the Iranian naval forces' control of the Strait of Hormuz and of nearly two-thirds of the Gulf area.

3. We also believe that Iran will play a bigger role in the area after the war and that it will be open up more extensively to the area's states and peoples, especially the progressive states that have helped it during the war. This will enable Iran to gain a distinguished position in the world and will cause the blockade engulfing it to be broken.

Saudi Communist Party

Muhammad 'Abdallah, the chairman of the party delegation to the conference: It is difficult to give a final visualization of the war's outcome. However, it is certain that this war has rendered U.S. imperialism a great service and has expanded the possibilities of its intervention and of escalating its military presence.

The other result is providing the U.S. imperialism with greater possibilities to occupy political and military positions in Saudi Arabia openly.

The third of these results is the weakening of the Iranian capability and the offering of objective facilities to the counter revolution to strengthen its positions by rehabilitating the Iranian military establishment through the escalating political role of this establishment.

Moreover, the war will destroy Iraq's and Iran's political and economic resources that have been thrown into an unjust and unjustifiable war. In addition to the tens of billions lost by the two countries, both will need vast funds and long years to rebuild what the war has destroyed, not to mention the ousting of the Iraqi army from the battle of confrontation against Israel.

What is more, Saudi Arabia has turned into a weapons storehouse, considering that 60 percent of the weapons purchased since the outbreak of the war have not been used and are at the beck and call of the Americans.

Bahrain Popular Front

Sa'id Sayf, Executive Committee member:

It is difficult to speculate on the results at present as long as the war goes on. However, we will tackle the question from the angle of the point reached by matters so far.

At the level of the U.S. scheme to dominate the Gulf, we find that the Americans have found in the war their object to infiltrate and intervene rapidly on the pretext of protecting the Strait of Hormuz and of securing the flow of oil to the capitalist countries. Western pressures exerted on the area's states to direct their political decision according to the will of these imperialist countries have become, as acknowledged by the Americans and the British, very heavy. This has put the area under protection and has put us all face to face with a new phase of political struggle against imperialism.

As a result of the war, the Americans have come to play the role of the regional policeman whereas they used to reiterate in the past that Iraq could play the role of the Gulf policeman because of its enhanced military weight and of the decline of the

Iranian military weight. But the mutual destruction of the economic and military capabilities and the fact that both Iraq and Iran rely on others for armament have realized for the Americans what they want. After the war, the victor will not be able to play an effective role for years to come.

Regionally, evident polarization has occurred and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has become the political power that directs undisputed the political action of the area's states. Consequently, Saudi Arabia has come to possess the ability to impose its political and security solutions on these mini-states. In view of the fact that the Saudi-Iraqi relations are advanced, Saudi Arabia has become capable of imposing its political conditions on any Iraqi post-war program because Iraq will be in need of Saudi Arabia's financial aid for years to come to repair what has been damaged by the war.

As a result of the war, the separation [of forces into progressive and reactionary] imposed by the Camp David treaty in the Arab Peninsula has disappeared. There is no more talk about this issue and coordination among Oman (Qabus is a supporter of Camp David), Saudi Arabia and the other oil states in the Gulf has become evident. As for flirtation among these states, it has started to assume more tangible features embodied in the security steps concerning the Gulf and the Red Sea. According to what is reiterated by apparently various sides, the potential for what the U.S. imperialism can do is substantial and has been increasing since the war.

Who will triumph in this war which will not be a short one, considering that the Iranian revolution wants to be the inlet to destroying the Iraqi regime and that Iraq wants it to be an inlet to toppling Khomeyni? The triumphant side will be able to have political influence because the reactionary Arab onslaught against all the forces of progress and liberation in the Gulf and the Arab Peninsula will intensify in case Iraq triumphs. But in case Iraq is defeated, big revolutionary storms will blow in the area and the struggle against imperialism and its allies will become more ferocious [because imperialism and its allies will try to prevent] the area's masses from being inspired by the Iranian model of struggle against imperialism and the reactionary regimes.

Popular Front for Liberation of Oman

Muhammad 'Abd-al-Rahman, Local Command member:

[Part of the sentence dropped] a few months and they will rest and consider the war against the interest of both peoples. The imperialist forces, especially the U.S. imperialism, will benefit from this war to entrench their direct presence in our area. The war is exhausting the capabilities and resources of both peoples. The reactionary forces in the Gulf and the Peninsula are trying to exploit this war to weaken the Iranian revolution. The force clamoring most strongly for this war is the Saudi reaction that has created the justifications [presumably meaning that has cited the war as a justification] for the flow of modern weapons to Saudi Arabia.

One of the tangible results of this war is the bolstering of the position of the reactionary regimes in the area. A number of meetings and consultations have taken place to strengthen the positions of these regimes against the national movement in this area.

The second of these results is the strengthened link between these regimes and the direct military presence and economic domination, such as the increase in oil production and as permitting the U.S. AWAC's and their crews to come to the area [sic].

As for Muscat's regime which was besieged as a result of the intensifying struggle of the Omani masses under the leadership of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and as a result of the regime's stance vis-a-vis the Camp David parties, this war has given this regime the means to break this blockade through its claim of concern for the area's Arabism, for protecting the Strait of Hormuz and for securing the freedom of navigation in this strait.

Moreover, the war has given this regime the opportunity to raise its voice against what it calls the communist danger.

Democratic National Front-North Yemen

Mujahid al-Qahhali, member of Front's Secretariat:

The Iraq-Iran war has diverted the attention of the Arab nation from its central issue, namely the issue of Palestine, and has exposed the economic revolution and the revolutionary tide of both countries to annihilation instead of channelling them against Israel.

On the other hand, this war has enabled the U.S. imperialism to escalate its military intervention in the area and to tighten its grip on this area.

At the same time, this war has strengthened the rush of the reactionary regimes toward the bosom of the U.S. imperialism and has enchanced the possibility of their intensifying their oppression.

The war will have negative consequences for the Yemeni unity and for the steps to implement this unity. Taking advantage of the war conditions, imperialism and the reactionary forces will exert efforts to escalate their intervention in the Yemeni affairs in a manner that does not serve our masses' interests and their aspirations for unity.

Yemeni Socialist Party

Salim 'Umar Bakir, Central Committee member:

Before the war, the Americans leaked every now and then reports on their intention to occupy the oil sources militarily on the pretext of securing the flow of oil to the U.S. industry. Moreover, when war broke out between the two parts of Yemen in 1979, the United States declared that this area falls within the direct sphere of the U.S. national security. In the wake of this, Washington worked energetically to complete its scheme for full control over the area and to also complete the Camp David scheme by building a vast network of military bases extending from Egypt to Somalia and Kenya, in addition to its old bases in Diego Garcia and in the Peninsula and the Gulf, mainly in Oman.

The task of these bases is to protect the U.S. interests and to deal a quick blow to the national liberation movement in this area.

During the Iraq-Iran war, Washington has escalated its intervention and has moved its fleets and its rapid intervention [deployment] forces in the Gulf. It has also tried to persuade the other imperialist countries of the need to participate in occupying this area.

Efforts are now in progress through coordination among these forces, as happened in the recent military exercise [presumably meaning the joint U.S.-Egyptian exercise], to tighten the grip of imperialism on this area.

The fundamental political outcome of this war will be the tightening of the U.S. grip on this area and the increased subservience of the reactionary regimes to the United States.

The United States is blackmailing the area's rulers who regimes are likely to collapse by saying that there is an external agression and by talking about the illusion of the "Soviet danger" to these regimes.

The United States will change its previous strategy which is based on relying on the local agent to protect the U.S. interests. Therefore, it will escalate its direct military presence. However, this action will provoke the area's people and there will be a direct reaction.

Escalation and intensification of the struggle is the most likely probability because the war will unite the reactionary forces in the area. Such unification requires a united reaction from the revolutionary forces.

It is natural that the war will lead to intensified oppression and not to liberalization. It is not unlikely that the regimes will be inclined toward absolute and direct dictatorship.

The war will also have negative consequences to the developments of unity between the two parts of Yemen and will obstruct these developments through the enhanced influence of the reactionary forces which will be revitalized by the war. In this regard, the possibility of endeavors to establish Yemeni unity, but under the reactionary influence, should not be disregarded.

8494
CSO: 4802

NEW INSTITUTE TEACHES ARABIC TO MUSLIM MISSIONARIES

Riyadh AL -RIYADH in Arabic 14 Dec 80 p 5

[Interview with Dr Mahmud Sini by Turki al-Ayyar: "Foreigners Learning Our Language"--date and place of interview not given]

[Text] When you visit the Arabic Language Institute of Riyadh University you will discover that you are a stranger to your own language, but not these young people who have come from all parts of the world to learn the language of the Holy Koran. The situation as a Chinese student explained it is that the language that is learned in the institute is not suitable for commerce with the man in the street where the Arabic language lives in virtual banishment... For that reason it should be that the name of the institute become the institute for native speakers and not the institute for non-native speakers... This institute is the first of its kind in the world to teach Arabic to non-native speakers at the university level.

Seven years ago work began on it under the direction of the department of Arabic in the College of Literature. In view of the tremendous success which it met, the late great King [Faysal] ordered the creation of the institute in 1973. To find out about the institute's workings we met with its director Dr Mahmud Isma'il Sini who has administered it since its inception.

Dr Mahmud Sini said about the beginnings of the institute's programs: "Study at the institute began with night sessions only and then at the beginning of 1974 morning sessions were added, teachers' training courses followed after that. The institute has three chief goals: the instruction of Arabic, Arab culture and Islamic culture to non-native speakers of Arabic; the training of teachers in the modern methods of teaching Arabic to such students; and the development of studies and instructional materials to serve the spread of Arabic to non-native speakers.

"For these aims, four units have been established at the institute: the language and culture unit, the teachers' preparatory unit, a teachers' training section, and a research section."

About the conditions of entry and the hours necessary for graduation he said this: "The admissions' condition of course depend on the type of program. The language program does not accept any student who has not completed a high school degree or equivalency. The degree program does not accept those without a licence or bachelor's degree in Arabic or Islamic studies. For the teachers' training

program the student must have a high school diploma or equivalency in addition to experience in teaching Arabic to non-native speakers (TANN): The benefits given students include an equivalency fellowship at the University in addition to a suit of clothes and transport each year to and from the student's home town. The institute restricts admissions not according to certain countries but only in accordance with specific criterion. It gives priority to those who work in the field of the dissemination of Islam. It stipulates that there be given assurances from recognized Islamic studies associations that the student plans to continue his Islamic missionary work after graduation."

Dr Sini described the hours needed for a degree; "In order to get a diploma, 24 hours of study are required divided up into two study semesters in which the student studies a curriculum of general language, applied psychology, designing examinations and specific methods, teaching methods, Arabic phonetics, and etymology and syntax of Arabic. The language program has projected that 1800 study hours are needed, they are what is called connected hours divided between three levels.

"There is at the institute a library provided with all of the different books specializing in Arabic and culture. In addition there are journals and newspapers. The library has two parts: one is specifically for the instruction of the language and the other is for studies and special materials on modern linguistics and methods of teaching languages. There is also an audio-visual library containing films for teaching Arabic and model language-learning methods based on teaching other foreign languages by modern methods like English or French, both sections will help the institute's professors and researchers prepare comparable Arabic materials. There is also a complete language laboratory with a supervisory control panel which will allow replay, but for now is set up for listening only."

About the institute's problems Dr Sini said: "There are no administrative problems here. There is only the problem of a lack of manpower since the field of TANN (teaching Arabic to non-native speakers) is a new one, even though Arabic is the ancient language of Islamic history. The teachers of Arabic are not familiar with the modern methods and techniques of teaching foreign languages and because of that many of them rely on traditional language teaching and non-scientific methods. Techniques that sometimes are philosophical or theoretical make Arabic too complicated for the student and as a consequence they make him loathe to learn it. So the institute every year has great difficulty finding professors of exceptional qualifications. Likewise the institute faces another problem in the scarcity of authorities on modern linguistics for the teachers' training and research development programs, since specialists in applied language study for example, can be counted on the fingers of one hand. The institute is extremely eager to select well-qualified instructors for it, and consequently has laid down precise requirements; 300 applicants asked to teach at the institute but after investigation only 20 were selected and after personal interviews eventually only 5 were hired. This brings the number of our teaching staff to 20--all with either doctorates, Master's or advanced degrees in language instruction." Dr Sini added that the number of graduates from the language program of the institute has reached 100 whereas 80 have graduated from the degree program. Most of these are professors at Pakistani universities because each year the Kingdom gives 25 5-year fellowships

to Pakistani students. The calibre of students is very high and some graduates are now working as teachers of TANN in their own countries. These are usually the degree program graduates although there are some who graduated from the language program. He cited that there was an American student who has since become the director of a school in California for teaching Arabic there.

Dr Sini said that the number of students at the institute this year: "Was 500 men and women enrolled for the first semester this year in the different programs at the institute. The distribution is as follows: 5 degree program students, 40 students in TANN, and 5 morning session students for the language program. 200 students for the second semester are in the evening programs, and 260 students are from more than 40 Islamic countries." He counted the number of students in the night program at about 100 and the extension program at the University of Dari'iya has 50 women students while the extension program at the university hospital has 25 students and the school of dentistry has 25 as well. This number is the largest number to have conducted studies at the institute.

The institute's activities outside the Kingdom: "The institute in the past 4 years has set up a branch for teaching Muslims Arabic in London. It has also participated in the planning and implementation of branches for teachers' training of non-Arabs in Gambia and the Philippines, and also has plans for similar things in other countries. As for the preparation of teaching materials just now the institute is in the process of preparing not less than 13 books, some in the experimental stage and some already gone to the press for teaching Arabic to non-native speakers."

The extent of the commitment of Arab countries to such instruction: "The field of TANN has been neglected. In a study I conducted I found that for the German language there is annually spent not less than 80 and up to 400 million Marks, and the central office of the British Council which is committed to the instruction of English in London spends more than any ministry in the kingdom and and it is solely for the teaching of English. Its budget is not less than 100 to 200 million pounds sterling. And in France there's great interest in teaching French. That country spends hundreds of millions of (francs) yearly. But although Arabic is an international languag' I do not think that all the Arab countries spend more than 2 or 3 million riyals--even when there were systematic planned programs. Of course up to now there has been no separate agency for the dissemination of Arabic; there has been no organization for this specialized task. Of course the Arab Organization tries to offer whatever it can but it is nothing definite. Another example of the extent to which Arabic has neglected to train teachers in TANN is that the only university in the Arab world to train them is the University of Riyadh. Whereas in England the English language teacher can get training in not fewer than 40 universities and educational societies, and in America at more than 100 of them. That can give you a picture of the extent of the neglect that this field must cope with. I hope that the Arabs are conscientious in this very field and will bear the responsibility for spreading Arabic, as well as concern themselves with a more favorable image of it. Especially since Arabic has a special place in spiritual matters, as well as in economic and political matters."

After this we familiarize ourselves with the views of students at the institute about the program taught to them and about the use this program has been to them. We encountered a number of questions from various foreigners. We discovered that they speak Arabic fluently. But they sometimes have difficulty in their attempts to speak classical Arabic. (This in short is our own tragedy with our language.)

I met a student named 'Abduh Khaliq Rawdah from England who said: "I enrolled at the institute nearly a year ago but I had previous studied in the university with the Imam, Muhammad b. Sa'ud, on the subject of Islam." He said that the caliber of study at the institute was very good and he praised the curriculum which they used and the teachers. He said that there were no problems worthy of mention. He suggested that study at the institute should be on the hourly system.

9587
CSO: 4802

SOVIET-SYRIAN COOPERATION IN WATER PROJECTS REPORTED

Soviet-Syrian Committee Meeting

Damascus TISHRIN in Arabic 9 Dec 80 pp 1, 11

[Text] Meetings of the eleventh session of the joint subcommittee for irrigation and projects, subordinate to the permanent Syrian-Soviet committee for economic, technical and scientific cooperation between the two countries, began yesterday in the headquarters of the general organization for major projects.

The Syrian Arab side was chaired by Engineer 'Adnan Ibrahim, chairman of the board and director general of the general organization for major projects. The Soviet side was headed by Serafim A. Ivanov, member of the ministerial committee of the Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources in the Soviet Union.

Attending the meeting for the Syrian Arab side was Eng Madrak al-Sarraj, assistant director general of the organization, Eng Munir Sa'adah, director of water reservoirs, Eng 'Ala' al-Din Sulayman, director of the major northern river project, Eng Zuhayr Hilwani, chief of the Damascus, Barada and al-A'waj reservoir, Eng Muhammad Khayr Bajnuj, chief of the Yarmuk reservoir center, Eng 'Abdullah Jabur, chief of the organization's liaison office, and Mu'taz 'Abd al-Hamid, representative of the state planning commission.

After the director general welcomed the chief and members of the Soviet delegation, he reviewed the articles of the protocol signed in May 1980, pertaining to water reservoirs and the major northern river dam project.

Then, Mr Ivanov spoke, expressing his thanks to the director general for the warm welcome which the delegation had received. He expressed his hope that discussions of committee actions would proceed in light of the work plan set forth. Discussion of subjects contained in the agenda then proceeded, pertaining to the study undertaken by the Soviet side, in cooperation with Syrian experts, of the four reservoirs: Damascus reservoir, al-'Asi [Orontes River], Aleppo, Homs and the coast. The nature of the surface and subterranean waters was also determined. The major northern river dam project was also discussed, along with creating a network for irrigating a 14,000 hectare area with water from this dam, in order to irrigate agricultural lands located along the Syrian coast, north and south of Latakia.

Actions required to investigate subterranean water in the Syrian desert were also discussed, as well as a project to regulate the flow of the Badara and al-A'waj, in order to make the best use of their waters and the subterranean water in the two river basins, in terms of drinking water, irrigation and industry.

The two sides will continue their meetings this morning. The Soviet technical delegation arrived in Damascus at noon yesterday for this purpose.

Second Committee Meeting

Damascus TISHRIN in Arabic 10 Dec 80 p 2

[Text] The joint subcommittee for irrigation and projects, subordinate to the permanent Syrian-Soviet committee for economic, technical and scientific cooperation between the two countries, continued its meetings yesterday, at the headquarters of the general organization for major projects. Engineer 'Adnan Ibrahim, director general of the organization presided for the Syrian side, and Mr Serafim Ivanov, member of the ministerial committee of the Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources, for the Soviet side.

In this meeting, the committee continued discussions of subjects begun the day before yesterday. They pertain to water reservoir projects, the project to regulate the flow of the Barada and al-A'waj rivers, which include hydrological and hydrogeological investigations for these reservoirs, and a plan to utilize and protect water resources in light of reports pertaining to the energy study plan, the development of electrical installations, and to ensure a plan to regulate rivers in order to obtain maximum resources in terms of irrigation, drinking water and power.

The committee's discussions also dealt with the subject of experts tasked with work after the end of the current year, the drafting of reports pertaining to the plan and its preparation, and the subject of completing field operations, as well as discussion of the possibility of the Soviet side carrying out the necessary studies to regulate the Lake Qatinah reservoir and to send a number of Soviet experts and specialists in repair and maintenance operations for the machinery and excavators, to work at the central base for water reservoirs. Additionally, discussions were held on the possibility of cooperation in the field of the 'Akkar plain irrigation project on the Syrian coast.

The committee then turned to a discussion and study of matters pertaining to building the major northern river dam. The Syrian side confirmed the desire that a sufficient number of experts be sent who were qualified to do the main work on this dam by the end of next year, provided that they be sent to the country during the first quarter of that year.

Agreement was also reached that the Soviet side would submit to the country a program to do the studies required to prepare the implementing plans for the first stage of the irrigation network in the river's flood plain.

The Soviet side will also provide, by the end of the present year, the technical plan for the irrigation networks, in the size agreed upon, so that the Syrian side can study and make comments upon it.

On the other hand, the Ministry of Economy and Foreign Trade has formed a delegation to negotiate with the Soviet Union to conclude an agreement on the exchange of goods between the two countries during the next 5 years.

It is worth mentioning that the exchange agreement between Syria and the Soviet Union for the next 5 years will be signed during January of next year.

7005
CSO: 4802

ECONOMIC PROGRESS REVIEWED

Abu Dhabi AL-ITTIHAD in Arabic 3 Dec 80 p 2

[Article by Ahmad Sa'id: "Outstanding Economic Prosperity for the Emirates on Gulf and World Levels; State Expends 14,500 Dirhams Annually on Services for Each Person in the Country"]

[Text] The Ministry of Planning, on the occasion of the 9th national holiday, issued a report on economic and social development in the country during the period from 1972 to 1980. It stated that the UAE has achieved the stage of "abundant prosperity" at the emirates level. His Highness the president and the members of the UAE's supreme council have striven to adopt planning in the management of economic and social activities, and the country has reached outstanding economic prosperity on regional and world levels. The report stated that, despite organizational challenges which confronted the course of growth in the UAE, as a result of earnest efforts on various levels, it had been possible to achieve high growth rates within various sectors of the national economy, along with a gradual reduction of dependence upon crude oil resources.

The report stated that, in regard to production, the individual's share, during the UAE's 9 years, rose from 20.2 thousand dirhams in 1972 to 100.4 thousand dirhams this year. The percentage of increase amounted to 397 percent. Moreover, the individual's share of consumer expenditures increased from 5,400 to 27,800 dirhams, an annual growth rate of 22.7 percent. Furthermore, the government has striven to make services available equally to all citizens and newcomers. The individual's share of governmental expenditures for these services, education, health, social affairs, labor, housing, etc., rose from 2,000 to 14,500 dirhams this year, an increase of 383 percent.

The report added that the UAE enjoyed widespread investment activity through implementation of projects covering all economic and social fields. The fixed investment for 1972 was approximately 1,722 million dirhams. That has doubled 17 times during the UAE's existence, amounting this year to 29,779 million dirhams, with an increase of 28.56 million, i.e., a growth rate of 42.8 percent annually. This is the largest percentage in comparison to what both the developing and advanced nations achieved.

The UAE government and the governments of the emirates have assumed the role of leading development and the national economy. Governmental investments increased from 612 million to 17,858 million dirhams, an annual rate of 52.1 percent. The

state is assuming the largest burden of development and the achieving of public goals, including such things as raising the individual's standard of living and giving him all services, in addition to building an advanced economic base. In this regard, current governmental expenditures, during the nine UAE years, have doubled more than 15 times, as a result of the increase in population on the one hand, and the improvement in quality of services on the other.

The report noted that the extensive activity by the country during these years has created an increased demand for labor at various levels. The size of the labor force rose from 228,000 in 1975 to 538,000 this year, a growth rate of 13.6 percent annually. The increase in the work force size was concentrated in the sectors of construction, 71,000 workers, transportation and communications, 43,000, wholesale and retail trade, 39,000, industry, 22,000, and governmental services, 25,000 workers.

Wages rose from 53.5 million dirhams in 1975 to 15,976 million in 1980, i.e., a growth rate of 24.7 percent a year. Since the growth rate of the work force was only 13.6 percent annually, i.e., less than the growth rate for wages, this means an improvement and increase in the level of wages in recent years.

7005
CSO: 4302

OFFICIAL DISCUSSES DEVELOPMENT OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS

San'a' AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 23 Nov 80 p 3

[Interview With Muhammad al-'Arashi, YAR undersecretary of Communications and Transport; "YAR Exerting Efforts to Develop Telecommunications on Basis That They Are One Half of Development"]

[Text] Following is the text of the interview conducted by Radio London [Presumably BBC] with YAR [Yemen Arab Republic] undersecretary of communications and transport:

An agreement was signed recently in San'a' with the British Telegraph and Wireless Company. Muhammad al-'Arashi, the YAR undersecretary of communications and transport is in London currently and I have taken the opportunity of his visit to the BBC's Arabic Section to conduct the following interview with him:

[Question] Brother Muhammad, as a beginning for this interview, let me ask you about the reason for your current visit to Britain.

[Answer] Our visit to Britain is in response to an invitation from the Limited Telegraph and Wireless Company that has been working in the YAR for nearly 10 years.

An agreement was signed recently between the government and the Telegraph and Wireless Company renewing the company's contract for 10 more years.

This agreement is one of the agreements important to the Yemeni economy because the company has been entrusted with developing YAR's external communications.

[Question] What, in detail, are the services that will be offered in accordance with the recently concluded agreement?

[Answer] As I have already said, the detailed services that the company will offer the YAR are external communication services, be they telephone, telegraph or telex services.

[Question] Concerning internal communications in the YAR which is known for its large area, can you tell us about the internal telephone communications?

[Answer] The fact is that internal communications in the YAR have developed considerably and that telephone lines in the cities have increased from 1,000 to 9,000

lines. The government has invested more than 90 million pounds sterling to develop the internal communications and [steps] have been taken in this regard with a French telephone company to install an internal network with nearly 100,000 lines covering the various cities of the YAR.

[Question] Mr al-'Arashi, can you tell us about communications between San'a' and the other cities of the republic? Does this communication take place through direct [telephone] lines?

[Answer] So far, there are no direct telephone lines between the various cities. But in the near future, God willing, there will be direct lines between the cities through an open channel to be installed by the French company and to be completed around 1985.

[Question] Insofar as the Arab countries neighboring the YAR are concerned, are there direct telephone communications or different kinds of communication?

[Answer] At present, there is a direct telephone line between us and the southern part of the homeland. In the near future, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and YAR will establish direct communications between them.

[Question] Let us return to the agreement concluded in San'a' before your current visit to Britain, can you tell us about the costs of this agreement and the means of financing it?

[Answer] As I said at the outset of the interview, the main goal of the agreement is to develop YAR's external communications. The Telegraph and Wireless Company will invest nearly 120 million riyals to develop the external communications.

[Question] How will the equipment be supplied for this project?

[Answer] The company will develop the external communications and will finance this project on the basis of utilizing it in the interest of Yemen and of the citizens.

[Question] We now come to training and to the cadres that will carry out these ambitious projects.

[Answer] One of the most important provisions of the new agreement is the provision committing the company to carry out the operational functions in the first 5 years, meaning that in accordance with the agreement the company is committed to train all the cadres needed to operate the external communications within 5 years.

[Question] Concerning your current visit to Britain which has come in the wake of the conclusion of the agreement, you have visited certain installations that have something to do with your work and with the concluded agreement.

[Answer] The Telegraph and Wireless Company has given me the opportunity to visit the training areas [facilities] in the United Kingdom and in Bahrain. In fact, I have been impressed by the effective means of training that help to prepare capable engineers to work in the spheres of external communications.

[Question] Mr Muhammad al-'Arashi, do you intend to send civil servants or some Yemeni citizens to be trained in the centers that you have visited in Britain?

[Answer] The company has presented an effective program to the Yemeni government to provide training for the Yemeni cadres. Numerous Yemeni citizens will be sent to Britain and Bahrain and a training center will also be set up in the YAR.

[Question] What are the projects that your ministry, the YAR Ministry of Communications and Transport, is preparing for the coming years?

[Answer] The truth is that the YAR government, embodied in the young and ambitious political leadership, is working to develop telecommunications on the basis of the conviction that telecommunications constitute one half of development and an effective means for the country's prosperity.

To develop telecommunications, the YAR has invested nearly 60 million pounds sterling. There will be direct communication [telephone lines] between the cities, as I have already pointed out. Moreover, most of Yemen's centers will be linked with the capital through stations built for this purpose.

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